A Quantitative Investigation into the Business Case for Diversity in the Boardroom: a Multi-Theory Framework by Bwanya, Princess
Citation: Bwanya, Princess (2019) A Quantitative Investigation into the Business Case for 
Diversity  in  the  Boardroom:  a  Multi-Theory  Framework.  Doctoral  thesis,  Northumbria 
University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/39723/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third  parties  in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content  must not be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
i 
 
 
 
A QUANTITATIVE 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
BUSINESS CASE FOR DIVERSITY 
IN THE BOARDROOM: A MULTI-
THEORY FRAMEWORK 
 
P R BWANYA 
 
PhD 
 
2019 
 
 
Volume 1 of 2 
 
ii 
 
A QUANTITATIVE 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
BUSINESS CASE FOR DIVERSITY 
IN THE BOARDROOM: A MULTI-
THEORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
PRINCESS RUTENDO BWANYA 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the University of 
Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Research undertaken in Newcastle 
Business School 
 
JANUARY 2019 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The past two decades have witnessed unprecedented governance failures 
coupled with the 2007/8 financial crisis. This highlighted inherent problems that were 
created by ‘groupthink’, where directors made decisions as a group with no one to 
challenge them or to offer different perspectives. The board of directors of a company 
has a fiduciary duty to provide oversight and protect shareholders’ interests, however 
governance failures suggest that not every board is well equipped to perform this 
critically important duty. Drawing on the business case, this study examines whether 
board diversity enhances the decision-making process and positively impacts financial 
performance. The study integrates agency, resource dependence and upper echelons 
theories in order to overcome the current myopic single based theory perspective, 
providing a more complete understanding of the relationship between board diversity 
and financial performance. On a global level, most of the studies regarding this topic 
are also focused on gender composition of the board. However, what makes this study 
different is the theoretical framework developed which allows both structural and 
demographic issues of diversity to be explored simultaneously. These are measured in 
terms of gender, age, education, experience, networks and board practices.  
Drawing on a positivist ontology, data on board diversity is gathered from a 
sample of the FTSE 350 companies in the UK from 2004 to 2014. In order to address 
the endogenous nature of corporate governance, a two-stage least squares estimation 
with instrumental variables is applied, using Tobin’s Q, return on equity and return on 
assets as measures of financial performance. Results from the multivariate analyses 
reveal that gender diversity, experience diversity and multiple directorships are 
significantly and positively associated with financial performance. However, in 
contrast to existing theory, the results reveal that directors’ age, education, experience 
levels and board practices have no association with financial performance. This 
indicates that the effects of board diversity on firm performance are mixed.  
In addition, an industry analysis of the findings reveals that ‘one size does not 
fit all’ and, in particular, this analysis displays a much stronger business case for board 
diversity in the mining and quarrying industry than in other industries. Therefore, the 
study provides empirical support for the importance of contextual factors between 
board diversity and performance. The findings from this study confirm the need to 
utilise theoretical paradigms that combine multiple theories when assessing the link 
between board diversity and financial performance, thus justifying integration of 
agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theories. The study furthermore 
provides empirical support of a business case for gender diversity, experience diversity 
and multiple directorships on boards, as well as offering insights to policy makers in 
formulating recommendations related to desirable characteristics of boards. Board 
members, nomination committees and shareholders can also benefit from these 
findings in creating boards that are well suited to perform their duties and in advancing 
the diversity agenda. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction to Chapter  
 
“…a commitment to equal opportunities...is inevitably undermined if the board itself 
does not follow the same guiding principles…” (Higgs, 2003, p. 42) 
 
Corporate governance has seen its greatest developments and reform in the last 
two decades, however, those decades have also been characterised by unprecedented 
governance failures coupled with the 2007/8 financial crisis. These failures 
highlighted inherent problems that were created by ‘groupthink’, where directors 
made decisions as a group with no one to challenge them or to offer different 
perspectives (Ararat, Aksu, & Tansel, 2015). In spite of the progress in corporate 
governance reform, corporate boards in the UK, US and other countries remain 
dominated by older white males (Wang & Clift, 2009). Scholars suggest that this 
homogeneity of corporate boards raises important ethical, social, political and 
economic issues. This study examines the business case for diversity in the boardroom 
through adopting a multi-theory framework. Specifically, the study intends to present 
robust evidence on the relationship between board diversity and firm1 performance 
and add to the extant literature in advancing the diversity agenda. This chapter 
introduces the thesis overall and provides an overview of the background and 
importance of this study.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 provides the background of the 
study including an outline of the development of corporate governance in the UK. 
Section 1.3 discusses the rationale and motivations for conducting this thesis, whilst 
section 1.4 presents the research objectives and research questions for the thesis. 
Section 1.5 discusses the potential contribution to knowledge and practice of this 
                                                          
1 The term firm in this thesis refers to a company. 
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study, whilst Section 1.6 provides an overview of the structure of the entire thesis. 
Finally, Section 1.7 summarises this chapter.  
 
1.2 Background to Research 
Good corporate governance is comprised of different mechanisms and practices 
that aim to ensure the accountability of corporate directors and corporate management 
(Brammer, Millington & Pavelin, 2007). Similarly, Mallin (2016) notes that the aim 
of corporate governance codes and codes of best practice is to encourage better 
transparency and accountability in firms alongside increasing the confidence levels of 
investors in the firm. In this regard, the UK is considered as one of the leading 
countries in corporate governance development and reform (Goergen, 2012). The 
development of corporate governance internationally is said to have begun in the 
United States (US) in the mid-1970s when the Federal Securities and Exchange 
Commission officially introduced the term corporate governance in their register 
(Cheffins, 2013). In the United Kingdom (UK) however, the term corporate 
governance attracted little attention and was rarely used before the 1990s. For instance 
the newspaper The Economist, refrained from using the term until 1990 (Cheffins, 
2013). The biggest development and catalyst of corporate governance reform in the 
UK began in 1991 when the accountancy profession, the London Stock Exchange and 
the Financial Reporting Council founded the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance that produced the Cadbury Report. The 25th anniversary of the 
Cadbury code, which formed the basis of corporate governance in the UK and in other 
countries, has recently passed in 2017. In addition, the UK is regarded and widely 
recognised as one of the world leaders in corporate governance reform (Veldman & 
Willmott, 2016). Mallin (2011) notes that since the Cadbury code’s development, 
many amendments have been made to the codes of best of practice, most of which are 
aimed at enhancing the role of directors and restoring public confidence in firms and 
in the stock markets.  
 
Cheffins’ (2013) examination of the history of corporate governance notes that 
corporate governance issues were not largely discussed in the economics and finance 
literature until the 1980s with most of these studies focusing on the US market. 
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Seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) did however address 
agency theory and agency problems, which are the foundations of corporate 
governance literature. A study by Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse (2009) states that 
the focus of corporate governance problems has historically been on conflicts of 
interests or allocation of resources in firms. However, they emphasise a much wider 
focus on the creation of knowledge and coordination of agents, which implies that 
more attention should be paid to the analysis of directors’ skills and abilities (Van Ees 
et al., 2009). This is in line with the issue of board diversity, which Lopes, Ferraz and 
Martins (2016) argue is one of the most significant issues facing modern firms. Board 
diversity has also been the subject of discussion in some of the codes of best practice 
in the UK. For instance, the Higgs report (2003) looked at the role and effectiveness 
of non-executive directors and noted that the population of non-executive directors, at 
that time, was drawn from a narrow pool of people. In addition, a key statement made 
in the Higgs report regarding diversity was that “…the qualities necessary for an 
effective contribution to the board can also be acquired from a variety of backgrounds. 
The interplay of varied and complementary perspectives amongst different members 
of the board can significantly benefit board performance...” (Higgs, 2003, p.42). The 
main argument in favour of increased board diversity is that the effectiveness of the 
board should improve with a wider mix of skills, perspectives and backgrounds, and 
this turn should lead to increased firm performance (Post & Byron, 2015).  
 
Initially, research on team or group diversity largely focused on top management 
teams and senior management in the extant organisation and management literature 
(Dahya, Dimitrov & McConell, 2008). However, in the aftermath of unprecedented 
financial scandals, governance failures and the financial crisis, attention has shifted 
into the effectiveness of the functions and roles of the board of directors (Reguera-
Alvarado, de Fuentes & Laffarga, 2017). In this regard, board diversity has been 
considered as a vital mechanism for improving the effectiveness and decision-making 
processes of corporate boards (Kuhç & Kuzey, 2016). Grosvold, Brammer and Rayton 
(2007) suggest that board diversity has also grown to be of importance for several 
reasons. These include diversity screens that have been employed by some 
institutional investors in their commitment to diversity in the work place, concerns and 
aspirations by different stakeholders groups such as employees and customers, and the 
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inclusion of board diversity discussions as part of best practices in corporate 
governance (Grosvold et al., 2007). Board diversity as an area of research is also 
gaining importance due to the mandate of increasing the number of women on boards 
that many countries have adopted in recent years (Kagzi & Guha, 2018). For instance, 
in 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in India, mandated the presence of at least 
one female director on the corporate board of listed companies (Chapple & Humphrey, 
2014). In Europe, from the year 2006, large firms in Norway were required to have at 
least 40% of their boards comprised of female directors and, in 2012, the large firms 
in Norway had an average of 42% female directors on their boards (Marinova, 
Plantenga, & Remery, 2016). Although the majority of government considerations and 
prior research has placed greater focus on gender diversity, board diversity 
encompasses a wide variety of attributes. Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) broadly 
define board diversity as the different attributes that may be represented by directors 
on the board including age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, community 
representation, knowledge, educational background, professional background, 
independence, expertise, prior commercial, industry, career, life experience and 
technical skills.  
 
1.3 Rationale for Research  
The case for diversity in the boardroom is mainly centred on two arguments, 
which are the ethical case versus the business or the economic case (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Hagendorff & Keasey, 2012; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). An 
earlier report by Brancato and Patterson (1999) noted that a former executive vice 
president of the Bank of America highlighted that there is much debate between those 
who propose firms should be diverse because it is the right thing to do and others who 
propose that diversity enhances shareholder value. Further to this, the CEO of a real 
estate firm and a director of an industrial firm was quoted in an interview by Dvorak 
(2008, p.4) stating, “…When I’m sitting in that boardroom, my fiduciary responsibility 
is to the shareholders of that company – not social engineering. I can talk about 
diversity. But there ought to be a business case…”. The business case for diversity 
suggests that directors with different perspectives, backgrounds and skills have unique 
attributes that are beneficial to firms in enhancing firm value and improving firm 
performance (Hagendorff & Keasey, 2012).  Carter et al. (2010) argued that it is 
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important to have a good understanding of the relationship between board diversity 
and firm performance as this can have various significant implications for the 
corporate governance practices of firms and for public policies. On one hand, if board 
diversity does not influence or impact board processes and firm performance, then the 
agenda for increasing diversity in the boardroom rests on the ethical argument and is 
a matter of public policy. On the other hand, if board diversity positively impacts board 
processes and firm performance, then the business case for diversity can be strongly 
considered in advancing the diversity agenda (Carter et al., 2010). Interestingly, from 
a public policy perspective, the European Commission proposed that by 2020, 40% of 
non-executive board positions should be occupied by female directors (European 
Commission, 2012a). However this proposal was not motivated by equity 
considerations or the ethical arguments, rather, it openly refers to the business case for 
gender diversity, and suggests that gender diversity improves firm performance 
(Marinova et al., 2016). Therefore, both the academic literature and public policy 
recognise the importance of examining the link between board diversity and firm 
performance in order to provide empirical evidence as to whether there is a business 
case for diversity in the boardroom.  
 
The ethical case for board diversity emphasises the inequality associated with 
excluding groups of individuals on the board on the basis of gender, race, age or other 
related characteristics (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). In addition, the ethical case 
seeks to empower members of society whom have historically been excluded from 
positions of power such as on the corporate boards of firms (Hagendorff & Keasey, 
2012). In this regard, board diversity is associated with equality of representation and, 
the notion of the ideal of ‘fair’ outcomes in society (Brammer et al., 2007). The 
business case for board diversity, on the other hand, proposes that diversity enhances 
the abilities of directors to perform their board functions, especially when engaging in 
complex problem solving, strategic decision making and monitoring managers (Wang 
& Clift, 2009). Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) suggest three main reasons to 
explain why board diversity can improve firm performance, allowing a business case 
to be drawn upon. First, they suggest diversity can promote a greater understanding of 
the market because the market itself has become diverse. Therefore, board diversity 
can increase a firm’s ability to penetrate the market by matching its board to the 
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stakeholders in the market. Second, the different attributes and cognitive function of a 
diverse board can increase innovation and creativity. Lastly, a variety of perspectives 
from diverse directors can enhance the decision-making process of the firm by a better 
understanding of the business environment and through considering different 
alternatives in the process (Carter et al., 2003). An article on moving the board 
diversity field forward by Adams et al. (2015) states that regardless of the effects of 
board diversity, it is the subject of discussion in public policies globally, which makes 
it crucial for academic research to provide empirical evidence on the role board 
diversity plays. 
 
Although there are various reasons to suggest that diversity is a key mechanism 
of good corporate governance practice and of board effectiveness, the majority of 
corporate boards remain largely homogenous in their composition (Catalyst, 2015; 
Dhir, 2015). At the same time, the academic literature investigating the relationship 
between board diversity and financial performance is still quite limited according to 
Marinova et al. (2016). Research examining diversity in the boardroom has 
predominantly focused on gender diversity with fewer scholars examining other 
aspects of diversity such as age, educational background and experience (Ben-Amar 
et al., 2013; Kagzi & Guha, 2018). Further to this, the studies that examine the impact 
of gender diversity in the boardroom within the European context have produced less 
positive results, which has raised questions on the driving mechanism behind this 
relationship (Smith, Smith & Verner, 2006; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). 
Consequently, Marinova et al. (2016) proposed that more research should be 
conducted within Europe on the link between board gender diversity and firm 
performance with an application of more sophisticated methodologies. This is in order 
to provide empirical evidence on the business case argument within the European 
context and to add to the European policy debate (Marinova et al., 2016). Similarly, 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman (2012, p.385) called for further research to be 
conducted on what they call “…the continuing debate of the desirable features of a 
successful board…”. Therefore, this thesis draws on the business case for diversity 
and examines whether various aspects of board diversity enhance the decision-making 
processes of boards and, positively impact financial performance 
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1.4 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance in listed companies within the UK context. Board 
diversity is now considered as an integral part of good corporate governance according 
to Kuhç and Kuzey (2016). Therefore, the UK provides a fertile setting in which to 
investigate this relationship as it has been at the forefront of the development and 
reform of some of the most influential corporate governance practices worldwide. This 
thesis intends to present robust evidence and explore the potential determinants of 
board diversity from UK corporate firms. Although, the focus of this study is on the 
business case for board diversity, the results may also provide some insights on the 
ethical case for board diversity. The study’s sample consists of 198 companies that 
were consistently listed on the FTSE 350 between the years 2004-2014. Therefore this 
study’s main research objective is:  
 
 To examine the impact of board diversity on the financial performance of 
FTSE 350 companies in the UK.  
 
The research objective mentioned above will be achieved by answering the following 
three research questions: 
 
 Research question 1: Which theoretical framework is the best modelling 
tool of board diversity and financial performance? 
 
 Research question 2: Is there a relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance? 
 
 Research question 3: Does the relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance differ amongst industries? 
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The first research question seeks to identify a theoretical framework that 
addresses the different functions and roles played by the board of directors. In addition, 
the study aims to utilise and develop a theoretical framework that allows both 
structural and demographic issues of diversity to be explored simultaneously. These 
will be measured in terms of directors’ gender, age, education, experience, networks 
and board practices, these variables relate to the second research question. Research 
question 3 attempts to explore any differences amongst industry sectors in line with 
the notion ‘one size does not fit all’ (Mikes & Kaplan, 2015). 
 
1.5 Contribution of Study  
This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge and practice in the following ways:  
First, this thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge by adopting a multi-theory 
framework to assess board diversity and financial performance. The extant literature 
notes that directors play multiple roles on boards which include a resource provision 
role, monitoring and control role, oversight role, advisory and strategic roles (Nahar-
Abdullah, 2004; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). However, there is no single 
theory in corporate governance that addresses each of these functions in examining 
the link between board diversity and firm performance (Ali, Ng & Kulik, 2014). 
Therefore, Kagzi and Guha (2018) suggest that it is more beneficial to utilise a multi-
theory framework that encompasses different dimensions of diversity and addresses 
the different roles and functions of the board of directors. This study integrates agency, 
resource dependence and upper echelons theories in order to provide a more holistic 
theoretical lens in assessing board diversity. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
this is the first study to integrate these three theories.  
 
Second, this thesis aims to contribute to knowledge by examining both 
demographic and structural issues of board diversity simultaneously. In regards to 
structural diversity, the majority of prior corporate governance studies have largely 
focused on assessing CEO duality and board independence as proxies of structural 
diversity (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Ben-Amar et al. (2013) articulated that structural 
diversity refers to the recommendations and guidelines set out in governance codes 
and codes of best practice. Therefore, rather than focusing solely on board 
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independence and CEO duality, this study examines other aspects of board practices 
that are considered best practice by the UK governance codes. This will be done by 
constructing a board index based on the codes of best practice, which will be tailored 
to UK firms and allows the study to focus on a much wider scope of structural 
diversity. With regards to demographic diversity, Nicholson and Kiel (2007) observed 
that an important question remained unanswered in corporate governance research, 
which was whether differences in human capital, such as skills and expertise, of boards 
are related to corporate performance. The majority of prior studies that have examined 
the demographic diversity of boards have largely focused on either gender or ethnic 
diversity (Carter et al., 2010; Low, Roberts & Whiting, 2015). Therefore, this study 
seeks to contribute to the extant literature by examining other aspects of board 
diversity that have not been commonly included in prior studies, such as age diversity, 
educational background and directors’ prior experience.  
 
Third, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by 
implementing econometric approaches that have not been extensively used in prior 
corporate governance literature. Marinova et al. (2016) point out that the majority of 
previous corporate governance studies suffer from the problem of endogeneity and 
therefore when examining board diversity and firm performance a methodology that 
addresses such an econometric issue is crucial. This study employs a two stage least 
squares estimation with instrumental variables that addresses the problem of 
endogeneity in the analysis and provides results that are more robust. In addition, for 
robustness purposes, this study also employs generalised least squares estimation that 
address the issues of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the data analysis. The 
statistical models also test a lagged relationship between the diversity measures and 
financial performance, as the impact of diversity is not likely to be immediate, and 
Carter et al. (2010) observe that this is rare in prior research.  
 
Lastly, this study seeks to contribute to knowledge by conducting an industry 
analysis in line with the notion that ‘one size does not fit all’ (Mikes & Kaplan, 2015). 
This is consistent with contingency theory that suggests a more complex association 
between board and firm performance in that certain diversity measures may be more 
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desirable in some firms and not in other under various circumstances (Fielder, 1967). 
In a similar vein, the Barclays (2010) annual report states that it is important for 
corporate governance frameworks to recognise that one size does not always fit all and 
to allow firms to operate in ways that suit the needs and challenges they face. Ooi, 
Hooy and Som (2015) state previous studies on board diversity have not taken into 
account industry-specific factors, which may influence firm outcomes. This study 
aims to contribute to this body of knowledge by examining the link between board 
diversity and financial performance within industries. The study’s sample is broken 
down by industry according to standard industrial classification (SIC) codes, which 
classify companies in industry sectors according to the economic activities in which 
companies are engaged. 
 
In addition to the overall contribution to the discussion of board diversity and 
firm performance, the findings of this thesis can offer insights to policy makers in 
formulating recommendations and codes of best practice that are related to desirable 
characteristics of boards. Board members, nomination committees and shareholders 
could also benefit from these findings in strategically creating boards that are well 
suited to perform their duties and, in advancing the diversity agenda. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline  
This thesis is comprised of a total of seven chapters and this section outlines the 
structure and content of each of these chapters to offer a better understanding of their 
relevance within this study.  
 
Chapter 1 has introduced the thesis and provided an overview of the 
development of corporate governance in the UK. In addition, the chapter discussed the 
rationale of this study drawing upon the need to examine the business case for diversity 
in the boardroom and presented the study’s research objective and research questions. 
Lastly, the chapter provided insights of how the thesis aims to contribute to knowledge 
and practice.  
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Chapter 2 explores the academic literature in the field of corporate 
governance practices and board diversity. Specifically, it provides a detailed 
discussion of the history and development of corporate governance in the UK 
alongside the various definitions of corporate governance from both academic 
research and practice. This chapter also, focuses on addressing research question 1 
through a review of the theoretical perspectives that are commonly used in prior 
literature when examining board composition and firm performance. In addition, the 
chapter discusses structural diversity, demographic diversity and firm performance 
and then provides an overview of prior empirical literature in the field of study. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the gaps identified in the literature that this thesis aims 
to address and it presents the basic conceptual framework that underpins this thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 follows on from Chapter 2 and discusses the study’s theoretical 
framework in more detail and in so doing, the chapter addresses research questions 1 
2 and 3. The chapter begins by critically discussing upper echelons, resource 
dependence and agency theories and further provides a synthesis of these three 
theories in framing this study’s theoretical framework. In addition, this chapter 
identifies and discusses the individual board characteristics that will be examined as 
measures of diversity and it develops the hypotheses that will be tested in order to 
address research questions 2 and 3. 
 
Chapter 4 begins by confirming the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological choices upon which this thesis is based. It includes details on how the 
sample is screened and how the independent, dependent and control variables are 
measured in this study, including the construction of the board index created for this 
thesis. The chapter also presents and discusses the regression diagnostic tests in order 
to identify the most appropriate multivariate technique that addresses the relevant 
econometric issues in the data. Lastly, this chapter presents the empirical design of the 
regression models to be used in the analysis and the instrumental variables utilised in 
this research. This chapter is important because it addresses all three research 
questions and it explains how the research has been carried out, how the data has been 
collected and the choice of the methodological approach taken.  
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Chapter 5 presents and discusses the multivariate analysis related to research 
questions 1 and 2. The chapter begins by presenting the descriptive statistics for all 
the dependent, independent and control variables for this study. The chapter then 
presents and evaluates four regression models comprised of different variables in order 
to find the model that best explains any variation in the dependent variable and in so 
doing, these results examine the applicability of the study’s theoretical framework 
using the data set. This chapter also presents the multivariate analysis that relates to 
research question 2 and the study’s hypotheses. Each of the diversity measures are 
individually discussed alongside the results and the chapter discusses how the results 
of each of these measures contribute to the extant literature.  
 
Chapter 6 is the second of the analysis chapters and it specifically addresses 
research question 3. The chapter begins by presenting a summary of the industry 
findings by displaying the association with financial performance found for each 
independent variable in each industry. The chapter then discusses each of the 
independent variables separately in relation to the industry findings and discusses the 
contribution to knowledge on that basis. In addition, the last sections of the chapter 
offer insights into some of the most interesting industry findings and why it is 
important to consider contextual factors when examining board diversity and firm 
performance. Further to this, the chapter discusses how this thesis has expanded 
knowledge in the field of board diversity within industry settings.  
 
Chapter 7 is the final chapter and provides the conclusion to the thesis. The 
chapter begins by reviewing the study’s research objective and the rationale for 
conducting this thesis. It then provides an overview of the key literature, key findings 
and contribution to knowledge of the each of the thesis’ research questions. Lastly, the 
author discusses the limitations of the thesis and explores the directions for future 
research which arise from the study’s findings. 
 
13 | P a g e  
 
1.7 Summary of Chapter  
This chapter has introduced a brief background of the development of corporate 
governance in the UK and how the body of literature on board diversity emerged in 
response to numerous corporate scandals and the financial crisis. The chapter also 
presented the rationale for the study, which focuses on drawing upon a business case 
for diversity in the boardroom and this helped in formulating the research objective 
and research questions for this thesis. Lastly, the chapter has provided an outline of 
the structure of the thesis and an overview of the contents of each chapter in the thesis. 
The next chapter will discuss and review the applicable literature and theories that 
relate to corporate governance and board diversity. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter discusses and evaluates academic literature linked to the research 
questions and objective presented in Chapter 1. The chapter aims to discuss the 
development of corporate governance in the UK and, the duties and roles played by 
directors in the UK context. In addition, the chapter provides an overview of prior 
empirical findings and identifies a gap in the literature that this thesis will attempt to 
address. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 defines corporate governance 
from both academic research and firms perspectives. Section 2.3 discusses the 
development of the corporate governance system in the UK, whilst Section 2.4 
discusses the roles and duties of boards of directors. Section 2.5 provides an overview 
of board heterogeneity versus homogeneity, whereas section 2.6 provides an overview 
of prior empirical studies on board diversity and firm performance and Section 2.7 
discusses the gaps identified in the literature review. Lastly, Section 2.8 provides a 
summary of the chapter.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Definitions 
There is not one agreed definition of corporate governance amongst scholars. 
An early definition provided by Tricker (1984) states that if management is about the 
running of a firm, then corporate governance deals with making sure the firm is run 
properly. This approach is predominantly from an agency theory perspective which 
presumes the separation of ownership from control in firms results in a conflict of 
interests between the principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). An alternative 
view of corporate governance emphasises a broader level of accountability to 
stakeholders through striking a balance between social, economic, communal and 
individual goals (Tricker, 2012). In line with this, a wider definition of corporate 
governance is provided by the OECD (1999, p.9) which states that corporate 
governance involves “…a set of relationships between a company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.”. Further to 
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this, Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) define corporate governance in the corporate 
sector as the evaluation of expenditure heads to which an organisation’s resources are 
allocated and the resolution of conflicts amongst various members of the firm. 
 
The history of corporate governance is said to date back to the 1970s after global 
markets became integrated (Malik & Makhdoom, 2016).  However, the biggest 
catalyst of reform and development in corporate governance was in the 1990s and 
2000s after numerous high profile scandals and failures of large firms such as Polly 
Peck and Coloroll (Cheffins, 2013). As a result, in the UK, the committee on the 
financial aspects of corporate governance set the first UK Corporate Governance Code 
in 1992 and this committee simply defined corporate governance as the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Committee, 1992). This 
definition suggests that corporate governance is a collective system that creates a link 
between the board of directors (directing) and the shareholders who are the owners of 
the company (controlling) (Malik & Makhdoom, 2016). Some scholars suggest that a 
characteristic of good corporate governance practice is when a firm provides essential 
information to its shareholders and stakeholders in an attempt to minimise information 
asymmetry (Agyemang & Castellini, 2015). However, other scholars argue that good 
corporate governance practices enable firms to attract investment and brand 
themselves as a credible firm (Agyei-Mensah, 2016).  
 
The definitions of corporate governance discussed above are based on the 
literature and academic research. However, some firms have begun to provide their 
own definitions and outline of what corporate governance and good governance is. 
For instance, in BP’s annual report, they define it as follows “…Governance is not an 
exercise in compliance nor is it a higher form of management. Governance lies at the 
heart of all the board does and it is the task our owners entrust to the board. It has a 
clear objective – ensuring the pursuit of the company’s purpose…” (BP, 2004, p.110).  
The annual report further notes that governance requires distinct policies and 
processes in which the board of directors has the responsibility to oversee and ensure 
good governance. In addition, Marks and Spencer’s (2010) annual report, states that 
corporate governance encompasses the board of directors demonstrating 
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independence, bringing fresh perspectives, questioning management, making strategic 
decisions and ensuring accountability to shareholders and stakeholders. Notably, the 
definition provided by BP is more in line with the agency theory perspective, whereas 
the definition Marks and Spencer takes is more consistent with the stakeholder 
perspective. This is in line with prior studies that argue good corporate governance 
practice should be developed internally through voluntary practices that are contingent 
on the context of the firm as the ‘one size fits all’ framework may not ensure best 
practices for all firms (Black, De Carvalho & Gorga, 2012). Taken together, the 
definitions of corporate governance from both academic research and organisations 
emphasise an important duty of the board of directors in governing the firm and 
remaining accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders.  
 
2.3 Development of the UK Corporate Governance System  
The development of corporate governance in the UK commenced in the 1990s 
after public concern over unexpected financial scandals, corporate failures and rising 
levels of directors’ pay (Dewing & Russell, 2004). These corporate scandals had a 
significant impact on investors’ confidence in the accountability, disclosures and 
transparency of directors (Malik & Makhdoom, 2016). In response to this, various 
reports, codes and legislation were issued in an attempt to enhance good corporate 
governance practice and to encourage accountability and transparency in corporate 
firms. The first committee that was set up to address these concerns was the committee 
on the financial aspects of corporate governance in 1991 that published the Cadbury 
Report in 1992 (Dewing & Russell, 2004). Mallin (2011) points out that the Cadbury 
report is commonly recognised as having set the foundation for a best practice system 
in the UK and in other countries that later adopted this practice. The main 
recommendations of the Cadbury report were that firms should have at least three 
independent non-executive directors (NEDs) on their boards, the roles of Chairman 
and CEO should be separate and that firms should set up audit, remuneration and 
nomination sub-committees of the board (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Academic 
scholars state that a major limitation of this report was its sole focus on the financial 
aspects of corporate governance, which meant other important aspects such as 
executive remuneration, internal control and risk management were not fully 
addressed (Dewing & Russell, 2004; Ntim, Opong & Danbolt, 2012). Following on 
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from this initial report, there have been several reports that have elaborated on 
different aspects of the Cadbury report and some reports and codes have been in 
response to the 2007/8 global financial crisis (Mallin, 2011). Some of these reports 
and codes elaborate on different board practices and aspects of structural diversity that 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. The most notable and applicable 
ones to this study are discussed next.  
 
Following public concerns over directors’ remuneration and rising pay 
packages, the Greenbury committee was established to strengthen the accountability 
of the board and to enhance directors’ performance (Jones & Pollitt, 2004). The main 
recommendations of the Greenbury Report were about the disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration packages and the presence of independent directors on the remuneration 
committee (Greenbury Report, 1995). Although the Greenbury Report introduced 
some governance issues that had not been included in the Cadbury Report, some 
scholars criticised it for not restricting executive directors from excessive pay (Conyon 
& Sadler, 2010). In 1998, the first UK Combined Code was developed which drew 
together recommendations from the previous reports. The combined code operated on 
the comply or explain approach which requires companies to state in their annual 
reports whether they have adhered to the code’s recommendations and explain the 
reasons for any non-compliance (Bozec & Bozec, 2012). This code further 
recommended that directors should carry out reviews on the effectiveness of the 
system of internal controls and risk management (Combined Code, 1998). In the early 
2000s, further company failures and scandals occurred including the infamous Enron 
scandal and this again had an impact on investor confidence in the market and raised 
concerns over the effectiveness of corporate governance practices (Conyon & Sadler, 
2010). In response, the Higgs review (2003) reviewed the role and effectiveness of 
NEDs and recommended the disclosure of the number of board meetings held, 
disclosure of board committee meetings, attendance records of individual directors 
and a separation of the role of CEO and Chairman in the company (Higgs, 2003). 
Based on the recommendations of the Smith and Higgs Reports, the Combined Code 
(1998) was revised and published as the Combined Code (2003). The requirements of 
this code are listed in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Requirements of the Combined Code (2003) 
Summary of the Combined Code (2003) Requirements 
 
 Splitting the roles of CEO and Chairman  
 
 Appointment of Independent Chairs 
 
 The majority of the board to comprise independent Non-Executive 
directors  
 
 Audit committees to be established and act as links with external auditors  
 
 Remuneration committee to be established and set executive directors’ 
remuneration 
 
 Nomination committee to be set up and to establish a formal and 
transparent nomination process for new directors  
 
 Board committees to have independent non-executive directors on them 
 
 The board should have a formal rigorous annual evaluation of its 
performance, the various board committees and of the individual directors 
 
 
Source: Combined Code (2003) 
 
Over the years, the corporate governance environment in the UK and globally 
developed further, and the Financial Reporting council has revised the Combined 
Code every two years, from 2006 to 2018, with all the codes based on the comply and 
explain principle. The most recent corporate governance code used for this study was 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). The 
main differences or revisions included in this code are: companies are now required in 
their annual reports to have a section that discloses the board’s policy towards diversity 
and the implementation of the policy, listed companies are required to submit for an 
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external tender every 10 years at the least and, more dialogue is encouraged between 
shareholders and the board of directors (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). The UK 
corporate governance system is currently characterised by an outsider system of 
corporate governance based on the Anglo-Saxon model and includes a separation of 
ownership from control, hostile takeovers and strong investor protection (Garanina & 
Kaikova, 2016). Firms listed on the FTSE 350 are required to adhere to the Corporate 
Governance Code principles set by the Financial Reporting Council as part of the 
listing rules. Additionally, the Companies Act (2006) sets the fiduciary duties of 
directors and in particular, Section 172 of the act specifies that directors must act in 
the best interests of the company’s stakeholders and not just solely on the 
shareholders’ interests (Mallin, 2011).  
 
2.4 Board of Directors: Duties and Roles  
The board of directors is a collective group of individuals who are nominated by 
a firm’s shareholders and are responsible for making decisions on their behalf (Van 
den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). This makes the board of directors a key mechanism in 
improving corporate governance within organisations. This is primarily because the 
board has the power to govern the organisation, to ensure good governance and 
alongside this, act on behalf of shareholders and other stakeholders (Azlan Annuar, 
2014). Investors expect directors to have a certain standard of care and Tricker (2012) 
notes that the two main duties of directors are a duty of care and a duty of trust or 
fiduciary duty. The duty of care requires directors to exercise independent judgement 
with reasonable skills, diligence and care. The duty of trust requires directors to act in 
the best interests of the company, to avoid conflict between their duties and personal 
interests and, to behave with integrity and honesty (Tricker, 2012). Black, Cheffins, & 
Klausner (2006) articulate that these fiduciary duties require directors to act in good 
faith and to avoid all actions in which directors personally profit at the firm’s expense. 
 
 
In regards to the roles of directors, there are diverse perspectives in academic 
literature on the role of the board (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). Generally, the 
board of directors has the responsibility of leading and directing the firm and 
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protecting the interests of shareholders (Nahar-Abdullah, 2004). In particular, the 
board of directors has several functions, which include evaluating the firm’s strategies, 
monitoring and controlling managers, linking the firm to the external business 
environment and the appointment and remuneration of senior executives (Nahar-
Abdullah, 2004; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Kuhç & Kuzey, 2016; Yasser, 
Entebang & Mansor, 2015). Prior empirical literature has examined the role of boards 
in two broad functions. The first one regards advising management and requires 
directors to have expertise and firm specific knowledge (Armstrong et al., 2016). The 
second is to monitor senior management, which requires a certain degree of 
independence from management (Armstrong et al., 2016). Research has shown that 
the presence of NEDs on boards provides an independent element that benefits the 
board in performing its role. In addition, corporate governance researchers show that 
NEDs play multiple roles on the board besides monitoring management (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins, 2009; Pye & Camm, 2003). Therefore, apart from being a 
monitoring mechanism, NEDs are important for improving the general leadership of 
an organisation through enhancing the quality of a company’s strategy with different 
innovative ideas from an unbiased viewpoint. In line with this, Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2010, p.65) observe that the independence of NEDs on the board of directors, 
“…implies the ability of non-executive directors to see things differently...”. 
 
Fama (1980) states that one of the most important roles played by the board of 
directors is that of oversight and control of management on behalf of shareholders. 
Boards are required to establish adequate procedures for preventing mismanagement 
and installing a system that discourages fraudulent scandals and corruption (Van den 
Berghe & Levrau, 2004). The UK approach to the monitoring role of boards is more 
centred on the NEDs having an ex-ante rather than an ex-post monitoring role2. Ex-
ante monitoring refers to influencing and controlling projects, strategies and 
implementation plans that are consistent with the shareholders’ objectives (Zalewska, 
2014). However, in order for ex-ante monitoring to be effective Zalewska (2014) notes 
that there has to be a strong board with an adequate level of expertise. Further to this, 
Solomon (2010) states that for NEDs to effectively play a monitoring role, they need 
                                                          
2 Ex-post monitoring refers to examining the quality of the results once the project is completed or 
under way and this role is undertaken by auditors (Zalewska, 2014). 
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to be independent. Other researchers have shown that the presence of NEDs on boards 
provides an independent element that benefits the board in performing all of its roles 
(Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Carter & Lorsch, 2013). Armstrong et al. (2016) argue 
firms that operate in more volatile business environments are more costly to monitor 
due to greater information asymmetries between managers and directors. Therefore, 
in order for directors to effectively monitor managers, better transparency is needed to 
reduce such information asymmetries (Clemente & Labat, 2009). 
 
Another key responsibility and role of the board is to take strategic decisions 
that include, but are not limited to, mergers, acquisitions, executive appointments and 
the firm’s financial structure (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010).  Directors should 
have insights on the firm’s strategy and advise management in strategy formulation, 
identification and implementation (De Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Van den Berghe 
and Levrau (2004) further state that this implies directors should be able to see the 
present and keep an eye on the future (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). The strategic 
role also requires, to some extent, entrepreneurial skills and the ability to take risks 
that are beneficial to the firm and in line with its strategy (Armstrong et al., 2016). 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) state that directors also play a resource provision role to 
the firm through their external professional networks. For instance, directors with 
other external executive positions in financial firms can assist in securing favourable 
lines of credit and such resources enhance the functioning of the organisation (Daily 
et al., 2003).  
 
Admiral’s 2004 annual report summarises the role of the board as follows:  
“…the prime job of the Chairman is to run the Board, not the organisation: that is the 
job of the Chief Executive. It is for the Board, led by the Chairman, to ensure that the 
Company has strategies, quality of management, and all the resources – financial, 
human, technology – to create wealth on a consistent basis. At the same time, the 
Chairman has to ensure that the business is run with value and integrity, not only 
meeting governance codes but also the expectations of customers, employees, 
suppliers and wider stakeholders…” (Admiral, 2004, p.3). This report summarises 
and reinforces the strategic, resource provision and monitoring roles of the board of 
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directors. Thus, Admiral’s annual report and the academic literature both highlight 
that directors have fiduciary duties of care and trust and they play multiple roles on 
boards which include monitoring, advisory, resource provision and strategic roles 
(Black et al., 2006; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). However, Abidin, Kamal and 
Jusoff (2009) note that the blame for the majority of past corporate failures and 
scandals has been placed on the board of directors. The reasons stated in the literature 
for these failures include poor monitoring by the board, management pursuing their 
own interests and a lack of accountability by the board to stakeholders (Kuhç & Kuzey, 
2016). Therefore, it is important to ensure that boards of directors perform their roles 
and duties effectively as their ability to do so can either enhance or destroy firm value 
(Nahar-Abdullah, 2004).  
 
2.5 Heterogeneity versus Homogeneity on Boards 
Social scientists have attempted to explore the different effects of the 
characteristics and heterogeneity of group members in the decision-making process 
and, historically, this research has predominantly focused on top team management 
rather than boards of directors (Dallas, 2001). Governments, shareholders and various 
stakeholder groups advocate for greater heterogeneity amongst directors on corporate 
boards. Scholars who support greater board heterogeneity argue that firms can benefit 
from directors who bring diverse social and occupational perspectives to the board 
(Anderson et al., 2011). It is important to note that the terms board diversity and board 
heterogeneity are used interchangeably in the literature (Adams et al., 2015).3 The 
extant literature has debated the different potential effects of board 
diversity/heterogeneity and these arguments are discussed further in the next sections.  
 
2.5.1 Board Heterogeneity  
Kreitz (2008) broadly defines diversity or heterogeneity as any significant 
differences that differentiate individuals from each other.  Proponents of board 
heterogeneity argue that directors with different opinions and backgrounds are able to 
make better quality decisions due to an ability to stimulate the group and consider 
                                                          
3 Although this section refers to board heterogeneity, the rest of the thesis uses the term board 
diversity. 
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alternative perspectives (Perryman, Fernando & Tripathy, 2016). A diverse board 
therefore reduces the probability of complacency and narrow mindedness when 
evaluating decisions and formulating firm strategies by producing a wider array of 
solutions and criteria for evaluating strategies (Dallas, 2001). In line with this, scholars 
suggest that an effective board of directors is comprised of individuals who provide a 
wide range of skills, experience and diversity to the firm, as their competing views 
and perspectives can result in more innovative ideas and in more creative problem 
solving (Adams et al., 2015). In addition, Petrovic (2008) notes that this broader base 
of information, knowledge and skills from diverse boards alleviates the problems 
encountered with ‘groupthink’ and allows for more innovative ideas and contributions, 
which in turn should improve firm performance. Other scholars have examined the 
idea of board heterogeneity from an agency theory perspective and concluded that 
board diversity increases the independence of the board; therefore, diverse boards will 
be more effective in monitoring and controlling management (Marinova et al., 2016). 
From a resource dependence theory viewpoint, board diversity may generate a better 
public image of the firm and gain access to a wider range of resources through the 
different external ties and social ties of diverse directors (Smith et al., 2006). A study 
by Anderson et al. (2011) found empirical evidence to support the notion that 
shareholders view board heterogeneity as a means of protecting and benefiting their 
interests and that board heterogeneity in complex firms significantly improves firm 
performance.  
 
A different stream of literature contends that greater diversity can involve 
greater costs as the coordination of a diverse group of individuals can be more difficult 
due to conflicts of opinions arising (Smith et al., 2006). A diverse board of directors 
may slow down the decision-making process and constrain strategic changes as the 
different and varied perspectives may make it more difficult for the board to reach a 
consensus (Marinova et al., 2016). This in turn leads to a less effective decision-
making board and obstructs the competitiveness of a firm, especially in uncertain and 
rapidly changing business environments, such as the tourism and information 
technology industries, where quicker decision-making is vital (Carter et al., 2003). 
Other opponents of board diversity argue that ethnic minority and female directors, 
for instance, may be appointed as a sign of tokenism, therefore their contributions to 
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the board may be marginalised (Gul, Srinidhi & Ng, 2011; Hillman, Shropshire & 
Canella, 2007). Therefore, greater board diversity may increase the potential for 
conflicts and divisions to arise on the board, which can affect the board’s cohesiveness 
and decrease firm performance (Francoeur et al., 2008; Ntim, 2015).  
 
2.5.2 Board Homogeneity  
The main arguments for homogenous or non-diverse boards are centred on the 
disadvantages of highly diverse boards of directors. Social psychology has drawn on 
the notion of ‘faultlines’ to explain potential negative effects of diversity (Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998). Adams et al. (2015) define faultlines as any assumed dividing lines 
that separate a group into homogenous subgroups based on members’ alignment with 
attributes such as gender, age or race. Faultlines may increase the potential for 
conflicts amongst the board and reduce board effectiveness, therefore homogenous 
boards would be more advantageous in promoting cohesiveness (Li & Hambrick, 
2005).  This line of thinking is consistent with the social identity theory that proposes 
the group to which an individual belongs boosts their self-esteem and their identity, to 
the extent that individuals within a similar group (i.e. gender, social class, age group) 
will gravitate towards each other and discriminate against other members who are not 
part of them (Brown, 2000). Demographic diversity attributes are likely to be 
associated with this in group/out group categorising that hinder group cohesiveness 
and can obstruct the dynamics of the board in the decision-making process (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005). Similarly, Forbes and Milliken (1999) note that heterogeneous 
boards are associated with cognitive conflict and can result in board members avoiding 
each other.  This is consistent with Westphal and Bednar’s (2005) study that conducted 
a survey on the NEDs of US companies and found that NEDs with diverse functional 
backgrounds, educational backgrounds and gender had lower cohesion and failed to 
effectively communicate to each other their concerns on the firm’s strategy. This 
resulted in the board failing to implement strategic change in response to low firm 
performance (Westphal & Bednar, 2005). These arguments taken together suggest that 
a homogenous board would be more beneficial in initiating strategic change and 
implementing quicker decision-making on the board.  
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Petrovic (2008) points out that highly homogenous boards of directors are 
subject to ‘groupthink’ where cohesive groups subconsciously repress any points of 
view or any information that is not consistent with the preferred views. This results in 
poor quality decisions and poorer effectiveness of the group. Consistent with this, 
Rizzi (2008) states that the ‘groupthink’ effect contributed to the poorer risk 
management decisions of firms that led to the 2007/8 global financial crisis. Petrovic 
suggests that in order to avoid the groupthink effect, moderate amounts of cognitive 
conflict can improve board effectiveness through a more critical consideration of 
important strategic issues. In addition, Veltrop et al. (2015) argue that not all 
demographic faultlines within a board will impact the way the board functions. 
Overall, the extant literature suggests that higher board heterogeneity can negatively 
impact the cohesiveness of the board and positively impact the cognitive conflict on 
the board. However, highly homogenous boards are positively associated with board 
cohesiveness but can negatively affect cognitive conflict, therefore a balance is needed 
(Adams et al., 2015; Petrovic, 2008; Westphal & Bendnar, 2005). Dallas (2001) states 
that the advantages of group diversity generally outweigh the advantages of 
homogeneity and group cohesion when the function of that group is to monitor some 
of its own members, such as in the case of the board directors. This is particularly 
important for effective boards from an agency theory perspective and in light of 
previous corporate scandals and financial crises. In addition, Perryman et al. (2016) 
argue that overall, heterogeneity and diversity in problem solving and in decision-
making produces better quality decisions through a broader range of perspectives and 
a more critical analysis of the decisions and related issues. This falls in line with the 
propositions of upper echelons theory that suggests individuals at the top of the 
organisation, who are responsible for the firm’s strategy, are influenced by their 
different characteristics and this influences the functioning of the organisation 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
 
2.5.3 Structural versus Demographic Diversity  
A review on board diversity research by Adams et al. (2015) notes that board 
diversity has commonly distinguished in the literature between task-related diversity, 
non-task related diversity and structural diversity. Similarly, Carter at el. (2010) state 
that the business case for board diversity mainly relates to the service, strategy and 
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control functions of the board. Task related diversity includes attributes such as 
educational and functional background, non-task related diversity includes gender, 
race, age and nationality, whilst structural diversity includes board independence and 
CEO duality (Adams et al., 2015).  
 
Ben-Amar et al. (2013) note that structural diversity refers to the best practices 
set out by governance codes and guidelines and they are mainly based on the 
assumption of a separation of ownership from control in firms. Therefore, measures 
of structural diversity commonly focus on attributes that enhance the monitoring and 
control function of the board of directors and this in turn can improve the quality of 
decision-making and lead to improved firm performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Consequently, structural diversity is commonly measured in the literature by the 
percentage of independent NEDs on the board and the separation of the chairman and 
CEO roles (Ararat at al., 2015). These measures are designed to nurture a greater 
diversity of interests and incentives on the board than if executive directors only were 
controlling the board (Ben-Amar at al., 2013). From the fiduciary perspective, 
structural diversity can improve board effectiveness and create value through reducing 
the agency costs of the firm (Rashid, 2015). Prior studies on the performance outcomes 
of structural diversity are mixed with the majority of the studies concluding that the 
performance effect of structural diversity is task-specific and contingent upon the 
context (Ararat et al., 2015; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). In order to examine 
structural diversity in this study, an index is constructed based on the 
recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 and this is discussed 
in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
In regards to demographic diversity, Hambrick and Mason (1984) propose that 
demographic diversity enhances the ability to deal with strategic change, and such 
diversity improves the knowledge base, creativity and quality of decision making of a 
group (Erhadt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003). This is based on the idea that an individual’s 
demographic attributes such as ethnicity, education, functional background, gender 
and age, will influence their cognition, behaviours, and decision making and 
consequently impact firm-level outcomes (Petrovic, 2008). This is in line with the 
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work of Becker (1964) on the human capital theory that examines the role of an 
individual’s collective stock of education, experience and skills in enhancing their 
cognitive capabilities that are beneficial to a firm. In addition, other scholars link 
human capital with resource dependence theory and suggest that human capital is a 
vital resource for firms as it brings diversity of perspectives to the boardroom 
(Terjesen et al., 2009). The majority of board research considers demographic 
variables separately and the majority of these studies have predominantly focused on 
either gender or ethnicity (Ararat et al., 2015; Ben-Amar et al., 2013). In addition, 
Carter et al. (2010) state that contingency theory is relevant in demographic diversity 
studies, as the effects can be different based on internal and external circumstances 
making diversity contingent upon the context. This is in line with Johnson et al.’s 
(2013) review of board composition that concludes increased board diversity could be 
utilised as a method to balance trade-offs between gathering various perspectives and 
creating cohesion, and it may provide access to a wider range of resources. Therefore, 
depending on the context, diversity may either result in positive firm outcomes, 
constrain outcomes, or it can balance them (Johnson et al., 2013; Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003). The theoretical framework developed in this study and discussed in 
Chapter 3 allows both structural and demographic issues of diversity to be explored 
simultaneously. 
 
2.6 Previous Empirical Findings 
The empirical evidence on board diversity and firm performance has produced 
mixed results and Low et al., (2015) note that this research has largely focused on US 
firms in comparison with other countries. Ntim (2015) states that the mixed evidence 
on the link between board diversity and firm performance is consistent with the 
conflicting nature of the conceptual literature on board diversity. Several studies report 
that board diversity is associated with higher market valuation and improves financial 
performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Erhardt et al. 2003; Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco, 
2016). For instance, Wellalage and Locke (2013) examined board diversity on a 
sample of 198 listed firms in Sri Lanka over the period 2006-2010, and found a 
positive association between the ethnicity and age diversity of directors and financial 
performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Erhardt et al. (2003) investigated the 
impact of ethnic and gender diversity on boards and observe similar results based on 
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a sample of 127 large US companies. In addition, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) 
examine the board gender diversity of listed firms in Spain and found a positive effect 
on firm value using panel data analysis. Whereas, a study by Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) on US firms found that boards with greater gender diversity made more effort 
to monitor managers. However, their study also found a negative relationship between 
the percentage of women on the board and Tobin’s Q (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
Mahadeo et al. (2012) find that age diversity and gender diversity on boards has a 
positive impact on the firm performance of companies listed on the stock exchange of 
Mauritius. The majority of these studies have focused on examining the links between 
gender diversity and firm performance, with less attention being paid to other diversity 
attributes (Post & Byron, 2015).  
 
Other studies that have examined the links between board diversity and firm 
performance have reported negative associations (Hillman et al. 2007; Smith et al., 
2006; Ujunwa, 2012). An earlier study by Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) on 
334 US hospitals researched the impact of board diversity on strategic change in the 
period 1980-1985, and found that firms with homogenous boards were more likely to 
initiate strategic change than heterogeneous boards. Adams and Ferreira (2009) found 
a negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance on US 
firms and concluded that the presence of women on boards may lead to unnecessary 
over-monitoring in firms with strong governance. Likewise, Ujunwa (2012) examined 
the board composition of 122 listed firms in Nigeria and found a negative association 
between CEO duality, board size, gender diversity and financial performance. A 
different stream of literature has provided empirical evidence of no association 
between board diversity and firm performance (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014; Rose, 
2007; Smith et al., 2006). For instance, Farrell and Hersch (2005) examined the 
addition of women on corporate boards of US firms and, using Poisson regressions, 
they found no evidence that the addition of female directors has an impact on ROA 
and market returns. Similarly, Carter et al. (2010) found no significant association 
between gender and ethnic diversity of boards and the financial performance of firms 
listed on the S&P 500. They further argue that their findings are due to the contingency 
effect of board diversity on performance (Carter et al., 2010). Wang and Clift (2009) 
also report that gender and ethnic diversity on the boards of Australian firms had no 
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significant impact on ROA and ROE and, they conclude that there is no business case 
for gender and ethnic diversity in the Australian context.  
 
The empirical findings on board diversity and firm performance above have 
provided evidence of both beneficial and harmful effects of diversity on performance. 
Adams et al. (2015) and Kagzi and Guha (2018) have conducted recent reviews of the 
research on board diversity in the last decade and suggested different reasons for the 
mixed findings in the extant literature. One of the most common reasons for mixed 
findings in prior board diversity research is that researchers have utilised different 
theories to support their findings and each theory examines a different dimension of 
board diversity (Ali et al., 2014). For instance, studies using agency theory perspective 
may only examine the monitoring function of directors, whereas studies using the 
resource dependence theory perspective may only examine the resource provision role 
(Kagzi & Guha, 2018). Another reason for some of the mixed findings in the literature 
is that scholars have used different types of data, with the majority of studies on board 
diversity using cross-sectional data (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). However, Adams et al. 
(2010) state that the majority of the studies that use cross-sectional data suffer from 
econometric problems such as endogeneity and reverse causality which need to be 
adequately addressed with such data sets. Post and Byron (2015) conducted a meta-
analysis of women on boards and firm performance and they suggest that the 
inconsistent findings on this relationship were due to different contextual factors. 
Other scholars suggest that the disparity in prior findings could also be due to 
differences in measurements of diversity variables (Ararat et al., 2015; Kagzi & Guha, 
2018). Lastly, the empirical findings may also be mixed due to scholars using different 
measures of performance. For instance, Haslam et al. (2010) report that board diversity 
has a positive impact on accounting based measures of performance and a negative 
impact on market based measures of performance.  
 
2.7 Gaps in Literature 
The literature reviewed in this chapter has identified that directors of a company 
are a key internal mechanism of corporate governance as they play multiple roles on 
the board. In particular, the literature review has highlighted four main gaps in the 
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literature that need to be addressed when examining the link between board diversity 
and firm performance. First, the majority of studies that have examined board 
composition and board diversity have predominantly used an agency theory 
perspective. A central element of agency theory is the board of directors’ role of 
providing oversight and monitoring management due to the separation of ownership 
from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  However, Daily et al. (2003) state that 
although agency theory is useful in conceptualising the monitoring and control role of 
directors, it does not consider directors’ other roles such as the resource provision, 
service, advisory and strategic roles. Similarly, Hillman et al. (2009) suggest that 
resource dependence theory is not adequate on its own in exploring board composition 
or diversity and firm performance as its sole focus is on the resource provision role. 
In addition, Kagzi and Guha (2018) note that each theoretical perspective examines a 
different dimension of board diversity. Therefore, a multi-theory perspective that takes 
into account the different dimensions of diversity, including both structural and 
demographic diversity, is required when examining the business case for diversity. In 
addition, the multi-theory framework must also address the different functions and 
roles played by the board as individual theories focus on a single function or role of 
directors.  
 
Second, the literature reviewed highlighted that academic research has largely 
focused on the independence of NEDs in board effectiveness and performance. 
However, there has been scarce literature on the capability of NEDs in performing 
their duties and in improving board effectiveness. In addition, prior studies have 
commonly looked at board independence and CEO duality when examining structural 
diversity (Ararat et al., 2015; Ujunwa, 2012). However, Ben-Amar et al. (2013) noted 
that structural diversity refers to the recommendations and guidelines set out in 
governance codes and codes of best practice. Therefore, rather than focusing solely on 
board independence and CEO duality, studies that examine structural diversity need 
to include other aspects of best practices of the board such as director attendance, 
shareholder relations, disclosures and board committees. Third, Anderson et al. (2011) 
note that board demographic diversity can arise from differences in attributes such as 
educational background, experience, profession, gender, age and ethnicity. However, 
Post and Byron (2015) state that beyond gender diversity, there is a limited amount of 
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academic research and evidence to support the notion that board diversity influences 
firm performance. Therefore, academic research on board diversity needs to adopt a 
much wider focus on other aspects of diversity, besides just gender diversity, in 
building a business case for diversity in the boardroom. Lastly, one of the reasons that 
prior studies on board diversity have produced mixed results is that contextual factors 
were not taken into consideration and Johnson et al. (2013) call for future research on 
board diversity to investigate contextual factors in helping to reconcile the conflicting 
findings. This thesis will attempt to address the gaps identified in the literature by 
adopting a conceptual framework that takes into account the different roles played by 
directors and that addresses different aspects of diversity. This framework is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
2.8 Summary of Chapter  
This chapter has defined corporate governance and discussed the history of the 
development of the corporate governance system in the UK, which was largely 
developed in response to numerous corporate failures and scandals. The literature 
review identified the multiple roles and duties of the board of directors as a key internal 
mechanism of corporate governance in firms. These roles include, monitoring and 
control, advisory, strategic and resource provision roles. The review also noted that 
prior empirical studies that have examined board diversity and financial performance 
have only focused on certain aspects of structural diversity, such as board 
independence and CEO duality. Other studies have predominantly focused only on 
certain aspects of demographic diversity such as gender diversity and ethnic diversity. 
The next chapter will discuss the conceptual framework that this thesis will adopt in 
more detail and present the diversity variables that will be examined in this study. In 
so doing, the next chapter also develops the hypotheses that will be tested in this study. 
32 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss academic literature and theories that are 
linked to the research objective and research questions of this study. First, this chapter 
will provide an overview of the theoretical approach that will be adopted in this thesis 
in order to address the gaps identified in the literature. Second, this chapter will 
critically discuss and present upper echelons, resource dependence and agency 
theories, which will inform the basis of this research. Third, an integration of the three 
theories will be discussed and the board characteristics that will be used as independent 
variables in this research will be presented and discussed. Lastly, this chapter discusses 
the importance of conducting an industry analysis in this research. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses and presents the 
theoretical approach adopted in this thesis including a discussion of upper echelons, 
resource dependence and agency theories. This section also provides a synthesis of the 
three theories, which leads on to Section 3.3 that discusses the board index to be 
constructed in this study and the individual board characteristics that proxy board 
diversity. Section 3.4 discusses the reasoning behind conducting an industry analysis 
of the findings, whilst section 3.5 discusses the contribution to theory. Lastly, Section 
3.6 provides a summary of the chapter.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Approach Adopted in this Thesis 
The board of directors has four main important functions, which are to monitor 
and control management, to provide advice and counsel, strategy formulation and 
implementation and linking the firm to its external environment (Mallin, 2011). The 
structure and composition of a board can impact the way it performs each of these 
functions and the decision making process, and this in turn can determine firm 
performance (Carter et al., 2010). An earlier study by Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
suggested that board effectiveness can be measured through the extent to which boards 
succeed in effectively performing their roles and through the cohesiveness of the 
board. A large body of the theory in corporate governance literature addresses some 
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of these functions in one way or another, however Zattoni, Douglas, and Judge (2013) 
point out that there is no agreement on the theoretical perspective that best addresses 
board effectiveness in corporate governance research. In addition, they state that 
individual theories are limited in their ability to fully predict and offer insights, on the 
relationship between board diversity and financial performance (Zattoni et al., 2013). 
This is also consistent with Carter et al.’s (2010) study that states no single theory can 
predict the nature of the link between board diversity and financial performance 
encompassing the multiple functions that boards play. Rather, an adoption of an 
interdisciplinary approach from multiple theories can provide more insights into the 
relationship between board diversity and financial performance (Carter et al., 2010; 
Chen at al., 2016). Therefore, this thesis adopts a multi-theory approach in an attempt 
to overcome the current myopic single based theory perspective in corporate 
governance research and provide a more complete understanding of the relationship 
between board diversity and financial performance.  
 
Some corporate governance theories used in previous studies such as 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory, do not adequately predict a clear link 
between board diversity and financial performance. For instance, in line with the 
normative side of stakeholder theory, Yang and Konrad (2011) point out that 
institutional theory emphasises the normative context in which organisations exist, 
therefore the argument for board diversity from this perspective might be best centred 
on social responsibility and adhering to the social environment rather than on a 
business case for diversity. Prior literature has identified that resource dependence 
theory offers some of the most fruitful and theoretical arguments in exploring the 
business case for diversity in regards to the resource provision role (Hillman et al., 
2009). Whereas, agency theory establishes that the directors must enforce adequate 
monitoring and control mechanisms in order to protect shareholder interests as part of 
their monitoring and control roles. In addition, previous studies have noted some 
important implications of agency theory propositions on the effectiveness of boards in 
the decision-making process (Petrovic, 2008; Terjesen et al., 2009). However both of 
these theories do not adequately specify the diversity attributes of individual directors 
that can make them more effective in performing their roles and in improving the 
decision making process. Neither do these theories fully consider the strategic role 
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played by directors on the board.  Therefore, in addition to agency theory and resource 
dependence theory perspectives, this study also integrates upper echelons theory from 
management literature that clearly specifies the diversity attributes and characteristics 
of top management that can predict organisational performance and that address the 
strategic role (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The three theories are used to complement 
each other in order to enhance their predictive power on the association between board 
diversity and firm performance. These three theories are individually discussed in the 
following sections.  
 
3.2.1 Upper Echelons Theory   
“If we want to understand why organisations do the things they do, or why they 
perform the way they do, we need to understand the people at the top” (Hambrick, 
2005, p.111). 
The founding paper of upper echelons theory by Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
proposed that senior executives act and make decisions on the basis of their individual 
interpretations and options. The central idea of upper echelons theory is that because 
executives view the world through lenses of their personal values, experiences, 
personalities and backgrounds, these characteristics can be used to predict executives’ 
strategic choices and organisational outcomes (Karake, 1995). Upper echelons 
literature examines the top management team of organisations as being the people at 
the top.  Wong, Ormiston and Tetlock (2011) describe a firm’s top management team 
as the CEO, top managers and senior executives of a firm who are involved in making 
strategic decisions. This study will refer to the top management team as senior 
executives of a firm. The history of upper echelons dates back to the 1970s as a direct 
criticism of population ecologists who argued that large organisations are swept along 
by events in the external environment and somehow run themselves (Hall, 1977). In 
parallel to this, population ecologists argued that because environments are so large 
and exert a lot of pressure on organisations the impact of top executives becomes 
insignificant in running a firm (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Upper echelons scholars 
opposed this idea by taking the view that top executives greatly matter in the running 
of an organisation and acknowledged that managerial characteristics and backgrounds 
greatly influence organisational outcomes (Hiebl, 2013). Therefore, the study of senior 
executives is of utmost importance because they are a highly visible embodiment of 
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an organisation including its strategic direction, credibility and values (Cannella & 
Pettigrew, 2001). 
 
Upper echelons theory was built on the premise of bounded rationality; an idea 
developed by Cyert and March (1963) who suggested that complex and uncertain 
information or situations are not objectively knowable but rather merely interpretable. 
Cyert and March (1963) further stated that complex decisions are largely an outcome 
of behavioural factors as opposed to an automated pursuit for economic optimisation. 
Therefore, upper echelons theory is ultimately an information processing theory that 
offers a systematic way of explaining the behaviour of executives under conditions of 
bounded rationality (Hiebl, 2013). Upper echelons theorists suggest that the 
combination of particular situational conditions and upper echelons characteristics 
will lead to certain strategic choices that ultimately define organisational performance 
(Nielsen, 2010).  According to Hambrick and Mason (1984) the choices of senior 
executives are influenced by their cognitive base as well as their values and, since such 
psychological constructs are not easily observable, they suggested that the 
demographic characteristics of senior executives are suitable and reliable proxies for 
their cognitive base and values. A decision maker’s cognitive base and values thus 
generate a screen between a situation and the decision maker’s perception of it and 
this perceptual process is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Upper echelons theory argues that 
executives arrive at a strategic decision in the following three-stage process, illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 (Cannella & Pettigrew, 2001).  The first stage of this process is the 
executives’ field of vision. This relates to the directions in which executives look and 
listen resulting in them scanning only limited portions of the external environment. 
According to Hambrick and Mason (1984) executives cannot scan every detail of an 
organisation and its environment, a fact that restricts their field of vision and limits 
their subsequent perceptions. The second stage refers to what the executives’ actually 
see and hear which results in them selectively observing only some of the phenomena 
in their field of vision. The third stage is the extent to which executives attach meaning 
to what they see and hear. This leads to the interpretation of stimuli through a filter of 
individualistic values and beliefs (Zhihua, 2010).  
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Figure 3.1 Strategic Choice under Bounded Rationality: The Executive’s Construed Reality 
 
Source: Hambrick (2005, p.113)
STAGE 1 
STAGE 2 
STAGE 3 
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Hiebl (2013) stated that the backgrounds and strategic choice of upper 
echelons may be influenced by the situations organisations face, such as the external 
environment or firm specific characteristics. These are, then, antecedents to 
organisational outcomes and managerial characteristics. After the initial development 
of the upper echelons framework, Hambrick (2005) later suggested two moderators of 
the relationship between managerial characteristics and organisational outcomes, 
which are behavioural integration and managerial discretion. According to Cannella 
and Pettigrew (2001) behavioural integration is the extent to which executives engage 
in collective interaction by sharing information, resources and decisions. Hambrick 
(2007) argued that if executives do not collectively process information and make 
decisions, then their collective characteristics would be of no use in predicting 
organisational strategy and performance. Managerial discretion is based on the idea 
that the importance of senior executives is dependent on the level of discretion or 
freedom of action they possess in making strategic choices (Hiebl, 2013).  The 
implications of managerial discretion in the upper echelons framework are that upper 
echelons provide great predictions of organisational outcomes in direct proportion to 
the level of managerial discretion. If a high level of discretion is present, then 
executives’ characteristics will become reflected in strategy and performance, if 
discretion is lacking then executives’ characteristics do not matter (Hambrick, 2007).  
 
The values and cognitive bases of executives are said to be a function of their 
observable individualities such as education, experience, age, gender and nationality. 
This provides a basis for studying team dynamics by demographic proxy (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004). One of the differences between the upper echelons 
framework and other organisational frameworks is that upper echelons theory spans 
individual, team and firm levels. Importantly, the theory provides explanations on the 
influences of individual characteristics on team decision-making processes and firm 
outcomes. Organisational studies informed by other theoretical frameworks rarely 
examine cross-level interactions across all three levels (Nielsen, 2010). Since the 
development of the upper echelons framework, significant evidence has been 
accumulated to indicate that executives act, in part, on the basis of their individual 
characteristics and in turn companies become a reflection of their senior executives 
(Hambrick, 2005). Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) found strong evidence that 
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executives’ external networks influence company strategy. This suggests that external 
ties of executives may explain the extent to which the company in question would 
pursue strategies outside the industry’s central tendencies. Furthermore, Zhihua 
(2010) found positive associations between executives’ education levels and corporate 
social performance, whilst Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007) found that executives’ 
experience was significantly associated with management control systems and better 
use of financial information. As a result, upper echelons theorists argue that 
heterogeneity in an executive team is positively correlated with performance by virtue 
of the fact that homogeneity can lead to inferior decision making because of 
‘groupthink’ (Hiebl, 2013). 
 
Cannella and Pettigrew (2001) noted that the upper echelons framework places 
emphasis on the entire top management team as opposed to the CEO alone. In addition, 
Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) argued that the characteristics of all the senior 
executives are better predictors of organisational outcomes than those of the CEO 
alone. Scholars who invoke the upper echelons perspective typically argue that senior 
executives should be of interest because individuals at higher levels in the organisation 
are expected to exert greater influence on strategic decisions (Carpenter et al., 2004). 
Given the great complexity and difficulty in obtaining conventional psychometric data 
on executives, Jensen and Zajac (2004) state that researchers can reliably use 
demographic data of executives, such as functional backgrounds, education and 
experiences, to predict strategic actions and firm performance. Undoubtedly the upper 
echelons body of literature is a flourishing one. However, while empirical evidence 
exists to suggest that executives matter to firms, the results of empirical research are 
not wholly consistent.  
 
Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) found that executives’ nationality and functional 
background had positive effects on performance whilst age, education and experience 
had no effect on performance. Some critics of upper echelons theory claim it places 
too much emphasis on the importance of the top management team, thus glorifying 
executives. These critics further state that there are many other employees in 
organisations who affect performance and deserve scholarly attention (Cannella & 
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Pettigrew, 2001). However, Hambrick (2005, p.123) directly answered these critics by 
pointing out that the upper echelons model is entirely based on the flaws and human 
limits of executives and “…pokes holes in the mythology of all-knowing economic 
optimizer at the top of the firm. This is the antithesis of glorification...”. Nielsen (2010) 
took a closer look at upper echelons theory and noted that heterogeneity was defined 
as a general construct and no distinction was made between various elements of 
diversity such as age, gender and function. However, it is important to consider that 
these different elements of diversity will not have uniform effects when empirically 
applied as different types of heterogeneity in top management team composition will 
have different drivers.  
 
Research on top management team heterogeneity has produced inconsistent 
findings which may be due to this research neglecting the influence of power status 
within a team (Jackson, Joshi & Erhardt, 2003). Peterson et al. (2003) found that a 
CEO’s personality can impact the dynamics of a top management team and such 
differences in power and status produce dynamics that affect upper echelons 
relationships.  In addition, Carpenter et al. (2004) observed that another major 
limitation of the upper echelons framework is its focus on only the top management 
team, whereas there are other groups, such as the board of directors, who should be 
pivotal to the upper echelons model. A major criticism of the upper echelons model is 
described by Cannella and Pettigrew (2001) as the ‘congruence assumption’; as 
empirical research models based on demography include processes as concepts, with 
the expectation of providing an explanation of the relationships between demographics 
and organisational outcomes.  
 
These process constructs are not being examined nor directly measured and 
researchers need to investigate the black box of demography which Lawrence (1997) 
refers to as the real psychological and social processes that drive executives’ 
behaviour. Cannella and Pettigrew (2001) stated that it is important to consider that 
demographics are greatly limited, imprecise and noisy proxies for executives’ 
cognitive bases. However, in the earliest development of the upper echelons model, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that demographic characteristics are more 
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essential than psychological dimensions from an upper echelons perspective, because 
the cognitive bases and values of executives are not convenient to measure nor are 
they responsive to direct measurement. Further to this, the use of background 
characteristics has found favour for a long time in numerous research fields, such as 
in marketing research where demographics are frequently used as indicators of 
consumer preferences (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The upper echelons perspective is 
entirely based on the premise that executives are humanly finite and susceptible to the 
same human foibles as any other person. The role of an executive is highly demanding, 
which is why the upper echelons model is not out to demean executives but rather to 
develop insights that will improve their effectiveness (Hambrick, 2007).  
 
3.2.1 Resource Dependence Theory  
Previous research that has looked at the links between the board of directors and 
performance has followed numerous paths and some of the most popular paths have 
been that of agency theorists and resource dependence theorists. Resource dependence 
theory views the board of directors as a provider of valuable resources that improve 
firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This is precisely the area where resource 
dependence theory makes the greatest impact on contemporary research. Daily et al., 
(2003, p.275) allude to this in the following quote: “…rather than focusing 
predominantly on directors’ willingness or ability to control executives, in future 
research scholars may yield more productive results by focusing on the assistance 
directors provide in bringing valued resources to the firm and in serving as a source 
of advice and counsel to CEOs…”. Furthermore, Boyd’s (1990) earlier work on the 
resource dependence theory suggests that it is not just the number, but also the type of 
directors on the board that matter. Resource dependence theory draws upon the 
discipline of sociology and proposes that the very survival of a firm is dependent on 
its ability to obtain control over environmental resources and external pressures, such 
as regulation, and competition will cause firms to pursue environmental linkages 
(Boyd, 1990). Research conducted by Davis and Cobb (2010) after the 2007/8 
financial crisis, found evidence to suggest that interest in resource dependence theory 
is on the rise after an era of dormancy. This is because the current state of global 
activities, namely economic crises, dissatisfaction with political leadership and 
increased social activism, is significantly similar to the era in which Jeff Pffefer 
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conceptualised the theory and these affairs make matters of power and dependency 
more important. 
 
The founding work on resource dependence theory, by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), proposed five options for firms to use in reducing environmental dependencies 
and these are mergers, joint ventures, political action, executive succession and boards 
of directors. The board of directors is viewed as an integral part of firm success by 
resource dependence scholars as the board is used as a key link in gaining scarce 
resources and valuable information needed by the firm (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). 
Although there is not one agreed definition of what these resources are, Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) define them as anything that can be considered as a strength or 
weakness of a firm, and their list of resources that could be provided by directors 
includes expertise, legitimacy or boosting a firm’s public image, advice, counsel, links 
to stakeholders including finance providers and strategy formulation. In addition, other 
scholars suggest that qualified directors from diverse backgrounds and constituencies 
can provide better links and networks with stakeholders, such as customers and the 
society, which can enhance the firm’s reputation, opportunities and values (Mahadeo 
et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015; Wellalage & Locke, 2013). Hillman et al. (2000) state that 
the most visible differences amongst directors are in their occupational attributes such 
as expertise, potential linkages, information and skills. In previous literature the 
primary antecedent of a board’s provision of resources was board capital and although 
different terms have been used to describe board capital, resource dependence theorists 
have commonly referred to it as directors’ expertise, knowledge, skills, reputation and 
experience (Hitt et al., 2001). Scholars suggest that a board’s provision of resources is 
directly linked to firm performance as these resources reduce transaction costs, reduce 
environmental uncertainty, reduce dependency between the firm and external 
contingencies and in the long run aid in the survival of the firm (Hillman, Cannella & 
Paetzold, 2000). Earlier work by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) reported that firm 
performance is dependent upon the development of linkages to the external 
environment such as boards of directors, which implies that board composition ought 
to be affected by environmental pressures and demands, and differences in board 
composition should affect performance. 
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Hillman et al., (2009) assert that in order for a firm to facilitate strategic change 
and gain competitive advantage, the board’s composition must be strategically altered 
because as a firm’s external environment changes, so does the need for linkages within 
that environment. The extent to which directors benefit a firm is however dependent 
on whether their presence provides access to valuable resources, reduces 
environmental dependency or helps in establishing legitimacy as not every director 
has the ability to do so (Daily & Schwenk, 1996). It is therefore important to observe 
the unique attributes each director brings to a firm as doing so will help in determining 
the kind of resources any given director is likely to bring. The board of directors may 
also be an advantageous resource in reducing transaction costs through external 
linkages. Gales and Kesner (1994) provided an example of this as follows: if a director 
has regulatory knowledge, their knowledge can help in reducing transaction costs with 
a regulatory agency. Several other studies in organisational psychology contend that 
individual differences in knowledge and skills have a direct impact on job performance 
and individual training success (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014). Intangible resources 
embedded in directors, such as knowledge, skills and experience, are more likely to 
produce competitive advantage due to them being unique and harder to imitate. 
Therefore resource dependence theory researchers argue that the heterogeneous 
distribution of resources in firms, such as human capital,  is advantageous and explains 
differences in performance, as firms with valuable resources that are harder to imitate 
will outperform competitors lacking those resources (Crook et al., 2011). A study by 
Provan (1980) argued that in order for companies to acquire these critical resources 
they would need to attract powerful members of the community onto their boards. 
Hillman (2005) found that companies operating in heavily regulated industries tended 
to have more former politicians on their boards than other industries, as they offered 
important political resources that were beneficial to firms in highly regulated 
industries. This is in turn had a positive correlation with higher levels of financial 
performance.   
 
 Hillman et al. (2009) found that from a resource dependence view, directors are 
beneficial to companies for legitimacy, giving advice and counsel, providing 
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information and providing preferential access to resources. The legitimacy theory 
assumes that companies behave according to society’s demands hence when a 
company discloses information it reduces public pressure by making itself look 
legitimate to the public (Cong & Freedman, 2011). Further to this, financial crises and 
scandals can lead to a breach of trust and companies will need to work hard to boost 
public confidence and reduce information asymmetries. Better transparency can 
reduce information asymmetries between the firm and users of its financial 
information, thus making a firm more attractive to the market as investors can better 
judge the risk levels (Clemente & Labat, 2009). A study by Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) 
proposed that during legitimacy crises, director turnover can be a crucial step toward 
restoring legitimacy and mending broken links with the environment; and when clients 
know the credentials of new directors they can predict the quality of services they will 
receive which eventually reduces an imbalance of information asymmetries. Agency 
theory assumes that inside directors are more inclined to side with managers’ interests 
hence need to be monitored, however resource dependence theory views inside 
directors as an important resource as they provide firm specific information to the 
board which helps with decision making (Hillman et al., 2000).  
 
Another limitation of resource dependence theory is that although human capital 
and resourceful directors have numerous positive benefits to firms, they represent a 
cost to firms as directors with more skills and expertise would require a larger 
remuneration (Hillman et al., 2009). However, Carter et al. (2010) and Hillman et al. 
(2009) note that prior studies on the board of directors more often support the 
propositions of resource dependence theory over other perspectives including agency 
theory. Therefore, resource dependence theory provides a good basis for some of the 
most influential theoretical arguments that advocate a business case for board 
diversity. Conversely, resource dependence theory focuses more on the resource 
provision role of directors whereas Chapter 2 highlighted that directors play multiple 
roles on boards not just the resource provision role (Armstrong et al., 2016). 
Considering this, in a review of resource dependence theory by Hillman et al. (2009), 
it was suggested that resource dependence theory is not sufficient on its own and 
should be integrated with other theories in order to offer new insights on the 
phenomenon of interest.  
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3.2.2 Agency Theory  
The other and most dominant path that previous researchers have followed when 
examining the link between the board of directors and performance is that of agency 
theorists. They argue that a key role of directors is to monitor management on behalf 
of shareholders, as effective monitoring can reduce agency costs and improve 
performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Agency theory is arguably the foundation of 
many corporate governance frameworks, practices and regulatory initiatives. A major 
concern in corporate governance and transparency development is about corporate 
control. In the modern world the “…separation between ownership and control of 
corporations characterises the existence of a firm...” (Bonazzi & Islam, 2007, p.7).  
This theory assumes that a company’s actions are compelled by individuals’ pursuit 
of self-interest, with contracts overseeing relationships between management, 
shareholders and employees (Mihret, 2014). Agency theory identifies a principal-
agent relationship in firms, where directors work as agents on behalf of shareholders. 
This separation of ownership from control not only brings about a conflict of interest, 
but also results in information asymmetry, as shareholders are not involved in the daily 
running of the firm (Tricker, 2012). Therefore, agency theory offers shareholders the 
pre-eminent position in organisations, not just as the owners, but also as the residual 
risk takers (Clarke, 2004). 
 
The agency problem was initially explored by Ross (1973) and the first detailed 
theoretical explanation was provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) who 
described the agency relationship as “…a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximisers there is good reason to believe that 
the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal...”. This definition 
expresses a clear division of responsibility between the principals and agents thus 
making delegation explicit (Saam, 2007). Clarke (2004) states that the essence of the 
agency problem is the separation of management and finance, where agents 
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accumulate significant residual control rights and discretion over the allocation of 
investors’ funds. Moreover, agency theory proposes that conflicts of interest between 
the principal and agent arise because of three main issues: information asymmetries, 
risk preferences and goal conflicts (Saam, 2007). Informational asymmetries arise in 
the agency relation because the principal cannot effectively monitor the agent’s 
competences, skill set, intentions, actions and internal firm knowledge (Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003).  
 
Johnson and Droege (2004) stated that principals and agents are assumed to have 
different attitudes towards risks. The key factor here is the link between compensation 
schemes and performance. Agents may be more risk averse as they may entirely rely 
on their earnings for income, whereas principals are assumed to be risk neutral as they 
can diversify risk by investing in multiple companies (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003).  
Conflicts of interest may also arise in the agency relation because both the principals 
and agents have different goals. Both want to maximise their individual utility, agents 
want to maximise their income whilst principals want to maximise their returns (Saam, 
2007). The combination of information asymmetry, different risk preferences and goal 
incongruence can lead to opportunistic behaviour, adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Adverse selection refers to opportunistic behaviours that 
may occur before setting a contract, where for example a candidate applying for an 
executive job overstates their accomplishments on their CV. In contrast to adverse 
selection, moral hazard occurs after a contract is already in place. Moral hazard refers 
to the behaviours that directors may take once employed which may not be in the best 
interest of shareholders, such as using creative accounting (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). 
Therefore from an agency theory perspective, the key role of directors is to ratify the 
decisions of managers and to reduce and minimise the problems associated with the 
separation of ownership from control by ensuring managers’ actions are aligned with 
serving the interests of shareholders (Hillman et al., 2000). 
 
Many corporate scandals such as the Enron scandal were a result of directors 
abusing their power through creative accounting to hide debt and credit operations, 
which meant investors did not know the risk imposed when investing in these firms 
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(Vinten, 2002). More recently, Paul Moore who was formerly the head of regulatory 
risk at HBOS before its collapse was quoted in an interview saying, “…I strongly 
believe the real underlying cause of the problems was simply this - a total failure of 
all key aspects of governance… there has been a completely inadequate separation 
and balance of powers between the executive and all those accounting for their 
actions…” (Buckley, 2011, p.209). Agency theory suggests that the solution to 
overcoming conflicts of interests between directors and shareholders is to design 
incentives such as bonuses and stock options that align the interests of both directors 
and shareholders (Shapiro, 2005). According to Johnson and Droege (2004) the goals 
of principals and agents can be aligned through incentive based contracts which tie 
rewards to achievement. Incentive-based compensation schemes encourage agents to 
pursue goals that are directly linked to the principal’s goals and tangible rewards 
(Johnson & Droege, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) state that when incentives are aligned 
with shareholders’ interests, directors will become effective monitors of management 
which will in turn improve performance. Agency theory suggests that when agents 
have an information advantage over principals about the outcome of their actions, it is 
efficient to have a written contract with payoffs that are based on outcomes that can 
be observed by the principals (Mallin, Melis & Gaia, 2015). In addition, Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) also suggest that equity compensation motivates directors to be better 
monitors as when boards do not directly share in company equity they have no 
appreciation of it and may have no motivation to pursue shareholders’ interests. On 
the other hand, agency theorists propose that the directors themselves must also be 
monitored in order to minimise abuse of power and Bonazzi and Islam (2007) state 
that this can be done through the use of external auditing on financial reports and 
through employing independent outside directors in order to improve transparency. In 
this separation of ownership from control, agency theorists assume that inside 
directors are more inclined to side with managers’ interests whilst independent outside 
directors are better suited to represent and protect shareholders’ interests (Hillman et 
al., 2000). Therefore, agency theory researchers such as Band (1992) state that 
independent directors are a key mechanism in monitoring the self-seeking actions of 
managers and protecting shareholders’ interests. However, Fama and Jensen (1983) 
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suggest that besides their monitoring role, outside independent directors can also be 
classified as trade experts who provide valuable expertise and connections to the firm. 
Scholars have argued that independent directors are able to act in a preventative 
capacity through monitoring the actions of executive directors, protecting investor 
confidence and reducing agency costs, which in turn improves corporate performance 
(Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). Independent directors are meant to monitor executive 
directors but at the same time they rely on the information provided by these executive 
directors. Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) describe this as the independence 
paradox, which also raises questions about the importance of director independence.  
 
Corporate governance researchers have criticised agency theory through the 
lenses of other theories such as stakeholder and stewardship theories. The major 
limitation of agency theory is that it is based on the assumptions that “…people are 
self-interested not altruistic…” and the only objective of a firm is to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth, whereas stakeholder theory argues that the purpose of a firm is 
to create value for all its stakeholders (Tricker, 2009, p.222). However, stakeholder 
theory itself has been criticised for lacking adequate empirical grounding and for 
needing major reformulation to improve its explanatory and predictive efficacy 
(Mihret, 2014). Agency theory proposes that conflicts of interest and agency costs can 
be minimised through monitoring directors and management. However, stewardship 
theory dismisses the assumption of goal conflicts by presuming an alignment between 
the interests of managers and shareholders implying there would be no need to monitor 
them (Fox & Hamilton, 1994). In addition, stewardship theory proposes that pro-
organisational and socialist behaviours have higher utility than individualistic self-
seeking behaviours, such that stewards will act in the organisation’s best interest 
(Johnson & Droege, 2004).  
 
Another limitation of agency theory is that it does not recognise that directors 
may require different skills and capabilities in order exercise their duties effectively 
(Petrovic, 2008). Agency theory recommends aligning the board’s incentives with 
those of shareholders creates better monitoring, however this focus on incentives 
overlooks the board’s ability to monitor and agency theorists have not openly 
48 | P a g e  
 
considered that boards may vary in their ability to monitor (Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001). In addition, other scholars argue that agency theory does not fully acknowledge 
the fact that directors are a social group that is part of a highly dynamic system, 
therefore the effectiveness of boards could more likely depend on cognitive ability and 
group cohesiveness and participation (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Petrovic, 2008). 
Wiseman, Cuevas‐Rodríguez and Gomez‐Mejia (2012) argue that although agency 
problems are universal, their manifestation and the solutions in which they should be 
dealt with may vary depending on the institutional context because delegation is 
involved. Agency theory offers a major theoretical contribution to organisational 
literature by regarding information as a commodity that has a cost and can be 
purchased (Clarke, 2004). This implies that organisations can invest in formation 
systems, such as boards of directors and auditors, to control agent opportunism. Clarke 
(2004) further recommends that although agency theory presents a valid view of 
organisations, additional theoretical perspectives can help capture the greater 
complexity of organisations. In line with Ararat et al., (2015), this study departs from 
previous studies by focusing on the board’s role of monitoring as a channel through 
which board diversity can improve financial performance. This line of thinking is 
based on the argument that diversity on the board can lead to improved monitoring 
through preventing groupthink in decision making and prompting critical enquiry 
(Carter et al., 2003; Ararat et al., 2015). The next section will discuss how upper 
echelons, resource dependence and agency theories will be integrated in order to form 
the theoretical framework of this study. Table 3.1 shows how the research questions 
presented in Chapter 1 are addressed by the theoretical framework discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of Research Questions and Theories 
Research Questions Theory  
 
Which theoretical framework is the best modelling tool 
of board diversity and financial performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there a relationship between board  
diversity and financial performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does the relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance differ amongst industries? 
 
Upper Echelons Theory 
Proposes that top executives’ demographic 
characteristics are great predictors of 
performance. 
 
 
 
Resource Dependence Theory           
Maintains the view that the board of directors is 
a key link between a company and the resources 
it needs to increase performance. 
 
 
 
 
                           Agency Theory  
Asserts that a key role of directors is to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders, as 
effective monitoring can reduce agency costs 
and improve performance. 
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3.2.3 Integration of Upper Echelons, Resource Dependence and Agency 
Theories 
A single theoretical framework, agency theory, dominates the majority of 
literature in corporate governance studies (Huse et al., 2011; Jermias & Gani, 2014). 
Zattoni and Van Ees (2012, p.113) note that one of the main criticisms of this approach 
is that it simplifies assumptions and provides an ‘…under socialized view of human 
beings and reduces the complexity of corporate governance phenomena…’. In 
addition, Jermias and Gani (2014) suggest empirical studies using agency theory have 
produced inconclusive results because they have only focused on the monitoring 
function of boards and ignored other functions such as the resources directors provide 
to firms. Therefore, the results from Zattoni and Van Ees’s (2012) study, and other 
researchers, propose that a promising avenue for future governance research is to 
utilise other theoretical paradigms or to combine two or more theoretical frameworks 
to bridge this gap in the literature (Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2011).  
 
Agency theory asserts that inside directors are more likely to side with 
management’s interests therefore outside independent directors may better protect 
shareholders’ interests (Hillman et al., 2000). However, agency theory has overlooked 
the board’s ability to monitor management and protect shareholders’ interests and 
agency theorists have not explicitly considered the heterogeneity of this monitoring 
ability (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  Hillman et al. (2009) suggest that a fruitful area 
for theoretical refinement is research that disentangles the types of human capital 
needed on the board to provide the benefits advocated by the resource dependence 
theory. In addition, Hambrick and Mason (1984) noted the need to draw upon relevant 
literature from other disciplines when they conceptualised the upper echelons 
framework. Nielsen (2010) further states that upper echelons perspectives must be 
combined with alternative theories in order to fully answer the fundamental question 
of whether heterogeneity in top management teams impacts firm strategy and 
performance. Therefore, this section will focus on the limitations brought forward by 
upper echelons literature and address these through resource dependence and agency 
theories in order to offer a new theoretical lens on board composition. 
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Upper echelons theory proposes that in order to understand why organisations 
perform the way they do, researchers must consider the biases and dispositions of their 
top executives, whom Hambrick (2007) described as an organisation’s most powerful 
actors. Although the definition of the top management team differs among studies, the 
upper echelons stream generally refers to senior executives of companies and assumes 
these to be the individuals with the ultimate decision making power in firm strategies. 
This assumption omits a broader set of position holders, the board of directors, who 
are arguably the most powerful actors in the firm (Nielsen, 2010). Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) state that the board of directors is a key corporate governance mechanism that 
is ultimately responsible for the success and performance of a firm. Scholars who 
invoke the upper echelons perspective typically argue that senior executives should be 
of interest because individuals at higher levels in the organisations are expected to 
exert greater influence on strategic decisions (Carpenter et al., 2004). If this is the case, 
then it can be assumed that the board of directors, who are at a higher level than senior 
executives, should exert even greater influence on strategic choices and organisational 
outcomes. This view is in line with resource dependence theory that regards the board 
of directors as a key link in gaining scarce resources and valuable information needed 
by firms, thus making directors an integral part of firm success (Nicholson & Kiel, 
2007).  
 
Although there is not one agreed definition of what these resources are, Hillman 
and Dalziel’s (2003) list includes expertise, legitimacy or boosting a firm’s public 
image, advice, counsel, links to stakeholders and strategy formulation. Research 
shows that board members exert a direct influence on organisational strategy through 
the provision of different resources (Carpenter et al., 2004). At the same time, board 
members exert an indirect effect on organisational strategy which is not limited to 
counsel and advice but also through the selection and dismissal of CEOs (Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001). In addition, agency theorists propose that NEDs, apart from being 
a monitoring mechanism, are also important for improving the general leadership of 
an organisation through improving the quality of a company’s strategy with different 
innovative ideas from an unbiased standpoint (Brennan & McDermott, 2004). Zattoni 
and Cuomo (2010, p.65) observed that independence, “…implies the ability of non-
executive directors to see things differently...”. Therefore this study integrates upper 
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echelons, resource dependence and agency theories by proposing that an 
organisation’s strategic choices and performance can be explained, in part at least, by 
the profile of its board of directors.  
 
After the initial development of the upper echelons framework, Hambrick 
(2005) later suggested a moderator of the relationship between managerial 
characteristics and organisational outcomes, namely, managerial discretion. 
Managerial discretion is based on the idea that the importance of senior executives is 
dependent on the level of discretion or latitude of action they possess in making 
strategic choices (Hiebl, 2013).  The implications of managerial discretion in the upper 
echelons framework are that upper echelons provide great predictions of 
organisational outcomes in direct proportion to the level of managerial discretion. 
Further, Peterson et al. (2003) found that the CEO’s personality can impact the 
dynamics of a top management team and such differences in power and status produce 
dynamics that affect upper echelons relationships. This implies that the upper echelons 
of senior executives, or directors, will be poor predictors of performance because the 
CEO will have the greatest power and influence on the decision making process 
(Hambrick, 2007). On the other hand, agency theory addresses managerial discretion 
by highlighting the importance of board independence and CEO duality, stating that 
the role of the CEO and chairman should remain separate so that no one individual 
should have ‘unfettered powers of decision’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). 
Therefore, by combining upper echelons and agency theories, upper echelons 
characteristics will provide great predictions of organisational outcomes when there is 
no CEO duality and that at least half of the board of directors consists of independent 
non-executive directors. This eliminates issues of power and status, and proposes that 
the board’s effectiveness and performance can be determined by the collective and 
individual behaviours of all the directors (Reyner, 2010).  
 
Boards have a fiduciary duty to provide oversight and monitor management’s 
behaviour in order to protect shareholders’ interests, however Haynes, Campbell and 
Hitt (2014) state that not every board is well suited to perform this duty. Therefore, 
from an upper echelons and resource dependence perspective, it is important to 
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observe the unique attributes each director brings to a firm as doing so will help in 
determining the kind of resources any given director is likely to bring. Hillman et al. 
(2000) suggest that the resource dependence and agency roles of directors must be 
examined together in order to avoid incomplete pictures of board composition and 
performance. Earlier work on upper echelons theory identified the top management 
team to include both senior managers and senior executives, some of which served on 
the board of directors but excluded all other directors including non-executive 
directors (Carpenter et al., 2004). On the other hand, agency theorists propose conflicts 
of interests and information asymmetry can be overcome through external auditing 
and employing independent directors (Brennan & McDermott, 2004). Further to this, 
the development of corporate governance has seen the formalisation of board 
committees in governance codes, recommending that an effective board should have 
at least three principal committees, namely the audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees (Tricker, 2012). All of these committees are established for different 
purposes and are predominantly composed of independent directors. In order to 
provide a more holistic picture of both demographic and structural diversity in the 
boardroom, this study integrates upper echelons, resource dependence and agency 
theories, by not only focusing on directors’ demographics, but also board 
independence, board size and board committees. The integration of these three 
theories addresses the gaps identified in the literature in Chapter 2 and the basic 
framework that underlines the thesis is displayed in Figure 3.2 below.  
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Figure 3.2 Thesis Conceptual Framework 
 
Board Diversity 
Advisory Duty 
Strategic role and resource provision role
Demographic diversity 
Fiduciary Duty
Monitoring and control role 
structural diversity 
Board Decision-
Making
Firm Performance
Agency theory perspective
Resource Dependence and 
Upper Echelons theory 
perspectives
Minimises agency costs
Provides key resources, 
diverse opinions and skills
 
 
 
The framework presented in Figure 3.2 highlights the multiple roles of the board 
of directors in decision-making, which in turn is expected to impact firm performance. 
From a fiduciary perspective, the board influences firm performance by focusing on 
their monitoring roles, which minimise agency costs (Ben-Amar at al., 2013). This 
monitoring role is improved by structural diversity, which includes good governance 
practices that are recommended by codes of best practice and in the UK context, from 
the UK Corporate Governance Codes. The advisory governance duty alludes to the 
strategic and resource provision roles played by directors on the board and this 
contributes to enhanced strategic decision-making. This is achieved through more 
questioning, offering different perspectives, advising and formulating strategies in the 
decision making process (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). The directors also provide access to 
beneficial resources and act as a ‘lynch pin’ between firms and their external 
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environments (Hillman et al., 2009). These roles are enhanced through characteristics 
and attributes derived from demographic diversity. Taken together, board diversity, 
including structural and demographic diversity, is expected to enhance the board’s 
decision-making process and improve firm performance.  
 
3.3 Board Diversity Variables and Hypotheses Development   
Boards of directors have traditionally been seen as a homogenous network of 
elites with similar educational and professional training and consequently similar 
views on business practices and decision-making (Useem, 1984). Further to this, 
Norburn (1989) found that the majority of large UK firms were homogenously 
composed of white, middle class, middle-aged men with similar professional and 
educational backgrounds. In line with this, Brammer, Millington and Pavelin (2007) 
found that directors in UK firms had a high degree of demographic homogeneity. In a 
later study, Useem (1993) noted that institutional investors in the 1990s and 
shareholder activists began to increase pressure on companies to appoint directors with 
different backgrounds under the assumption that greater board diversity improves 
decision-making. More recently, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 promotes 
board diversity by stating that an effective board should have the right balance of 
experience, skills and knowledge (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). Post, Rahman 
and Rubow (2011) suggest that board diversity provides access to various knowledge, 
expertise and network domains through directors of different ages, gender and 
backgrounds. The board of directors as a group combines a variety of competencies 
and capabilities that collectively represent a pool of social or human capital for a 
company (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). In line with this study’s conceptual 
framework, a self-constructed board index is created in order to capture structural 
diversity in line with the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
2014.  
 
With regards to demographic diversity, Hillman et al. (2000) state that the most 
visible differences amongst directors are in their occupational attributes such as age, 
gender, expertise, potential linkages, information and skills. On this basis, the 
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independent variables that will be used to proxy demographic diversity in this study 
are as follows:  
 Age 
 Gender 
 Education 
 Experience 
 Multiple directorships 
The next sections will discuss academic literature on gender, age, education, 
experience and multiple directorships of directors together with the board index. In 
exploring the relevant literature on these variables, the research hypotheses will be 
identified and developed. 
 
3.3.1 Board Index  
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance has been 
commonly measured using different variables to explain the corporate governance 
arrangements of an organisation (Malik & Makhdoom, 2016). The most popular 
variables that have been used in previous research include board independence, CEO 
duality, board size, board committees and director’s compensation (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2013; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). The majority of 
these studies have been firmly grounded in the agency framework of Fama and Jensen 
(1983). Further to this, the majority of these studies focus on what Ararat et al. (2015) 
term as structural diversity, and they document positive associations between board 
independence, disclosure and firm value (Ararat et al., 2015; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1998). The board index developed in this study encompasses such structural diversity 
and its construction is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. However, the elements 
included in the index are consistent with prior literature and they are derived from the 
recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014. The main attributes 
included in the index are discussed in more detail in this section.  
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CEO Duality  
Duality refers to the position where the roles of Chairman and CEO are 
occupied by the same individual and this has been a subject of interest in corporate 
governance research over the last two decades. From an agency theory perspective, 
boards should be independent from management to prevent managerial entrenchment 
and because CEO duality conflicts with this proposition, agency theorists argue that 
CEO duality has a negative impact on firm performance (Krause, Semadeni & 
Cannella, 2014). In line with this, numerous studies have identified that CEO duality 
reduces a board’s independence and makes the board less effective in monitoring 
management and transparency (Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011). Other scholars suggest 
that a separation of the role of CEO from that of Chairman of the board reduces agency 
costs of the firm (Mishra & Mohanty, 2014).  However, other prior studies have found 
a positive relationship between duality and financial performance (Gill & Mathur, 
2011; Peng, Zhang and Li, 2007). These studies are consistent with the propositions 
of stewardship theory that argues duality can empower management to make 
independent executive decisions that are beneficial to the firm (Pillai & Al-Malkawi, 
2018). However, the board index is constructed in line with the study’s theoretical 
framework and the recommendations from the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, 
that states the role of the CEO and Chairman should remain separate so that no one 
individual should have ‘unfettered powers of decision’ (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014). Therefore, firms with CEO duality are expected to have a negative influence 
on financial performance and are not awarded any marks for this is the board index.  
 
Board Independence and Non-Executive Directors  
Research has shown that the presence of non-executive directors (NEDs) on 
boards provides an independent element that benefits the board in performing its role. 
From an agency theoretical perspective, boards with more independent NEDs are 
presumed to be more effective in monitoring and controlling management and 
consequently are expected to be more successful in directing management towards 
activities that enhance firm value and increase transparency (Jizi et al., 2014). Agency 
theorists assume that in the separation of ownership from control, inside directors are 
more inclined to side with managers’ interests whilst independent NEDs are better 
suited to represent and protect shareholders’ interests (Hillman et al., 2000). In 
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addition, corporate governance researchers show that NEDs play multiple roles on the 
board besides monitoring management (Hillman et al., 2009; Pye & Camm, 2003). 
Therefore, apart from being a monitoring mechanism, NEDs are important for 
improving the general leadership of an organisation through improving the quality of 
a company’s strategy with different innovative ideas from an unbiased standpoint. 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2010, p.65) observe that the independence of NEDs in 
organisations “…implies the ability of non-executive directors to see things 
differently...”. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) principles established that independent directors are needed to provide an 
unbiased view on issues such as remuneration, and apply independent judgement as 
this improves the integrity of financial information and the risk management of firms 
(Mallin, 2013). As a result of this, many governance codes, including the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, recommend a company’s board of directors to have a 
significant proportion of non-executive independent directors. 
 
The majority of empirical studies on board composition have concluded that 
greater board independence is related to improved transparency and effective 
monitoring (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Ferreira, Ferreira, & Raposo, 2011; Lim, 
Matolcsy, & Chow, 2007). Likewise, Ben-Amar and Zeghal (2011) proposed that 
boards with a large proportion of independent NEDs are more responsive to the 
information disclosure needs of investors, which therefore reduces agency costs, 
increases the quality of a company’s disclosure and boosts investor confidence. Other 
researchers have found that the presence of NEDS significantly impacts transparency 
and improves a company’s performance including stock returns and credit ratings 
(Clemente & Labat, 2009; Guo & Kga, 2012). Other researchers such as Brennan and 
McDermott (2004) found a negative correlation between the number of NEDs on a 
board and the financial performance of a company. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
concluded that this negative correlation could be accredited to NEDs lacking real 
independence or business knowledge to be truly effective. A different line of enquiry 
suggests that some independent NEDs lack time, relevant experience, skills and 
knowledge to perform their duties effectively. These are all measures that will be 
examined in this study in the other variables discussed previously. However, the board 
index incorporates measures of board independence in line with previous research that 
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states structural diversity is best measured by board independence and CEO duality 
(Ararat et al., 2015).  
 
Board Size 
Agency and resource dependence theories provide support for an appropriate 
board size in order to control for agency costs and to provide valuable resources to 
firm through key links and connections (Jackling & Johl, 2009). However previous 
literature has produced mixed findings on the benefits of larger boards in comparison 
to smaller boards. For instance, Azeez (2015) notes that smaller boards can improve 
firm performance, because larger boards create greater agency costs and may delay 
the decision-making process. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) noted that 
larger boards may suffer from a dispersion of responsibility and an unpleasant attitude 
towards monitoring management. This is consistent with an earlier study by Yermack 
(1996) who found an inverse relationship between board size and firm value in US 
firms. However, Pillai and Al-Malkawi (2018) suggest that larger boards have the 
advantage of sharing management and expertise and the ability to oppose any 
irrational decisions by the CEO. In line with this, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find a 
positive relationship between board size and firm performance. In addition, Mishra 
and Mohanty (2014) note that small boards may find difficulties in staffing various 
board committees and large boards have the benefit of having board members with 
more diverse backgrounds, skills and knowledge.  Numerous studies have identified 
that a good board size must have a minimum of six directors and a maximum of 15 
directors (Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Darmadi, 2013). This is consistent with the 
recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code that states a board should 
be of a sufficient size to meet the firm’s business requirements but should not be 
inconveniently large (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). This is incorporated in the 
construction of the board index in line with the code’s recommendations and prior 
studies.  
 
Board Committees  
The development of corporate governance has seen the formalisation of board 
committees in most governance codes, including the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
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recommending that an effective board should have at least three principal committees 
namely the audit, nomination and remuneration committees (Tricker, 2012). In 
addition, many governance codes state that for board committees to be effective they 
must be composed of a majority of independent non-executive directors, who must 
meet frequently to exercise effective control of their duties and responsibilities (Ben-
Amar & Zeghal, 2011).The board of directors has a fiduciary duty and responsibility 
to act on behalf of the shareholders, and in practice many of these responsibilities are 
delegated to the board committees (Guo & Masulis, 2015). Therefore from an agency 
theory perspective, board committees with independent directors are able to enhance 
the monitoring role of the board, whilst from a resource dependence theory 
perspective, board committees can provide important resources to the firm (Appiah & 
Chizema, 2016). Generally the audit committee focuses on managing internal financial 
performance and the appointment of independent auditors. The remuneration 
committee is responsible for dealing with incentive plans for managers, compensation 
and benefits of executives, whilst the nomination committee is in charge of the 
nomination and selection process of directors. Therefore, through the board 
committees, the board can directly influence the quality of financial reporting and 
disclosures, CEO pay and the nomination of new directors (Green & Homroy, 2018).   
 
Eulaiwi et al. (2016) note that it is important to investigate the structure and 
formation of board committees in corporate governance research due to the central 
role they play in setting objectives, monitoring and advising firms. In line with this, 
Francis et al. (2015) note that the compensation of CEOs, which has been greatly 
debated in the literature, is directly under the scope of influence of the board of 
directors. Empirical evidence also suggests that composition and role of board 
committees is important for the governance of a firm. For instance, Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) found that the presence of a CEO on the nomination committee 
resulted in the appointment of fewer independent directors. Further to this, they also 
found that shareholders of a firm viewed the presence of a nomination committee as 
an important signal of the board’s ability to maintain independence. A study by 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) found that independent audit committees had lower 
debt financing costs. Further to this, Krishnan (2005) found that firms with 
independent members and more financial experts on their audit committees had 
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significantly fewer internal control problems. Dell’Atti, Intonti and Iannuzzi (2013) 
argued that there is a positive relationship between financial performance and a high 
quality remuneration committee because when the committee is efficient agency costs 
are reduced and it improves incentive alignment. In regards to board diversity, 
Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye (2012) note that nomination committees play a key role 
as they have the ability to ensure suitable candidates with diverse knowledge, 
backgrounds and skills are appointed to the board. The effectiveness of these board 
committees is dependent on their size, independence, frequency of meetings and 
expertise of members, as stated by Ben-Amar and Zeghal (2011). These elements are 
also incorporated in the board index that is constructed for this study.  
 
Directors’ Meetings and Attendance 
Literature that has investigated the board meeting activities of directors has 
largely found that the number of meetings that firms hold are significantly associated 
with firm performance and the corporate governance practices of the firm (Brick & 
Chidambaran, 2010; Gray & Nowland, 2017; Sharma, Naiker & Lee, 2009). These 
studies are consistent with the notion that increased meeting frequency and attendance 
enhances the monitoring and advisory roles of the board of directors. Gray and 
Nowland (2017) note that prior literature on director attendance has revealed that 
attendance at board meetings is systematically related to director characteristics and 
firm characteristics. Brown and Caylor’s (2006) study displayed that director 
attendance was the seventh (out of 51 measures) most significant corporate 
governance measure that was positively related to firm performance in US firms. In 
addition, Min and Verhoeven (2013) found that NEDs’ attendance was positively 
related to the firm performance of companies in South Korea and Taiwan. In regards 
to board committees, Hoque, Islam and Azam (2013) found that more frequent 
remuneration and audit committee meetings had a positive association with ROA. 
However, other scholars such as Vafeas (1999) found a negative relationship between 
the frequency of board meetings and firm value. Generally, the majority of scholars 
suggest that the frequency of attendance in board meetings by directors is a good signal 
of their commitment and active role in monitoring management (Mishra & Mohanty, 
2014). Therefore, the attendance of directors and meeting frequency is included in the 
board index constructed. The construction of this study’s board index is discussed in 
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more detail in Chapter 4. To this end, based on all of the discussions in this section 
and the predictions of the agency and resource dependence theories, the following 
hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 1. The board index is positively associated with financial performance. 
 
3.3.2 Age Diversity  
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons perspective proposes that age is one 
of the demographic variables that can be used as a proxy of senior executives’ 
psychological attributes that influence decision-making and performance. 
Furthermore, Mudambi and Treichel (2005) state that age can also be viewed as a 
proxy for experience, as older directors are assumed to have greater experience than 
younger directors do. The age of directors on a board is also seen as an important 
factor of board composition and Gilpatrick (2000) argues that the ideal NEDs to have 
on a board are older and mature retired executives who tend to have more experience. 
However, Mahadeo et al. (2012) state that a more effective board should be diverse in 
terms of age for the following reasons:  
 older directors provide greater expertise, experience and potentially have a 
bigger network 
 middle-aged directors are more suitable for the day to day running of the firm 
and the major executive duties 
 younger directors can bring new, creative and innovative ideas.  
Age as a variable can represent differences in skills, attitudes, personalities, values and 
traits of individuals (Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernandez-Izquierdo & Munoz-Torres, 2015). 
Scholars argue that these differences can be categorised into generations because the 
social and historical experiences from a given generation have influenced the 
individuals’ behaviours (Sullivan et al., 2009; Twenge et al., 2010). The general 
consensus amongst scholars about the four major generations of the 20th century is as 
follows: the Greatest Generation (born 1922-1945), Boomers (born 1946-1964), Xers 
(born 1965-1983) and Generation Y (born 1984-2002) (Sullivan et al., 2009; Twenge 
et al., 2010; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015). Twenge et al. (2010) argue that members of 
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the Greatest Generation age group are self-disciplined and extremely loyal employees 
who believe in traditional values. The Boomers believe that hard work leads to 
success, they value independent thinking and have extrinsic measures of career 
success (Twenge et al., 2010). Xers are said to be influenced by financial, family and 
societal insecurities that dominated their childhoods and although they lack solid 
traditions, they are more flexible and highly accustomed to rapid change (Ferrero-
Ferrero et al., 2015). Twenge et al. (2010) state that the characteristics of Generation 
Y members are less clear but because they grew up with the internet, they are 
innovative and are more accustomed to gaining access to information quickly. The 
growth of technological and social change over the past several decades means that 
the generations currently in the workplace have had different life experiences, beliefs 
and values (Pitt-Catsouphes, Mirvis & Berzin, 2013). Therefore, directors of different 
age groups can increase the overall diversity of the board of directors through access 
to a range of expertise, perspectives and skills (Mahadeo et al., 2012).  
 
Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007) state that there is an active promotion of age 
diversity in boards because the experiences, skills and knowledge of different age 
groups can improve the overall knowledge on the board. Age related differences in 
teams could also benefit companies by providing a greater diversity of skills and 
multiple perspectives (Hertel et al., 2013). Mudambi and Treichel (2005) state that 
younger directors are assumed to have better understanding of key aspects of today’s 
economy such as technology, markets and business metrics. From a resource 
dependence perspective, younger directors will be able to provide key resources to 
firms through their innovative nature and understanding of the modern economy 
(Mudambi & Treichel, 2005). Research by Barker and Mueller (2002) found that CEO 
age was positively associated with research and development spending in firms. They 
further concluded that younger CEOs tend to be more risk seeking and increase 
spending on research and development costs because their career and financial 
security concerns have a longer time horizon (Barker & Mueller, 2002). Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) stated that one of the most enduring findings about senior executives’ 
age is that older managers or executives tend to be more conservative, follow lower 
growth strategies and are more risk averse. This is consistent with the work of Zhihua 
(2010) who observed that older directors tend to be more conservative making them 
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more risk averse than younger managers, and more likely to comply with all the rules 
and routines of the firm. Therefore, older directors are expected to resist major changes 
in their organisations in order to maintain the status quo and a study by Frosch (2011) 
showed a positive relationship between the average age of employees and innovation. 
An earlier study by Child (1974) suggested that older executives might have greater 
difficulty in grasping new ideas and implementing organisational change. In addition, 
Barker and Mueller (2002) argue that older CEOs and executives tend to focus more 
on goals that benefit them in the short term, as they would soon be reaching retirement 
age. Older directors are generally at a point in life where financial security and career 
security are of greater importance, therefore any risky actions which may have an 
adverse effect on their security are avoided (Zhihua, 2010). This view is consistent 
with agency theory that proposes that agents do not always act in the best interests of 
shareholders but rather seek to maximise their own wealth (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
 
Over the past years, researchers have examined age by looking at older workers 
and generational differences in the workplace; however, the results have been 
inconclusive, as many empirical studies have only considered age as a control variable 
(Hertel et al., 2013; de Lange et al., 2010). In addition, Shore at al. (2009) state that 
research on age diversity is much less developed than research on race and gender, 
suggesting that the potential effects of age diversity on performance have not yet been 
fully established. Prior findings on the relationship between age diversity and 
corporate performance are inconsistent. Mahadeo et al. (2012) found positive effects 
of age diversity on firm performance whilst Zimmerman (2008) found no significant 
effects. Kilduff, Angelmar and Mehra (2000) examined 35 simulated firms with a total 
of 159 managers and found significant evidence to suggest that age diversity of team 
members positively affects firm performance. A different body of research by Kunze, 
Boehm and Bruch (2013) explored a common stereotype in literature that older 
workers are more cognitively rigid, short term focused and resistant to change than 
their younger counterparts. Their study examined a sample of 2,981 employees from 
various companies in Germany and found that older workers were less resistant to 
change than their younger counterparts (Kunze et al., 2013). In terms of linking age 
and gender, Wegge et al. (2008) reported that age and gender seem to have 
independent effects on intricate decision-making tasks. The arguments for age 
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heterogeneity and homogeneity on boards are inconclusive as issues on generational 
gaps can also impact board effectiveness, hence further research must be conducted  
(Kang et al., 2007). However, Harrison and Klein (2007) argue that age variety or 
diversity broadens the cognitive, behavioural repertoire of the board, which leads to 
better decision making and ultimately improves performance. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 2. Age diversity on the board of directors is positively associated with 
financial performance. 
 
3.3.3 Gender Diversity  
In 2005, the Ethical Investment Research service examined over 1,600 
companies listed on the FTSE All World Development Index and found that women 
only made up 7% of directors in these leading companies (Maier, 2005). Given this 
scarcity of female directors on boards, gender diversity has become one of the most 
debated, but important, element of board composition that has led to a growing body 
of research in business ethics and corporate governance (De Cabo, Gimeno & Nieto, 
2012). Although female representation on corporate boards is also now of increasing 
importance for policy makers around the world, there has been a slow advancement 
of the number of women on the board of directors (Terjesen, Sealy, Singh, 2009). 
Many European countries, such as Spain and France, have imposed minimum quotas 
for female representation on the boards of publicly traded organisations (De Cabo et 
al., 2012). The UK, on the other hand, has implemented voluntary standards to 
promote gender balance in boards (Visser, 2011). In 2012, the UK government put 
gender diversity in the boardroom at the top of its agenda, however in that same year 
nine out of ten board roles went to men (Neate, 2012). According to Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2004) female representation on boards is an area of concern because 
women’s talents are not being fully utilised. In addition, male directors had formed an 
elite and exclusive group in the UK’s corporate world which led to more homogenous 
boards than otherwise would have been the case. This makes gender diversity an 
important element of achieving board heterogeneity (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004).  
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There have been inconsistent findings on the impact of gender diversity on 
firm performance and the existing literature on women on corporate boards is inter-
disciplinary with research emerging from psychology, sociology, leadership, finance, 
management and corporate governance fields (Terjesen et al., 2009). De Cabo et al. 
(2012) found that banks with larger boards had a higher proportion of female directors 
on their boards, which could be a signal of smaller boards preferring homogeneity. 
Although some research identified that women have traits that make them well 
positioned for roles requiring trust, Bigelow and Parks (2006) (as cited in Terjesen et 
al., 2009)  observed that investors were willing to invest 300% more in male led firms 
than female-led ones. In contrast to this, Farrell and Hersch (2005) found that female 
directors were more likely to serve on boards of better performing firms suggesting 
this could be for two reasons. One could be that a shortage of supply allows women 
to self-select the companies in which they serve or the better performing firms were 
able to focus more on diversity goals. Carter et al. (2003) drew upon agency theory to 
explore the link between gender diversity and firm value, and found a positive 
relationship between the two on Fortune 1000 boards. Although the findings on gender 
diversity have produced mixed results, Konrad, Kramer and Erkut (2008) pointed out 
that there should be more than one female director on a board before female members 
can exert a positive influence on performance.  
 
Liao et al. (2015) identified that males and females are culturally and socially 
different which is reflected in their personalities, communication skills and 
educational backgrounds. Furthermore, a report by the Financial Reporting Council 
(2012) observed that women contribute significantly to a board as they are generally 
more committed, diligent, innovative and bring good dynamics to the board. Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003) state that in order for boards to effectively exercise their monitoring 
function, they need to have the right mix of experience and capabilities to monitor 
management and evaluate business strategies. Fondas and Sassalos (2000) argued that 
from an agency theory perspective, gender diversity through more female 
representation on boards, should improve the board’s monitoring role in protecting 
shareholders’ interests. This is because women have higher expectations about their 
responsibilities as directors which can make the board more effective in monitoring 
management (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000).  Furthermore, Huse and Grethe-Solberg 
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(2006) found that female directors can enhance board independence and improve 
corporate governance of firms. This is because women tend to take directorship roles 
more seriously by being better prepared for meetings and through more questioning 
and discussions than their male counterparts (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). This is 
reflected in a study conducted by Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) who found that the 
FTSE 100 firms in the UK that had female directors were quicker to adopt and report 
the recommendations of the Higgs review than male dominated boards.  
 
Other scholars who use the resource dependence framework argue that because 
firms operate in increasingly complex and uncertain environments, their boards must 
be composed of diverse individuals who can provide a breadth of resources (Terjesen 
et al., 2009). Hillman at al. (2007) further state that women have the potential to link 
firms to different networks or resources than men do by virtue of their different values, 
experiences and beliefs. In this context, greater board diversity expands board 
members’ networks and contacts, which in turn expands the networks and links of 
companies with their external environment (Hillman et al., 2000). A combination of 
societal expectations, institutional investors and recommendations from codes of best 
practice have placed pressure on firms to be more diverse and legitimate in their 
governance practices (Hillman et al., 2007). Research on firm legitimacy suggests that 
larger firms are more visible to the public therefore will experience more pressure to 
conform to the expectations of society (Suchman, 1995). Bilimoria (2006) proposes 
that female directors can also provide legitimacy to firms as their presence signals that 
a firm values the success of women in society. Institutional investors have also 
increased their scrutiny of boardrooms for diversity; therefore the reputation and 
credibility of a firm may be improved through gender diversity (Terjesen et al., 2009). 
In light of this, large firms, such as those in the FTSE 350, can improve their 
legitimacy and gain from a wider range of resources through gender diverse boards. A 
different body of research by Hillman et al. (2007) found that female representation 
on boards is linked to firm size, industry type and firm diversification strategy. Some 
studies have found correlations between particular industry sectors and female 
directors, such as retail, finance, media, banking and health care sectors (Hillman et 
al., 2007; McCormick-Hyland & Marcellino, 2002). A retired CEO of Avon Products 
Inc. concluded that because 60% of the company’s purchases were made by women, 
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it made more business sense to have female directors on the company’s board 
(Sweetman, 1996). Therefore, in certain markets, female directors may provide a vital 
resource by suggesting new strategies of bringing products to market based on 
knowledge of females as customers (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). 
 
Traditionally, women have made fewer investments into education and work 
experience which is reflected in lower pay and promotion (Tharenou, Latimer & 
Conroy, 1994).  Research by Oakley (2000) suggested that women are not offered 
organisational rewards, such as promotions or developments, because of the 
assumption that women lack adequate human capital for board positions. However, 
upper echelons theory suggests that individuals make decisions based on their 
cognitive bases and Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999) further suggest that people of 
different genders have different beliefs, attitudes and perspectives based on these 
differences. Therefore gender diversity can have a significant impact on the overall 
diversity of a board and on firm performance (Hillman et al., 2007). Gender is also 
said to be associated to risk seeking behaviour and Huang and Kisgen (2013) observed 
that male executives were more risk seeking than female executives when it came to 
issuing debt and acquisitions. However, Johnson and Powell (1994) argue that the 
perception that women are more risk averse than men is a stereotypical preconception 
that does not reflect women’s actual economic behaviour. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 3. Gender diversity on the board of directors is positively associated 
with financial performance. 
 
3.3.4 Education Diversity  
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) earliest upper echelon model recognised that 
one’s formal educational background may yield rich information. Therefore, to some 
extent, the skills and knowledge base of a person can be reflected through their 
educational background and qualifications (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Hitt et al. 
(2001) further suggested that knowledge is a vital competitive asset for firms that can 
be gained through formal learning or learning on the job. Individuals with higher 
education levels are assumed to have higher intellectual potential and tend to give 
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more reasons and objectives in the decision making process as they consider all 
stakeholders (Zhihua, 2010). Upper echelons researchers therefore suggest that 
education, to some extent, is an indicator of an individual’s values and cognitive base 
and that this can play a role in establishing strong inter-organisational ties (Hambrick, 
2007). Several studies noted by Hambrick (2005) found positive associations between 
executives’ formal education, innovation and company growth. However, there have 
been inconsistent findings on the impact of education on organisational outcomes. 
Wally and Baum’s (1994) study proved the assertions of upper echelons theory by 
examining the impact of executives’ education in strategic decision-making. This 
study found executives with higher education levels have greater cognitive complexity 
and such complexity provides greater ability in absorbing new ideas and accepting 
innovations. Furthermore, a handful of studies have found that more innovative 
organisations are led by executives with higher education levels (Barker & Mueller, 
2002).   
 
Naranjo-Gil, Maas and Hartmann (2009) showed that younger and shorter-
tenured financial directors with an educational background in business are associated 
with the use of innovative management accounting instruments. In line with these 
findings, Pavlatos (2012) examined a sample of Greek hotels and found that chief 
financial officers with a business-oriented educational background displayed more 
comprehensive use of cost-management systems. A different body of research has 
looked at the association between directors’ education level and firm growth. 
Schutjens and Wever (2000) examined the determinants of new firm success and 
found no significant relationship between education levels of directors and new firm 
success. In line with these findings, a study of 48 new start-up firms in Korea found 
education to be positively correlated with profitability but not with growth (Jo and 
Lee, 1996). In contrast, Audretsch and Lehmann (2005) found that firm survival was 
positively associated with the education of directors and was even higher for directors 
who were educated to degree level and above. Most of the studies mentioned above 
focused on directors’ education level, however there has been research that has 
associated university ranking with reputation and prestige (Zhihua, 2010). Lester et al. 
(2006) found that early stage investors place value on the educational prestige of an 
initial public offering firm’s executives and, that educational prestige was attributable 
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to increased investor valuations. Therefore, the greater legitimacy of an initial public 
offering firm, as signalled by the educational prestige of its executives, allows it to 
improve early stage valuation by investors. 
 
In terms of the impact of educational background on firm performance and 
board effectiveness, Cannella, Park and Lee (2008) found mixed results of both 
negative and positive correlations. However, Lee and Tsang (2001) pointed out that 
contradictory findings about the relationship between education level and firm success 
may be largely due to the confounding effect of firm size. They further concluded that 
the contribution of directors’ education level to venture growth of larger firms is 
statistically greater than that of smaller firms. Education plays a less important role in 
running smaller firms because they are simpler. This is because, in general, the 
operations of larger firms are relatively more complex, require more planning and 
more knowledge (Lee & Tsang, 2001). Therefore, despite the contradictory findings, 
Lee and Tsang (2001) proposed that education does indeed have a positive impact on 
firm success and growth because education equips an individual with various skills 
that are essential in running an organisation. Lester et al. (2006) suggest that 
individuals attribute different values and skills to status characteristics such as 
education level, networks, and experiences. This is consistent with D’Aveni’s 
assertion that “going to the proper schools, having impressive prior work experience 
and associating with the right people indicates higher status, aggregated prestige and 
skill” (1990, p.124). In their study of investor valuations, Lester et al. (2006) found 
that investors seem to reward firms with high levels of executive educational prestige 
where educational prestige is the reputation and ranking of the university an individual 
attended.  
 
Upper echelons theorists articulated that education can serve as an indicator of 
one’s values and cognitive preference only if it is assumed that most people take 
decisions about their education very seriously (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Looking 
at business education, other theorists and critics have argued that MBA programmes 
attract conservative, risk-averse students and teach analytic skills geared toward 
avoiding big mistakes or losses (Barker & Mueller, 2002). Therefore, MBA 
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programmes are perceived as doing little towards developing innovative or risk taking 
skills in students. A similar argument may be applied for legal education, which also 
seems to place little emphasis on innovation (Barker & Mueller, 2002). However, 
historically, compensation and salaries of employees and managers have been strongly 
linked to the education and experience they possess. Organisations have also heavily 
invested in different training courses designed to build and improve human capital and 
performance (Combs et al., 2006). Therefore, researchers have long understood that 
human capital, especially one’s education and training, plays a vital role in 
organisational performance (Crook et al., 2011). Zhihua (2010) proposed that the 
education of directors is also beneficial to companies in improving non-financial 
performance such as corporate social responsibility. This is because, the higher the 
education of directors, the longer they would have stayed in an educational institute 
that would have provided more social values. Therefore directors or executives with 
advance education will give more reasons and objectives in decision making and will 
be better placed to not only consider the demands of all stakeholders, but to pay more 
attention to social problems (Zhihua, 2010). Furthermore, Lee and Tsang (2001) state 
that the increasing complexity of the global business environment appears to indicate 
that education is a vital entrepreneurial quality. Based on these arguments, the 
following hypotheses are proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 4. The education level of the board of directors is positively associated 
with financial performance. 
Hypothesis 5. The educational diversity of the board of directors is positively 
associated with financial performance. 
 
 
3.3.5 Experience Diversity  
Carpenter et al. (2004) recognise that the expertise and skills of directors can 
be reflected through their previous experience. In addition, Mahadeo et al. (2012) 
argue that a wider range of knowledge, skills and occupations is vital for complex 
firms with multi-dimensional business needs and various functions. Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) suggest that research on corporate governance and board 
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composition can be advanced by going beyond an emphasis on the board’s propensity 
to exercise control over decision-making. They suggest this line of research should 
have a wider focus on whether directors possess relevant skills and experiences that 
enable them to effectively exercise control and monitor management. In line with this, 
Kroll, Walters and Wright (2008) propose that board effectiveness can be explained 
in part through the possession of suitable knowledge gained from directors’ 
experience. Therefore, boards of directors who do not have relevant experience may 
be incapable of fully contributing to the strategic decision making of a firm (Kroll et 
al., 2008). From an agency theory perspective, directors with suitable knowledge 
gained through experience will not only be better monitors, but will also be useful 
advisors to top managers (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory 
views director experience as a vital intangible resource that is more likely to produce 
competitive advantage due to experience being unique and hard to imitate (Crook et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, upper echelons scholars suggest that senior executives carry 
essential and unique skills that are displayed through their perceptions and beliefs, and 
these perceptions and beliefs are ultimately based on executives’ experiences (Nielsen 
& Nielsen, 2013). 
 
Although agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theories all 
emphasise the importance of experience in board effectiveness and decision-making, 
existing studies on the impact of director experience and performance have produced 
mixed results. Previous studies in management literature have examined the impact of 
director experience on different aspects of firm performance. For instance, a study by 
Fich (2005) revealed that shareholders react positively to the appointment of non-
executive directors with past CEO experience in other firms. However, Gray and 
Nowland (2013) found that both the depth and breadth of directors’ prior experience 
is valued by the market at the time of the directors’ appointment. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) proposed that greater experience can enhance a director’s ability to monitor 
firm performance and provide advice to the organisation. A different body of literature 
has examined the proposition that directors with certain functional backgrounds such 
as lawyers, marketing specialists and government officials, may provide important 
expertise and experience that is useful for advice and counsel (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). In agreement with this notion, a study by Westphal and Milton (2000) found 
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that directors with professional experience were able to understand business situations 
more effectively and made better acquisition decisions. Guner, Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) reported that directors with links to commercial banks assisted with access to 
their companies to acquire external financing. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) found that 
companies with financial expertise on their boards display a lower likelihood of 
accounting restatements. Other studies have found significant evidence to suggest that 
directors with political links and legal expertise are beneficial to their companies 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Krishnan, Wen & Zhao, 2011).  
 
Gray and Nowland (2013) recognise that experience and expertise are essential 
for an effective board because directors are required to perform numerous complex 
tasks which need skill and expertise. Although prior business experience and expertise 
in areas such as accounting, finance and law help directors in effectively performing 
their duties, Gray and Nowland (2013) argue that prior experience as a director is the 
most relevant experience that directors can possess. In addition to functional 
background, Le, Kroll and Walters (2013) note that firm and industry-specific 
experience are essential to directors’ abilities to perform their duties as this experience 
can impact decision making and performance. Industry specific human capital can be 
defined as implicit knowledge and experience of an industry’s structure, technologies, 
competitive environment and dynamics (Le et al., 2013). According to Hiebl (2013) 
directors with functional experience in a certain core industry will be more familiar 
with the activities in that industry, therefore uncertainties in the micro and macro 
environments will be better anticipated and prepared for. Various scholars have argued 
that an individual’s previous career experiences shape and influence their decision 
making process through the knowledge gained from their past experiences (Beckman, 
2006; Sorensen, 1999). Therefore, directors’ professional knowledge in industry and 
management should be beneficial to the quality of their decision-making and 
contribute to corporate competitive advantage, which ultimately leads to increased 
performance (Gray & Nowland, 2013). 
 
After the most recent financial crisis of 2007/8, Aldamen et al. (2012) found 
that during the crisis performance was positively related to the audit committee’s 
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expertise. An interesting proposition was brought forward by Li and Ang (2000) who 
suggested that directors with specialised skills or those with good reputations are 
needed to provide advice when the board has to make major decisions. Such directors 
do not need to attend to all routine business decisions but add value in special 
situations. This is evident in the case of Kroll et al. (2008) who found that directors 
with prior experience make better acquisition decisions and exert more influence on 
the board. This notion differs from that of Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) who found that 
the industry experience of executives had no effect on decision making and financial 
performance. However, Thorsell and Isaksson (2014) noted that previous research 
may have produced mixed findings on the influence of directors’ experience on firm 
performance due to issues of measurability and a shortage of available data. Kroll et 
al. (2008) defined director experience as the number of years a director has been a 
manager or board member of a firm within the same industry, whilst Certo et al. (2001) 
defined director experience as the number of cross directorships a board member has 
held. Other scholars such as Kang et al. (2007) and Bodnaruk et al. (2008) used age as 
a proxy for director experience suggesting that older directors should have more 
experience than younger directors. For that reason, it is important to define the term 
director experience for this study and provide a proxy for experience, skills and 
expertise of directors.   
 
The prior experience of directors is useful for learning and developing skills 
of how to be a director and, furthermore, developing an appreciation of the role 
(Westphal & Milton, 2000). The role of a director goes beyond reading financial 
statements and involves absorbing comprehensively large amounts of complex 
information quickly, evaluating the actions of management and how these actions 
impact the firm (Khanna, Jones & Boivie, 2014). Therefore, when directors have prior 
experience at senior levels in a firm, the human capital they develop should be 
invaluable as they should be more effective in providing strategic advice (Khanna et 
al., 2014). In addition, Fich (2005) argues that directors with previous experience of 
being a director provide unique expertise and are of greater value than directors of 
other occupations or positions. Directors with such experience are expected to produce 
high-quality outcomes through their pool of knowledge, skills and connections 
(Conger, Lawler & Finegold, 2002). External connections developed through previous 
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board appointments and industry experiences represent valuable capital as such 
connections provide access to vital resources (Hillman, 2005). This view is in line with 
the resource dependence perspective that views directors as a key link in gaining 
scarce resources and valuable information needed by the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). Upper echelons theorists propose that managerial (in this case directors’) 
inclinations, strategic choices and decisions are explained by the directors’ pre-
existing knowledge systems and skills. These knowledge systems and repertoire of 
skills are primarily derived from prior professional experience (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; 
Kor, 2003; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008). Therefore, directors’ current and past 
professional experiences as board members or as senior executives can be a strong 
indicator of their human capital (Certo, 2003). The main benefit of directors with 
senior level experience is that they provide the unique resource of direct experience 
which indicates greater intelligence and effectiveness (Khanna et al., 2014).  Taken 
together, the arguments presented suggest that the previous appointments of directors 
are a suitable proxy for experience in this study. Therefore, the following hypotheses 
are proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 6.  The experience level of directors is positively associated with 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 7.  The experience diversity of directors is positively associated with 
financial performance. 
 
3.3.6 Multiple Directorships  
Directors’ external ties are also referred to as inter-locking directorships, cross 
directorships, multiple directorships or directors’ networks in literature. Hillman et 
al.’s (2009) study notes that directors’ networks can be measured by the number of 
other directorships they hold on other boards. Therefore, this study will use the term 
multiple directorships to refer to directors’ external ties. Historically, multiple 
directorships date back to the 1900s where the US congress passed the Clayton Act 
which prohibited multiple directorships among firms under the notion that “…no man 
can serve two masters…” (Drago et al., 2015, p.40). These external ties were viewed 
as instruments for decreasing competition thus damaging the market. In a similar vein, 
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Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard (2003) suggested that multiple directorships keep 
directors extremely busy which can reduce monitoring and oversight of management 
and ultimately decrease firm value.  However in the second part of the 20th century 
many studies examined multiple directorships and made several theoretical and 
empirical contributions (Drago et al., 2015; Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Perry & Peyer 
2005). A view consistent with agency theory is found in the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 201) which states that the independence of non-executive directors may be 
affected when these directors hold multiple directorships or when they hold significant 
links with other directors (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). In contrast to this, 
Sarkar and Sarkar’s (2009) research supports resource dependence theory that states 
directors with multiple directorships have better networks which help firms to create 
vital linkages with external constituencies. This in turn not only provides access to 
external resources for companies, but also reduces uncertainties (Hitt et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, upper echelons theory proposes that directors’ external ties influence 
company strategy because directors act on the basis of their backgrounds and 
experiences (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).  
 
Despite the theoretical contributions that have been made by scholars, there is 
still an ongoing debate about the benefits and limitations of multiple directorships as 
previous studies have produced inconsistent findings (Drago et al., 2015; Renneboog 
& Zhao, 2014). Studies by Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) and Larcker, So and Wang 
(2013) both documented a positive association between multiple directorships and 
firm performance. Furthermore, Di Pietra et al. (2008) examined the effect of multiple 
directorships on the share prices of Italian companies and found a positive effect. 
Other scholars in the same field have researched the impact of directors’ external ties 
on firm value. After Harris and Shimuzu (2004) found a positive association between 
multiple directorships and abnormal security returns, they concluded that firms may 
seek to employ directors with multiple directorships because such directors are more 
likely to add value to the firm. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) report findings 
consistent with this and propose that directors may increase their primary employer’s 
shareholder value if they obtain valuable knowledge and strategies used by other 
companies. The main argument from these studies is that multiple directorships 
provide better access to information that is beneficial in the decision making process 
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of firms (Omer, Shelley & Tice, 2014). In contrast to this, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
found that firms with boards that had multiple directorships were associated with 
weaker profitability, weak corporate governance, lower market to book ratios and had 
lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Likewise, Jiraporn, Singh and 
Lee (2009) examined whether multiple directorships reduce a director’s ability and 
effectiveness in monitoring management. They reported that directors with multiple 
directorships were more inclined to be absent from board meetings and served on 
fewer board committees. However Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) found that independent 
directors with multiple directorships attended more board meetings and were more 
likely to attend a firm’s annual meeting. Therefore empirical evidence on the impact 
of multiple directorships on firm value and performance is mixed.  
 
A different body of literature has found directors with multiple directorships 
to be a useful resource in mergers and acquisitions. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) found 
a significant positive association between takeover frequency and linkages through 
directorships between the bidder and the acquirer. In addition, Cai et al. (2010) show 
that informational asymmetries are lower when the bidder and acquirer have a 
common director, suggesting that better connected firms will be more active in 
mergers and acquisitions. Firms may also seek out better networked directors in order 
to benefit from other intangible resources such as information, business practice or 
prestige. Dart (2004) suggested that banks may be more inclined to lend money if the 
borrower has reputable and prestigious directors. If this is the case, then the 
opportunity to gain easier access to capital markets becomes an essential advantage 
for any firm (Drago et al., 2015). Nicholson and Kiel (2007) stated that directors’ 
external ties are associated with prestige, visibility and reputation, which makes 
multiple directorships a valuable resource for firm legitimacy. Likewise, Clements, 
Neill and Wertheim (2015) contend that the number of multiple directorships a 
director holds is related to their reputational capital. Therefore, only highly qualified 
directors are given the opportunity to serve on numerous boards and such directors are 
effective in their governance roles (Clements et al., 2015). Multiple directorships also 
have the potential to increase a directors’ knowledge in varied regulatory and 
industrial environments, to learn different management styles and to learn new 
strategies (Loderer & Peyer, 2002). This experience in turn enables directors to 
78 | P a g e  
 
provide better advice and offer better monitoring which should help in reducing 
agency costs (Jiraporn, Kim & Davidson, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, there is still considerable debate in academic literature on 
whether multiple directorships enhance or constrain corporate governance 
effectiveness which ultimately impacts firm performance (Renneboog & Zhao, 2014).  
Directors have numerous responsibilities which include a duty of care and a duty of 
trust or fiduciary duties. The duty of care calls for directors to exercise independent 
judgement with reasonable skills, diligence and care whilst the fiduciary duties require 
directors to act in the best interests of the company, to avoid conflict between their 
duties and personal interests and to behave with integrity and honesty (Tricker, 2012). 
In line with this, Clements et al. (2015) argue that when a director holds multiple 
directorships, it has the potential to either add or subtract from their effectiveness in 
fulfilling their fiduciary duties to each firm. Likewise, Jiraporn et al. (2008) show that 
the busyness of directors through multiple directorships is negatively related to firm 
value. They further argue that directors who serve on multiple boards are too busy to 
effectively monitor management which may exacerbate agency conflicts. Other 
scholars contend that some companies may hire directors with multiple directorships 
in order to obtain a higher degree of freedom and thus move away from their fiduciary 
duties to shareholders (Drago et al., 2015). However, a significant number of studies 
have found benefits associated with multiple directorships including circulating 
information across companies, reducing scanning costs and serving as a mechanism 
for diffusing innovation (Collins & Clark, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Omer et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, upper echelons, resource dependence and agency theories all 
support the proposition that directors obtain vital information and experience from 
multiple directorships. This not only enhances directors’ effectiveness in monitoring 
and advising management, but also enhances their effectiveness in strategic decision 
making (Hillman et al., 2009; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). Therefore this study proposes 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 8. Multiple directorships on the board of directors are positively 
associated with financial performance. 
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3.4 Contextual Factors and Extension of Hypotheses  
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 identified that prior studies on board 
diversity and firm performance have produced mixed findings because contextual 
factors were not taken into consideration. This thesis attempts to address this gap in 
literature through also testing the association between board diversity and financial 
performance within different industries to account for contextual factors. O’Connor 
and Byrne (2015) note that there has been an ongoing debate in recent years in 
corporate governance literature about whether a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is 
appropriate. Dowell, Shackell and Stuart (2011) cautioned against adopting a universal 
corporate governance approach and argued that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms are contingent upon a firm’s circumstances and the firm’s 
environment. This is consistent with the ‘one size does not fit all’ notion that suggests 
corporate governance practices are not universal and vary across countries, markets 
and industries (Kelton & Yang, 2008). Capelle-Blancard and Petit (2017) noted that 
industries are unique in that there are different internal competencies and external 
pressures inherent in each industry. Therefore, they suggest that it is crucial for 
research to address industry differences, however this should not necessarily 
invalidate large cross-sectional analyses (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017).  
 
With regards to board diversity, a study by Ararat et al. (2015) contends that 
when examining the link between board diversity and performance, it is important to 
consider contextual factors as the performance effect of diversity can be task specific 
and contingent upon the context. Similarly, Black et al. (2012) suggest that good 
corporate governance is often ‘local’; however, there is still limited evidence on the 
extent to which corporate governance practices can be applied universally across 
countries or across firms within a country. The majority of previous research in 
corporate governance has examined the link between board composition and firm 
performance from an agency theory perspective. However, Filatotchev and Allcock 
(2010) argue that this is a ‘closed system’ approach as it posits a universal set of 
linkages that does not pay much attention to the different contexts in which firms are 
embedded. This is consistent with the work of Aguilera et al. (2008) who pointed out 
that the ‘under-contextualized’ nature of the agency theory framework limits its ability 
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to explain the diversity of corporate governance practices in different organisational 
and institutional contexts.  
 
A body of research under resource dependence theory argues that the resource 
provision of directors is more likely to benefit firms only at certain stages of their life 
cycle. In line with this, Daily et al. (2002) found evidence to suggest that the resource 
provision role of directors is more crucial for new and small firms than for larger 
mature firms. Other research in resource dependence theory has found that certain 
directors may become less valuable to firms as the external environment changes. 
Cameron, Whetten and Kim (1987) argued that directors’ role as resource providers 
appeared to be more vital during times of decline and bankruptcy because distressed 
firms normally experience a decrease in their relative resource bases. These limitations 
do not invalidate resource dependence theory, instead they point towards the 
perspective that the need for external resources and information is a function of 
environmental demands. Hence, firms with varying levels of dependence will require 
different environmental linkages. Filatotchev and Allcock (2010) build on previous 
research by examining how the resources and capabilities that shape organisations’ 
interdependencies with different business environments can mediate corporate 
governance practices. Their study proposes that the role and effects of corporate 
governance practices may differ in ways that are contingent upon the vital external 
and internal resources within the context of the firm’s market or sector (Filatotchev & 
Allcock, 2010). Carpenter et al. (2004), who stated that it is important to examine 
firms at industry level because complex environments will require different resources 
and boards in comparison with stable industries and environments, support this. In 
parallel to this, Hiebl (2013) noted that contradictory results on certain upper echelons 
characteristics may be attributable to different industries as one size or structure may 
not fit all. This links well with research question 3 of this study, which is to explore 
and discuss the most desirable characteristics of a successful board between industries.   
 
Ooi et al. (2015) point out that previous studies on board diversity have not taken 
into account industry-specific factors, which may influence firm outcomes. Whilst, 
Johnson et al. (2013) call for future research on board diversity to investigate 
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contextual factors in helping to reconcile the conflicting findings in prior studies. 
Therefore, this study directly responds to this call and adds to this body of knowledge 
by examining the link between board diversity and financial performance within 
industries. In line with this, the hypotheses developed in section 3.3 are reiterated and 
further extended by considering them within an industry setting. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are proposed:  
Hypothesis 9. The association between the board index and financial performance 
differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 10. The association between age diversity of the board of directors and 
financial performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 11. The association between gender diversity of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 12. The association between education levels of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 13.  The association between education diversity of the board of 
directors and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 14. The association between experience levels of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 15. The association between experience diversity of the board of 
directors and financial performance differs between industries. 
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Hypothesis 16. The association between multiple directorships on the board of 
directors and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested by grouping the study’s sample into industries and 
these findings are presented and discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
3.5 Contribution to Theory  
This study makes two major contributions to theory. First, by extending 
Haynes and Hillman’s (2010) and Jermias and Gani’s (2014) work, this study 
integrates agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theories and thus 
contributes by overcoming the dominant and current myopia within the three streams 
of research based on a single theory perspective. In so doing, the study provides a more 
complete lens for exploring the link between board diversity and financial 
performance. In addition, the study places an emphasis on the monitoring, strategic 
and resource-provision roles of directors, however unlike other prior studies, this 
thesis does not solely focus on structural diversity but it also includes demographic 
diversity. Second, the main limitation with an agency theory perspective is that it does 
not take into account the fact that boards of directors require different skills and 
attributes in order to effectively execute their roles (Volonté & Gantenbein, 2016). 
Therefore, this study adds to the existing body of literature by overcoming this 
criticism through an integration of the upper echelons perspective bringing a focus on 
the attributes and skills that directors have and, in turn, their capability in performing 
their duties and roles effectively. In contrast, the upper echelons stream of literature 
has predominantly focused on senior managers and executives as being the ‘people on 
top’ rather than the board of directors. Therefore, this study integrates both agency and 
resource dependence theories placing greater emphasis on the board directors, 
allowing this study to investigate the upper echelons of the board of directors. Lastly, 
this study responds to Zattoni and Van Ees’s (2012) study that examines the challenges 
of corporate governance research and suggests that a promising avenue for future 
governance research is to utilise a combination of theoretical paradigms that bridge 
the gap in literature on corporate governance. 
 
83 | P a g e  
 
3.6 Summary of Chapter  
This chapter has discussed and presented the theoretical framework of this study 
by examining and discussing agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theory. 
The integration of these three theories provides an alternative theoretical paradigm to 
view the relationship between board diversity and financial performance in 
companies. From this framework, six variables that proxy different attributes of 
diversity were discussed alongside the construction of the hypotheses to be tested in 
this study. These hypotheses are further extended by examining them within different 
industries. Table 3.2 presents an extension of Table 3.1 and shows a summary of how 
the research questions are addressed by the theoretical framework and how the 
variables and hypotheses are subsequently developed. The next chapter presents and 
discusses the research design, sampling strategy and research methodology employed 
in this study. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Research Questions, Theories, Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
                                                          
4 The variables with a double tick are predicted by more than one theory. 
Research Question Theory Variables 4 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.  The board index is 
positively associated with financial 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2. Age diversity on the board of 
directors is positively associated with 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 3. Gender diversity on the 
board of directors is positively associated 
with financial performance 
Hypothesis 4.  The education level of the 
board of directors is positively associated 
with financial performance. 
Hypothesis 5.  The educational diversity of 
the board of directors is positively 
associated with financial performance. 
Hypothesis 6. The experience level of 
directors is positively associated with 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 7. The experience diversity of 
directors is positively associated with 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 8. Multiple directorships on the 
board of directors are positively associated 
with financial performance. 
 
Which theoretical framework is the best predictor 
of board diversity and financial performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there a relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance? 
 
 
 
 
 
Does the relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance differ amongst industries? 
 
Upper Echelons Theory 
Proposes that top executives’ 
demographic characteristics are great 
predictors of performance. 
 
 
 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Education 
 Experience 
  Multiple directorships 
 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Maintains the view that the board of 
directors is a key link between a 
company and the resources it needs to 
increase performance. 
 
 
 Education 
 Experience 
  Multiple directorships 
 
Agency Theory  
Asserts that a key role of directors is to 
monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders, as effective monitoring 
can reduce agency costs and improve 
performance 
 Experience 
 Board size 
 Non-executive directors 
 Board independence 
 Board committees 
 Disclosure 
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Hypothesis 9.  The association between the 
board index and financial performance 
differs between industries. 
Hypothesis 10. The association between 
age diversity of the board of directors and 
financial performance differs between 
industries. 
Hypothesis 11. The association between 
gender diversity of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
Hypothesis 12. The association between 
education levels of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
Hypothesis 13.  The association between 
education diversity of the board of 
directors and financial performance differs 
between industries. 
Hypothesis 14. The association between 
experience levels of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
Hypothesis 15. The association between 
experience diversity of the board of 
directors and financial performance differs 
between industries. 
Hypothesis 16. The association between 
Multiple directorships on the board of 
directors and financial performance differs 
between industries. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
ANALYSIS METHODS  
 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter  
This chapter presents and discusses the research methods, methodology and 
empirical design of the regression models adopted in this thesis. The aims of this 
chapter are first, to provide a comprehensive explanation of the philosophical 
underpinning, research design and sampling strategy used in this study. Second, the 
chapter presents clear definitions and measurements of the dependent, independent 
and control variables that are used. Lastly, this chapter discusses the diagnostic checks 
undertaken and any econometric issues in the data, in order to determine the 
appropriate regression model.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the research paradigm, 
which is purely a positivist approach. Section 4.3 discusses and evaluates the research 
methods and design, which focus on quantitative methods and secondary data gathered 
from different sources. Section 4.4 presents the definitions and measurements of the 
independent, dependent and control variables. Section 4.5 discusses the characteristics 
of the data set and presents the results from the regression diagnostic tests in order to 
the appropriate multivariate technique. Section 4.6 discusses the empirical design of 
the regression model and the instrumental variables adopted. Section 4.7 discusses an 
alternative regression model that is used for robustness purposes. Section 4.8 discusses 
the ethical considerations for this research, and finally Section 4.9 summarises the 
main points discussed in this chapter. The research approach discussed in this chapter 
will contribute to answering the research questions and objectives previously outlined 
in Chapter 1. These are detailed in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 Summary of Research Objective and Research Questions 
 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy  
Many debates amongst philosophers are about issues of ontology and 
epistemology (Blaikie, 2010). Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012) simply 
define ontology as the nature of reality and existence, whilst epistemology is about the 
best ways of enquiring into the nature of the world. Generally, realism and 
subjectivism are the two ontological positions that represent the traditional and 
contrasting presumptions about the nature of social reality (Gill & Johnson, 2010). 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (p.19, 2012) realism places emphasis on the world 
being external and concrete, and that “…science can only progress through 
observations that have a direct correspondence to the phenomena being 
investigated…”. The realist’s philosophical stance is that reality exists independently 
of the researcher’s mind, therefore there is an external reality (Sobh & Perry, 2006). 
In addition, the realists believe that social reality (knowledge) can be investigated and 
discovered by the researcher (Blaikie, 2010). In contrast, the subjectivist’s 
philosophical stance is that social reality (knowledge) is created by the researcher, 
accounting for consciousness and perception (Gill & Johnson, 2010). This thesis is 
conducted in the broader scope of finance research that is dominated by the positivist 
Research Objective and Research Questions: 
Research Objective : To examine the impact of board diversity on the 
financial performance of FTSE 350 companies in 
the UK.  
Research Question 1: Which theoretical framework is the best 
modelling tool of board diversity and financial 
performance? 
Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between board diversity 
and financial performance? 
Research Question 3: Does the relationship between board diversity 
and financial performance differ amongst 
industries? 
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and realist paradigm (Lagoarde-Segot, 2015).  In a similar vein, objectivism is the 
epistemological view that, “…things exist as meaningful entities independently of 
consciousness and experience, that they have truth and meaning residing in them as 
objects…” (Crotty, 1998, p.5). Thus, the existence of social reality is the very first 
presumption of an objective epistemology and this is the epistemology that underpins 
the philosophy of positivism (Crotty, 1998). The nature of this study’s research 
questions warrants a realist ontological stance and a positivist epistemological stance 
based on the assumption that reality is external and objective. This objectivist 
approach supports the development of quantitative and econometrics-based research 
(Schinckus, 2015).  
 
4.2.1 Epistemology  
Epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and justified belief and 
is concerned with how knowledge is acquired and validated (Carter & Little, 2007). 
Crotty (1998, p.3) simply defines an epistemology as, “…a way of understanding and 
explaining how we know what we know…”. Epistemological assumptions in turn 
determine the way a researcher views the world, the methodologies their research will 
employ and the justification of their choices (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). An analysis 
of the financial stream of research conducted by Lagoarde-Segot (2015) reveals that 
academic finance research is dominated by the positivist research paradigm and 
governed by an objectivist epistemology. In addition, an econometric methodology is 
often employed in finance research and in the logical positivist tradition (Lagoarde-
Segot, 2015). Likewise, previous studies on corporate governance and performance 
show that it is an area dominated by the epistemological understanding that 
phenomena can be examined through objective categories and verified by empirical 
scientific methods (Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Ahrens & Chapman, 2006; Mahadeo et 
al., 2012). This is the philosophy of positivism which looks at observable reality and 
where the truth is achieved “…through the verification and replication of observable 
findings concerning directly perceivable entities or processes...” (Clark, 1998, 
p.1243). Historically, corporate governance research has been dominated by studies 
following a positivist philosophy by using quantitative methods to test predictions 
based on agency theory (Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2007; Zattoni, Douglas & 
Judge, 2013). A review of studies published in the Corporate Governance: An 
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International Review Journal revealed that the majority of studies published between 
the years 2008 and 2010 adopted an explanatory approach characterised by 
deductively testing theory driven hypotheses (Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). In addition, 
Ketokivi and Mantere (2010) observed that most of the studies in governance research 
have used statistical analysis to study large data sets. Although other methods have 
been used in governance research, Crow, Lockhart and Lewis (2013) note that studies 
underpinned by a positivist epistemology have produced significant empirical work in 
the corporate governance field.   
 
Positivism is an epistemological position that proposes applying natural 
sciences methods to social reality and presumes that knowledge is obtained through 
gathering facts and testing hypotheses (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The central idea of 
positivism is that the social world exists externally, therefore its properties should be 
measured using objective methods, as opposed to subjective ones (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). Positivism is an objective philosophy, as it seeks to test theories to provide 
a greater understanding of occurrences and it is beneficial in that it is quantifiable, it 
allows testing of data to get a defined answer and its quantifiable properties are not 
dependent on the researcher (Neuman, 2006). Within the positivist epistemology, the 
researcher is considered to be objective and unengaged from the study subject such 
that the data collection and analysis is detachable from the researcher (Blumberg, 
Cooper & Schindler, 2014). In contrast, interpretivists argue “…statistical patterns or 
correlations are not understandable on their own. It is necessary to find out what 
meaning people give to the actions that lead such patterns...” (Blaikie, 2010, p.115). 
Interpretivism is associated with qualitative methods and is subjective as it respects 
differences between people by looking at, understanding or interpreting beliefs, 
motives and reasons (Williams, 2000). This study’s epistemology is guided by 
positivism in that hypotheses formulated in the literature are tested to identify the 
board characteristics of UK companies that have an impact on financial performance.  
In essence, the positivist philosophical stance predominates in science with the 
assumption that science quantitatively measures independent truths about a single 
perceivable reality. That is, the data and its analysis are purely objective and data does 
not change because it is being observed (Healy & Perry, 2000). 
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A criticism of the positivism philosophy is its implication that observations can 
be made in a way that is not influenced by existing theories and social science scholars 
argue that positivism does not confront ethical responsibilities deemed inherent in 
social sciences (Clarke, 2009). In line with this, researchers in other paradigms, such 
as interpretivism and social constructionism, criticise positivists for separating 
themselves from the world they study, however Healy and Perry (2000) argue that this 
is irrelevant to quantitative research methods. Other critics of positivists contend that 
one of the greatest mistakes a positivist can make is to use available data for other 
purposes than its original intention, or to assume that only research topics with 
available data are worthy of study. A famous scientific philosopher named Karl Popper 
simply states that although scientific theories and methods are never entirely 
justifiable or verifiable, they are however testable (Popper, 2002). Furthermore, 
Schweizer (1998) states that methodologies underpinned by the positivist 
epistemology should be that the method’s validity testing ensures that any researcher 
who applies the same method to the same sample set would come to similar findings. 
Various scholars have attempted to merge the views of interpretivism and positivism 
whist other scholars maintain that the two philosophies have such great differences 
that they cannot be reconciled (Goldkuhl, 2012). Gray and Milne (2015) propose that 
rather than debating about which is the better philosophy or method, a more vital 
question for researchers to consider is which method(s) or philosophy best suits the 
study’s research objectives? In a similar vein, earlier research by Morgan (1983, 
p.397) recognised that “…interpretative social science certainly offers a brand of 
insight that positivism cannot achieve, but on the other hand, positivism can also 
generate forms of knowledge that elude the interpretative approach…”. Zattoni et al. 
(2013) called for governance scholars to explore corporate governance research using 
different methods, either quantitative, qualitative or both, to obtain a richer 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation. The presupposition of the 
existence of a causal relationship between board variables and firm performance in 
this study warrants the adoption of a positivist theoretical perspective. This will allow 
the appropriate methodology, methods of investigation and statistical testing of the 
hypothesised relationships. Furthermore, the data for this study is gathered from the 
Bloomberg portal and the FTSE 350 companies’ annual reports, which are both 
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available in the public domain. Therefore, the researcher will remain detached from 
the sources of the study.  
 
4.3 Research Methodology  
Crotty (1998, p.3) refers to methodology as “…the strategy, plan of action, 
process or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods…”. Likewise, 
the relationship between theory and research determines whether the data collected 
will either build or test theories (Baker & Foy, 2012). Therefore, in order to meet the 
needs of this research, quantitative research methods are used in line with the 
positivism philosophy and deductive research approach. Lawson (2005) proposes that 
(scientific) knowledge may be obtained by formulating hypotheses as tentative 
answers to the problem under investigation, then by subjecting this to empirical tests. 
This is the deductive process where theory is tested through empirical methods in order 
to confirm or disconfirm theoretical hypotheses (Carey, 2011).  Deduction is a form 
of inference that intends to be conclusive and for it to be correct the argument must be 
valid and the reasons must be true (Blumberg et al., 2014). In addition, the deductive 
approach requires a stronger link between reasons and conclusions than the inductive 
approach (Blumberg et al., 2014). The inductive approach extracts conclusions out of 
observations and is linked to theory building and qualitative research (Wilson & 
Maclean, 2011). Bryman and Bell (2015) state that this approach tends to have little 
or unclear theoretical significance and observations are never complete. Therefore, 
although academics contend that the deductive approach tends to be linear and rigid, 
it better suits the quantitative nature of this study where pre-existing theories are 
empirically tested.  
 
The choice for either qualitative or quantitative research methods is an 
epistemological issue that reflects scholars’ views on science and knowledge. The 
philosophical divide between qualitative and quantitative research is most evident 
when addressing the positioning of the researcher in the study (Bredo, 2009). 
Quantitative research allows researchers to explore regularities in phenomena, conduct 
empirical assessments, analyse statistical data and remain independent from the data 
(Zikmund et al., 2010). In addition, Crowther and Lancaster (2009) state quantitative 
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research is advantageous because it is objective, provides clear and precise answers, 
allows hypothesis testing and uses numerical data which can be analysed through 
statistical techniques. Other scholars argue that quantitative research is limited in that 
it is rigorous and does not always explain the reason why things happen, whereas 
qualitative research provides a more in depth and detailed explanation of happenings 
(Blaikie, 2010). However, this does not invalidate quantitative research methods, as 
they are the most useful techniques in testing hypotheses and identifying associations 
according to Robertson and McCloskey (2002). Other critics of quantitative methods 
state that social scientists often use easily accessible figures in their empirical models 
without examining adequately any biases in the metrics. This limitation may lead 
social scientists to make incorrect inferences through biased statistics (Gray & Milne, 
2015). Work undertaken by Straub, Boudreau and Gefen, (2004) and by Lee and 
Hubona (2009) addresses this precaution by providing detailed reviews and guidelines 
on validity and reliability in quantitative research that establishes the quality and 
accuracy of the results. Issues on research quality are addressed in a later section of 
this chapter. As previously mentioned, the predominant approach in corporate 
governance studies has been the use of quantitative and econometric analysis and a 
similar approach is adopted in this study.  
 
4.3.1 Sampling Strategy  
Kumar (2011) states that the purpose of sampling in quantitative research is to 
draw inferences about the population from which the sample was selected, therefore 
it is important to select an unbiased sample that is a good representation of the 
population. The sample chosen for this study is the member companies of the FTSE 
350 index between two periods, namely end of December 2004 to end of December 
2014. The FTSE 350 is the largest 350 companies from various industries listed on the 
London Stock Exchange by market capitalisation. There are various reasons for 
selecting the FTSE 350 index as the sample for this study. First, the FTSE 350 index 
covers a significant percentage of the London Stock Exchange market capitalisation 
making it a good representation of the population of large UK companies (FTSE 
Group, 2016). Second, the FTSE 350 companies are all subject to the same corporate 
governance provisions provided by the UK Corporate Governance Code and this 
allows the study to construct the board index used in this research. A single country is 
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selected in order to avoid differing legal structures and this is consistent with Zattoni 
and Van Ees (2012) who suggest that this is beneficial because legal and cultural 
institutions have a strong impact on governance phenomena and mechanisms. Lastly, 
this study selects the FTSE 350 member companies as its sample because previous 
corporate governance research in other countries, such as the USA, has examined large 
companies listed on indexes, which are comparable to the sample of this research 
(Erhardt et al., 2003; Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2012; Yermack, 1996). The 
majority of studies in both the upper echelons and corporate governance fields have 
been largely based in the USA. Zalewska (2014) observes that many of the previous 
studies on board composition have also largely focused on the USA in comparison 
with other countries. Therefore, the choice of sample will contribute to the existing 
body of literature in the corporate governance arena by focusing on the FTSE 350 
companies in the UK. Board diversity and diversity in the workplace has become a 
growing issue of interest in politics, codes of best practice and society at large in the 
UK. For instance, the Financial Reporting Council, fairly recently, made changes to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code that now require listed companies to disclose and 
publish their diversity policies (Vinnicombe et al., 2015). 
 
The period of study is between the years 2004 and 2014 in order to capture the 
evolving nature of UK board composition. When this study began, the most recent 
corporate governance code in the UK was the Corporate Governance Code 2014. As 
a result, the selected sample period encompasses the evolution of the codes of best 
practices in the UK, particularly from the Combined Code (2003) to the Corporate 
Governance Code 2014.5 According to Zattoni and Van Ees (2012) the analysis of 
longitudinal data samples is helpful in understanding the dynamics of governance 
mechanisms as corporate governance issues are in continuous evolution. Previous 
studies on board composition and performance have used time lags ranging from one 
to three years for dependent variables with no consensus as to which lag is best 
(Abdullah, Ismail & Nachum, 2016; Carter et al., 2010; Hitt et al., 2006; Jackling & 
Johl, 2009). A meta-analysis of women on boards and firm performance, conducted 
                                                          
5 The researcher is aware that there now later editions of the code, namely the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2016 and 2018. However, at the time when the research commenced and data was 
collected the most recent code was the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014.  
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by Post and Byron (2015) found studies with effect sizes derived from firm 
performance were more positive for studies that used lags versus those that had no 
lags. Weir and Laing (2000) use a one-year time lag for their study and suggest that 
the lag between the change in governance structure of a firm and the effect on firm 
performance is particularly longer for accounting performance measures. Similarly, 
earlier research by Daily and Johnson (1997) confirmed that board composition was 
associated with financial performance two years later. Therefore, although the sample 
period for this study covers ten years, data for the independent variables is collected 
for the years 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. The performance measures and control 
variables are collected for the years, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. This is in order 
to analyse differences over longer periods and to incorporate a two-year lag between 
the dependent and independent variables, as their effects will not likely be immediate 
(Daily & Johnson, 1997; Hitt et al., 2006). 
 
Initially the sample consisted of all companies that were listed on the FTSE 350 
index at any point during the sample period. The screening process required companies 
to meet the following criteria:  
 The company had to be listed on the FTSE 350 index for a minimum of five 
consecutive years during the sample period. 
 The company had to have data reported on the Bloomberg database or in 
publicly available annual reports.  
Historical data on the FTSE 350 index company listings was gathered from the 
Bloomberg portal and the London Stock Exchange. Appendix A provides a full list of 
the screening process, including the companies that were included and excluded in the 
sample, and Table 4.2 provides a summary of the screening process.  
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Table 4.2 Overview of Sample Screening 
Criteria No. of 
Companies 
Initial sample  
 
637 
Exclude companies delisted from FTSE over sample period  
 
-413 
Companies consistently listed on the FTSE 350 for a minimum of five 
consecutive years between 2004 - 2014 6 
 
224 
Exclude equity investment instruments  
 
-22 
Exclude companies with no data reported on Bloomberg or available 
annual reports  
 
-4 
Final sample  
 
198 
 
 
A total of 224 companies met the first criteria and were listed on the FTSE 350 index 
for five consecutive years during the sample period. Companies listed as equity 
investment instruments were removed from the sample as their data is not available 
and thus did not meet the second criteria.  This brought the final sample for this study 
to a total of 198 companies, of which 78 of the firms in the sample are listed on the 
FTSE 100. A noticeable change in the screening process was that many companies 
that were excluded from the sample either were delisted from the index in 2008 or 
only became listed in 2010 after the financial crisis of 2007/8. A total of 41 firms in 
the final sample were not listed on the FTSE 350 index in the year 2004 and this year 
has the lowest representation of the sample and makes the dataset an unbalanced panel. 
Moreover, the inclusion of companies that have been consistently listed on the FTSE 
350 creates survivorship bias, however, it also allows the researcher to observe 
changes in board diversity for different firms over time. Overall, the sample is a good 
representation of the population of the largest 350 companies in the UK in each given 
year. 
 
                                                          
6 This criterion was selected to ensure the companies that were included were listed on the FTSE 350 
in the majority of the sample period, where they would all be liable to adhere to similar codes of best 
practices and regulatory requirements.  
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Previous studies on corporate governance and performance have excluded 
financial firms from their sample for various reasons. The main reasons behind this 
exclusion have been that financial firms are heavily regulated; therefore, their 
corporate governance systems and corporate performance may be affected differently 
to other industries (Cheng, 2008; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002). In the first part of 
the analysis, this study includes financial firms because doing so increases the sample 
size, which may lead to better results. The study also controls for variations in sectors 
and industries in the statistical software package used for the analysis. In the second 
part of the analysis, this study groups the firms into industry sectors and analyses the 
data as an industry comparison of 16 industry sectors as classified by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Hiebl (2013) notes that contradictory results on 
certain upper echelons characteristics may be attributable to different industries as one 
size or structure may not fit all. For instance, Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007) found 
a positive relationship between CEOs’ education and financial measurement systems 
whilst Burkert and Lueg (2013) did not find any significant relationship. However, 
Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2007) studied public hospitals whilst Burkert and Lueg 
(2013) studied large listed companies. The London Stock Exchange categorises 
companies into 41 different industries, however there are some industries into which 
none of the FTSE 350 companies fall and other industries that only have one or two 
companies under them. Therefore, the sample is broken down by industry according 
to SIC codes, which classify companies in industry sectors according to the economic 
activities that the companies are engaged in. Table 4.3 displays how the sample set is 
broken down into 16 industries over the sample period.                                                                                      
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Table 4.3  Industry Breakdown of Sample Set  
 
                                                          
7 This represents the total number of companies in the sample for each given year over the sample period. The year 2004 had the lowest representation of the sample 
compared to other years.  
Industry  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 TOTAL 
Accommodation, Food & Beverages Services 8 10 10 10 10 48 
Banking 7 7 7 7 7 35 
Business Support, Leasing, Employment, Public Administration Activities  6 12 12 12 12 54 
Construction and Development of Buildings 17 20 20 20 20 97 
Electricity, Gas, Water collection & Sewerage 4 5 5 5 5 24 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 5 9 9 9 9 41 
Financial Services, Auxiliary Services to Finance & Real Estate Activities 13 20 20 20 20 93 
Insurance 6 8 8 8 8 38 
IT, Media, Broadcasting & Publishing  6 8 8 8 8 38 
Management Consultancy, Head Offices Activities, Architectural & Engineering Services 12 15 15 15 15 72 
Manufacturing 32 36 36 36 36 176 
Mining & Quarrying 7 7 7 7 7 35 
Retail Sales, Gaming & Betting activities 12 15 15 15 15 72 
Telecommunications 6 7 7 7 7 34 
Transport 8 9 9 9 9 44 
Wholesale Trade 8 10 10 10 10 48 
TOTAL7 157 198 198 198 198 949 
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Table 4.3 displays a slight change in sample size in some industries and most 
changes in size occur between the years 2004 and 2006 where there is an increase in 
size. The most considerable change is seen in the financial services, auxiliary services 
to finance and real estate activities industry sector which had 13 companies in 2004 
and 20 companies in 2006 onwards. Industry sectors with closely linked SIC codes 
and similar economic activities are merged together and this is displayed in Appendix 
B. The industries with the most companies in this sample set are the manufacturing, 
financial service and construction industry sectors. Overall, this study will have 949 
firm year observations comprised of 16 industries over a 10-year period. Research 
conducted by Carpenter et al. (2004) observed it is important to examine the 
environment at the industry level because complex environments may require 
heterogeneous boards whilst homogenous boards may be more effective in stable 
industries and environments. Therefore, this study controls for industry dynamism 
which is further discussed in the next sections.  
 
  
 
4.3.2 Data Collection  
Data collection is a vital part of the research process as the validity, reliability 
and accuracy of data can be impacted by the sources of information from which it is 
gathered. Data can be categorised into either primary data or secondary data. Cooper 
and Schindler (2008) broadly describe primary data as raw or original data gathered 
for a specific study by the researcher, whilst Baker and Foy (2012) describe secondary 
data as data that has been previously collected by other researchers or organisations. 
Hox and Boieje, (2005) note that some research questions can be answered by using 
data previously collected by other scholars or for purposes other than research, such 
as companies’ annual reports and official statistics. Furthermore, Bryman and Bell 
(2015) summarise the advantages of secondary data collection as being less costly, 
less time consuming, data from official channels may be of a better quality and 
secondary research allows for the construction of longitudinal and trend analysis 
studies. However, secondary data must be used with caution as Kumar (2011) states 
that problems may occur with the availability, format and quality of this data. 
Researchers are required to locate data sources that meet the specific needs of their 
research, and when using secondary research, the relevant data may not always be 
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available (Kumar, 2011). Likewise, it is important to evaluate the quality of secondary 
data and this is less of a problem with official sources of data according to Oakshott 
(2009). This study uses secondary data collected from different sources and this is 
shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 Data Sources 
Variable Information Source Type of Data 
 
Return on Assets 
 
 
Bloomberg database 
 
Financial 
 
Return on Equity 
 
 
Bloomberg database 
 
Financial  
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Bloomberg database 
 
 
Financial 
 
Age 
 
 
Annual reports  
 
Governance 
 
Gender 
 
 
Bloomberg database 
 
Governance  
 
Education 
 
 
Annual reports  
 
Governance 
 
Experience 
 
 
Annual reports  
 
Governance 
 
Multiple directorships 
 
 
Bloomberg database 
 
Governance 
 
Board Index  
 
Annual reports  
 
Bloomberg database 
 
 
Governance 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows that the data required for this study is available in the public domain 
and will therefore be collected from both the Bloomberg database and companies’ 
annual reports. Bloomberg is a credible and professional source of information, which 
provides the benefit of reduced human errors and reliability. The literature reviewed 
in Chapter 3 shows that data was needed to provide proxies for a number of the board 
characteristics including age, education and experience. Therefore, although this data 
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is manually collected from companies’ annual reports, the researcher used different 
techniques and calculations to provide proxies for these variables, which is discussed 
in more detail in the next section.  
 
4.4 Measurement of Variables  
This section presents the definitions of the dependent, independent and control 
variables used in this research. The discussion will focus on how each of these 
variables are measured in this study, identify any differences from previous studies 
and discuss the construction of the corporate governance board index. Table 4.5 
displays a summary of the variables and their measurements for this study.
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Table 4.5 Summary of Variables and Measurements 
Dependent Variables  Measurement References  
Return on Assets 
 
(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇−𝑡𝑎𝑥)/𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 Kamardin  (2014) 
Masulis, Wang & Xie (2012)  
 
 
Return on Equity 
 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
Khanna, Jones & Boivie (2014)  
Lückerath-Rovers (2013) 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐿 / 𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑆 / 𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
Bhagat & Bolton (2013) 
Francis, Hasan & Wu (2015)   
 
Independent Variables  Measurement References  
Age 
 
Blau’s Index Ali, Ng & Kulik (2014) 
Boehm, Kunze & Bruch (2014)  
 
Gender 
 
Proportion of female directors on the board (%) Liao, Luo & Tang (2015) 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman (2012) 
 
Education 
 
Four-point scale reflecting the highest level of education attained 
 
Blau’s Index 
 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman (2012) 
Nielsen & Nielsen (2013) 
Experience 
 
Four-point scale reflecting the highest previous position held 
 
Blau’s Index 
 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman (2012) 
Nielsen & Nielsen (2013) 
 
 
Multiple Directorships 
 
 
Average number of directorships held by each director 
 
 
Gray & Nowland (2013) 
Khanna, Jones & Boivie (2014) 
 
Corporate Governance Board Index 
 
 
Aggregate score from Index (see Section 4.4.2) 
 
Bozec & Bozec (2012) 
Bhagat, Bolton & Romano (2008) 
Control  Variables  Measurement References  
Firm Age 
 
Number of years from date of incorporation 
 
Jackling & Johl (2009)  
Musteen, Datta & Kemmerer (2010) 
 
Firm leverage 
 
Percentage of long term debt to total capital 
 
Jackling & Johl (2009)  
Erkens, Hung & Matos (2012) 
 
Firm size 
 
 
Logarithm of total assets 
 
Nielsen & Nielsen (2013) 
Musteen, Datta & Kemmerer (2010) 
 
Industry Dynamism 
 
 
Standard error of the slope coefficient divided by mean value of sales 
 
 
Farjoun & Levin (2011) 
Zhang, Garrett-Jones & Szeto (2013) 
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4.4.1 Dependent Variables  
Firm performance can be measured in terms of financial performance and non-
financial performance; however, prior studies reviewed in Chapter 2 display that 
financial performance is a better indicator of how a firm is maximising shareholders’ 
wealth. Tobin’s Q is selected as the primary measure of financial performance in this 
study because it is the conventional proxy of firm performance in both corporate 
finance and corporate governance research (De Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Yang  & 
Zhao, 2014; Yermack, 1996). Futher to this, Nahar-Abdullah (2004) recommends the 
use of more than one performance measure in order to incorporate a wider range of 
performance issues. Consequently, this study also employs the return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE) as alternative measures of financial performance. These 
three measures of financial performance are adopted for four reasons. First, Ntim 
(2015) states that there is no agreement amongst existing corporate governance studies 
as to which is the best measurement of financial performance. Consequently, 
employing three different proxies of financial performance allows for robustness when 
checking the findings (Terjesen et al., 2016).  
 
Second, the theory developed in this study proposes that greater demographic 
diversity in the board of directors should improve the board’s ability to monitor and 
provide advice to executives. This in turn improves financial performance and Khanna 
et al. (2014) suggest that this improved financial performance is better represented in 
accounting based measures such as ROA and ROE. This is because accounting based 
measures indicate the effectiveness of the governance of a firm whilst market based 
measures are based on investors’ perceptions (Khanna et al., 2014). Third, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) examine the relationship between board leadership and firm 
performance and find that CEO duality is not significantly related to Tobin’s Q but 
has a significant negative relationship with ROA. Therefore, they conclude that the 
relationship between board structure and firm performance may be dependent on the 
type of measurement used for firm performance. Fourth, these financial performance 
measures are consistent with those used in previous corporate governance research 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Erhardt et al., 2003; Hillman et al., 2007; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Rodriguez-Fernandez, Fernandez-Alonso & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014).  For 
these reasons, this study uses measures of both accounting based performance and 
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market based performance in order to see whether there are different effects in the 
relationships between board diversity and ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q.  
 
Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is a market-based performance measure that was originally 
formulated by Tobin (1969) and is defined as the ratio of the market value of a 
company to the replacement cost of its assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). The criterion of 
Tobin’s Q is based on the comparison of a firm’s value in financial markets and its 
book value or capital stock (Holmes & Maghrebi, 2015). The forward-looking 
measure, Tobin’s Q is typically calculated as follows:  
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄=𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐿 / 𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑆 / 𝑇𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
Where:  
MVE (the market value estimate) = the product of a firm’s share price and the 
common stock outstanding  
L/TDebt = the book value of long term liabilities  
NetS/TDebt = the book value of current liabilities less current assets  
The numerator of Tobin’s Q equation partly reflects the value assigned by investors to 
a firm’s intangible assets; however, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that the 
denominator excludes the firm’s investments in intangible assets that are normally 
treated as expenses. Furthermore, Reddy, Locke and Scrimgeour (2010) state that this 
exclusion distorts the comparison of performance of firms that have differing degrees 
of intangible capital and this can be resolved by using depreciated book values of 
tangible assets. Theoretically, higher values of Q should encourage more investment 
because the relative cost of increasing capital stock through issuing new equity is 
reduced (Hansen & Seo, 2002). Earlier work done by Lang and Stulz (1994) suggests 
that the ‘Q measure’ is a better performance measure when comparing firms or 
industries because it does not require risk adjustment or normalisation.  
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Accounting scientists tend to prefer the use of measures such as Tobin’s Q over 
traditional accounting ratios and simple market valuations (Chahal & Kumari, 2013). 
Unlike ROA and ROE, Tobin’s Q reflects the long-term value of the firm, and it has 
to do with market perceptions about the value of corporate governance within the firm 
(Siddiqui, 2014). As a result, scholars argue Tobin’s Q is beneficial in that it takes into 
account both asset value and market value (Chahal & Kumari, 2013). In addition, 
Holmes and Maghrebi (2015) state that the q theory is particularly important in 
explaining economic fluctuations as it provides a vital linkage between the real and 
financial sectors. Earlier research has highlighted the difficulty in the calculation of 
‘Q values’ due to its complexity and costly data requirements, this study however, will 
avoid these issues by utilising the Bloomberg portal to get standardised data for all the 
FTSE 350 companies. 
 
Return on Assets  
Return on assets is a short term accounting based indicator of performance that 
is commonly accepted as a ‘yardstick’ for measuring business success (Brealey, Myers 
& Allen, 2014). Return on assets looks at the ratio of income to total assets and is 
expressed as follows:  
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇−𝑡𝑎𝑥)/𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
Where:  
EBIT = earnings before interest and tax  
Average total assets = the sum of total assets at the beginning and at the end of the 
financial year divided by two 
 
The calculations for ROA are normally based on the assumptions that net income 
includes extraordinary items and adjustments for changes in accounting principles; 
and the average total assets are the beginning and end of year assets divided by two. 
ROA is beneficial in that it measures how successful a company is in generating 
earnings independent of the financing of the assets (Azhar & Afandi, 2003). Some 
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limitations of this ratio are that it relies on financial information that can be 
manipulated by managers and it may be difficult to compare values across firms due 
to different depreciation methods and inflation of book values (Dragomir, 2010). 
Other critics state ROA is backward looking and only partially estimates future events 
in the form of depreciation and amortisation (Reddy et al., 2010). Although some 
critics argue that accounting-based performance measures can be manipulated by 
managers, agency theory argues that independent non-executive directors should 
improve transparency and disclosures of financial information through monitoring 
management (Clemente & Labat, 2009). In addition, Siddiqui (2014) states that both 
ROA and ROE reflect a tangible balance sheet effect with the influence of corporate 
governance already integrated in the accounting values. 
 
Return on Equity  
Arnold (2013, p.512) defines return on equity as “…profit attributable to 
shareholders as a percentage of equity shareholders’ funds…”. This ratio is expressed 
as follows:  
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
Where:  
Net income = fiscal year’s net income before ordinary share dividends  
Total equity = ordinary share capital plus reserves  
 
Net income is calculated as the fiscal year’s net income before ordinary share 
dividends and the total equity is ordinary share capital plus reserves (Atrill, 2009). 
This technique is a popular measure of corporate performance and Monteiro (2006) 
argues that ROE is one of the most important ratios that investors and shareholders 
should consider. In a similar vein, Khanna et al. (2014) suggest that ROE is an 
appropriate measure in corporate governance studies because it not only reflects the 
operating efficiency of a firm, but it also reflects the firm’s financial choices. 
Therefore, a performance measure that incorporates both operating efficiency and 
financing is useful given that boards are concerned with total firm performance. ROE 
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also has the benefit of linking asset turnover, financial leverage and profitability and 
it represents the end result of structured financial ratio analysis or the DuPont system 
(Brealey et al., 2014). Research by Frezatti (2007) posits that ROE allows for 
comparisons which are harder to make with other measures of return and it allows for 
a useful approximation of the return potential created in a limited time period, thus 
making it a popular indicator of return to shareholders. The major limitations of ROE 
are that it uses accounting income which can be manipulated with changes in 
accounting policies and it does not take into account the cost of its own capital (De 
Wet & Du Toit, 2007). In line with this, Khanna et al. (2014) propose that ROE may 
be viewed as a biased measure of total firm performance because two companies with 
the same net income may have different ROEs based on their level of debt. Therefore, 
this study controls for the level of firm debt by incorporating firm leverage as a control 
variable in the analysis models. In addition, the regression models are run using the 
other dependent variables to ensure robustness and allow comparability.   
 
There is a considerable debate in the literature concerning the association 
between corporate governance and measures of firm performance. For instance, 
Gompers et al. (2003) argue that investors may not always understand the implications 
of corporate governance on a company’s market value. Consequently, Core, Guay and 
Rusticus (2006) suggest that measures such as ROA are more suited for examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance. This study contributes 
to this debate by using both accounting and market based measures of performance 
and observing any differences or similarities in the governance-performance 
relationship. In addition, using all three performance measures in this study limits 
criticisms of ROA and ROE being ‘backward looking’ and Tobin’s Q as being 
‘forward looking’ by providing a more holistic view of the companies’ financial 
performance (Reddy et al., 2010).  
 
4.4.2 Independent Variables  
Table 4.5 presented the independent variables for this study, which are age, 
gender, education, experience, multiple directorships and the corporate governance 
board index. This section presents the definitions and measurements of these variables 
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together with a comparison of their measurements in previous studies. Appendix C 
shows the variations and similarities between measurements of these variables in 
previous studies and this study. The first section discusses Blau’s Index (1977) which 
is used to measure three of the independent variables for this study.  
 
Blau’s Index  
Scholars suggest that measures of dispersion of a group over specified 
categories rather than central tendencies are more vital in analysing the effects of 
demography on organisational performance (Nielsen, 2010). Researchers quantify the 
diversity of groups or teams in several ways, however Blau’s (1977) index of 
heterogeneity has been extensively used and is accepted as the norm by scholars in 
upper echelons and top team management research to measure categorical variables 
(Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015; Naranjo-Gil, 2009; Oba & Fodio, 2013). Blau’s index 
was previously known as Hirschman’s (1964) index, but was however originally 
proposed by Simpson (1949, quoted in Harrison & Klein, 2007) as a measure the 
diversity of species in ecosystems. Research by Harrison and Klein (2007) identified 
different types of diversity: diversity as separation, disparity and variety. Blau 
originally termed the variety form of diversity as heterogeneity, however other 
scholars have termed this as categorical variability and information diversity (Blau, 
1977; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999). Blau’s Index is a 
suitable measure for categorical variables, particularly because categorical variables 
are not amenable to the coefficient of variation measure (Naranjo-Gil, 2009). This 
index is calculated as follows:  
1 − ∑𝑝
2
𝑖
 
In this equation p is the proportion of team members in a given category whilst 
i is the number of various categories of the feature across all groups (Naranjo-Gil & 
Hartmann, 2007). The values of the Blau Index range from zero to one. A score of 
zero indicates perfect homogeneity or no diversity. Higher scores on this index 
indicate higher diversity of a certain feature between group members. The maximum 
Blau Index for a feature in a particular data set is determined by the number of 
categories of that feature in the data set and is calculated as: (n-1)/n where n is the total 
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number of categories (Haas & Nuesch, 2012). Therefore, according to Blau’s index, 
the higher the number of categories in a variable and the more equally the attributes 
are distributed across the various categories, the lower the sum of proportions and 
consequently the larger the Blau index value (Ararat et al., 2015). Harrison and Klein 
(2007) suggest that Blau’s index as a measure of diversity has desirable mathematical 
properties and has a tidy range of values from zero to one. Harrison and Klein (2007) 
further suggest that the choice of diversity measure in research should be determined 
by the theoretical specification of the type of diversity. Therefore, because this study 
has specified diversity as variety, Blau’s index is a suitable measure for the diversity 
of applicable variables.  
 
Age  
Shore at al. (2009) state that research on age diversity is much less developed 
than research on race and gender, suggesting that the potential effects of age diversity 
on performance have not yet been fully established. Prior findings on the relationship 
between age diversity and corporate performance are inconsistent. Mudambi and 
Treichel (2005) measure age as the average age of senior management in years and 
find no association between top managers’ age and performance of new ventures. In 
contrast, Mahadeo et al. (2012) measure age diversity using a Likert scale of different 
age bands and find a positive relationship between age diversity and performance. 
Harrison and Klein (2007) suggest that there should be an appropriate 
operationalisation to each type and measure of diversity. As a result of this, Ferrero-
Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2012) and Ferrero-Ferrero et al. 
(2015) empirically examine measures of age diversity and propose that generational 
diversity in firms can be categorised as diversity as variety. Furthermore, Ferrero-
Ferrero et al. (2012) use Blau’s index to measure age diversity and find a significant 
positive relationship between age diversity and firm performance. In line with this and 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, this study will use Blau’s Index (Blau, 1977) to 
measure age diversity in companies by means of four categories based on generations. 
These categories are: the Greatest Generation (ages 71-87), Boomers (ages 52-70), 
Generation X (ages 33-51) and Generation Y (ages ≤ 32). These categories fall in line 
with the general consensus amongst scholars about the four major generations of the 
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20th century (Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015; Sullivan et al., 2009; Twenge et al., 2010). 
Blau’s Index (Blau, 1977) is calculated by the following equation, where i is a 
particular generation and pi is the proportion of directors of a particular generation 
within the board. 
Diversity = 1 − ∑𝑝
2
𝑖
 
By using Blau’s Index for diversity, age is a continuous variable and in this study’s 
sample Blau’s index of age diversity varies between 0.00 and 0.75.  
 
Gender  
A report by the European Commission (2012a) observes that women 
contribute significantly to a board through greater innovation, productivity and 
improved company performance. Furthermore, Konrad et al. (2008) assert that there 
should be more than one female director on a board before female members can exert 
a positive influence on performance. However, previous findings on gender diversity 
have produced mixed results and remain inconclusive. Farrell and Hersch (2005) find 
that women are more likely to serve on better performing boards but did not find any 
significant direct links between gender diversity and performance.  Mahadeo et al. 
(2012) did however find a strong positive relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance. Similar to the studies by Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Mahadeo et 
al. (2012), this study measures gender as an estimated proportion of board size at the 
year-end and as a percentage. This will reflect the extent of female director 
appointments and the extent of gender diversity on the board.  
 
Education  
Historically, compensation and salaries of employees and managers have been 
strongly linked to the education and experience they possess. Organisations have also 
heavily invested in different training courses designed to build and improve human 
capital and performance (Combs et al., 2006). Therefore, researchers have long 
understood that human capital, especially one’s education and training, plays a vital 
role in organisational performance (Crook et al., 2011). Previous studies have used 
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different measures for education. For instance, Pavlatos (2012) measures educational 
background as the ratio of the years of business-oriented education to the total number 
of education years. Lee and Tsang (2001) measure the level of education in years 
whilst Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) use Blau’s index to measure educational diversity. 
The hypotheses for directors’ education developed in Chapter 3 are in two parts, the 
first part seeks to link directors’ education levels with performance and the second 
part links educational diversity with performance. Therefore, the measurement of 
directors’ education in this study is in two parts. First, to assess the directors’ education 
levels, a four-point scale that reflects the highest level of education attained is used. 
This scale is similar to the one used by Mahadeo et al. (2012) and Barker and Mueller 
(2002), and is coded in bands ranging from zero to three as follows:  
0 = No college degree 
1 = Undergraduate degree 
2 = Master’s degree 
3 = PhD degree 
 
Although simply counting the number of education bands present in a board can reflect 
education diversity, a more robust measure is to use Blau’s Index for diversity. 
Therefore, educational diversity is measured as the Blau index of directors’ current 
educational backgrounds using the formula below:  
Diversity = 1 − ∑𝑝
2
𝑖
 
In this formula, i is a particular education band and pi is the proportion of directors of 
a particular education level within the board. In this study’s sample, Blau’s index of 
educational diversity varies between 0.00 and 0.75. 
 
Experience  
Carpenter et al. (2004) recognise that the expertise and skills of directors can 
be reflected through their previous experience. Thorsell and Isaksson (2014) note that 
previous research has produced mixed findings on the influence of directors’ 
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experience on firm performance due to issues of measurability and a shortage of 
available data. Kroll et al. (2008) define director experience as the number of years a 
director has been a manager or board member of a firm within the same industry, 
whereas Certo et al. (2001) define director experience as the number of cross 
directorships a board member has held. Other scholars such as Kang et al. (2007) and 
Bodnaruk et al. (2008) use age as a proxy for director experience, whilst, Gray and 
Nowland (2013) argue that prior experience as a director is the most relevant 
experience that directors can possess. The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests 
that the previous appointments of directors are a suitable proxy for directors’ 
experience in this study and this is similar to studies conducted by Fich (2005) and 
Gray and Nowland (2013). In addition, the hypotheses developed for directors’ 
experience are in two parts, the first part links director experience to financial 
performance whilst the second part links the experience diversity of directors to 
financial performance. In order to assess the experience of directors, the four-point 
scale system used by Mahadeo et al. (2012) is adapted to reflect the highest previous 
position held by a director. The four-point scale is coded in bands ranging from zero 
to three as follows:   
 
0 = no previous appointments held  
1 = previous appointment held in a core functional background  
2 = previous appointment at a senior managerial level  
3 = previous appointment as a director 8 or CEO 
 
The core functional backgrounds for the second band have been identified in the 
literature as finance or accounting, production or operations, administration, 
marketing or sales, engineering or research and development and legal functions 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In order to assess the diversity of experience of directors 
on the board, the Blau’s Index for diversity is used. In the formula below, i is a certain 
                                                          
8 This directorship may either be in an executive or non-executive capacity as Kor and Sundaramurthy 
(2008) assert that directors’ repertoire of knowledge and skills is primarily derived from prior 
professional experience as a director. Therefore, this experience should apply to both executive and 
non-executive roles.  
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experience band and pi is the proportion of directors of a particular experience band 
within the board.  
 
Diversity = 1 − ∑𝑝
2
𝑖
 
 
By using Blau’s Index for diversity, experience is also a continuous variable with its 
values ranging between zero and one. In this study’s sample Blau’s index of 
experience diversity varies between 0.00 and 0.75.  
 
Multiple Directorships  
Despite the theoretical contributions that have been made by scholars, there is 
still an ongoing debate about the benefits and limitations of multiple directorships as 
previous studies have produced inconsistent findings (Drago et al., 2015; Renneboog 
& Zhao, 2014). In addition, a variety of different measures of multiple directorships 
have been used in previous literature. For instance, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
measure multiple directorships as the percentage of directors on the board holding two 
or more outside directorships and find a negative association between multiple 
directorships return on sales. Kor and Sundaramurthy (2008) measure multiple 
directorships as the total number of board ties of outside directors of a firm during a 
particular year and find a strong association with firm growth. Other studies measure 
multiple directorships as the average number of directorships held by each director 
(Ferris et al., 2003; Gray & Nowland, 2013; Khanna et al., 2014). Likewise, Hillman 
et al.’s (2009) study notes that directors’ networks can be measured by the number of 
other directorships they hold on other boards. Therefore, this study simply measures 
outside directorships as the average number of directorships held by each director. 
This is calculated as the total number of other directorships held divided by the total 
number of directors on the board as reported in the annual reports.  
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Board Index 
Scholars have debated in governance literature on the best methods of 
empirically measuring the quality of corporate governance of a company. Da Silva 
and Leal (2005) further suggest when analysing the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance, a corporate governance board index is more suitable 
than looking at a single control mechanism. Other scholars suggest that only specific 
board characteristics or variables are critical determinants of corporate governance 
(Bhagat et al., 2008). Although there is no one best measure of corporate governance, 
the use of corporate governance indices has become the most dominant approach in 
evaluating the quality of a company’s corporate governance (Bhagat et al., 2008; 
Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Da Silva & Leal, 2005; Korent, Dundek & Calopa, 2014). 
Previous governance studies have either used self-constructed corporate governance 
indices or ones generated by commercial firms (Carvalhal & Nobili, 2011; Epps & 
Cereola, 2008; Gompers et al., 2003). Corporate governance indices may be 
constructed either through information gathered from commercial service providers, 
data hand collected from publicly available information, questionnaires sent to 
companies or from commercial ratings.  
 
Bozec and Bozec (2012) state that survey based indices may produce biased 
results as companies that do not respond may be those with poor governance and those 
that do respond may have glorified the quality of their governance. Over recent years, 
commercial providers of governance services and financial economists have 
constructed measures of corporate governance that collapse into a single number. 
Zheka (2006) suggests that weightings used in commercial governance ratings tend to 
be significantly influenced by subjective views of analysts based on their knowledge 
and experience of companies. In addition, commercial governance ratings do not 
always take into account country differences and firms’ specific circumstances 
(Bhagat et al., 2008). On the other hand, Bozec and Bozec (2012) propose that self-
constructed indices by researchers have the ability to select governance provisions that 
are relevant to the study’s sample. Furthermore, academic indices use equally 
weighted values for each provision on their index in order to note the absence or 
presence of a practice and this makes academic indices less subjective than 
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commercial ratings (Bozec & Bozec, 2012). There is still, however, a debate amongst 
researchers as to whether corporate governance indices should be weighted or not.  
 
Bhagat et al. (2008) state that the weights assigned to an index are critical in 
the eyes of investors as when an index’s weight is not consistent with those used in 
the market, incorrect inferences will be drawn. In addition, other scholars argue that 
unweighted indices may provide an inaccurate measure of the quality of a firm’s 
governance. This is because all governance features are weighed equally although 
some features are stronger predictors of governance quality than others and the 
stronger predictors should be given higher weights (Chen et al., 2007). In contrast, 
Bozec and Bozec (2012) argue that commercial ratings are significantly impacted by 
the analysts’ subjective views and this may also result in incorrect inferences if the 
weighting scales are not consistent with those in the market. Therefore, a more 
conservative approach is to use indices with equally weighted governance provisions. 
Bhagat et al. (2008) believe that self-constructed equally weighted indices provide a 
better measure of corporate governance under the canons of scholarly research.   
 
Bozec and Bozec (2012) identified several limitations of corporate governance 
indices which, if not dealt with, may potentially increase certain empirical problems 
related to measurement and endogeneity. First, indices comprised of different 
provisions provide a greater risk of measurement errors that may result in an incorrect 
specification of the statistical analysis of the governance-performance relationship. 
Second, governance indices that assign equal positive weights to all the provisions in 
the index treat good governance attributes as complements rather than substitutes. This 
notion is underpinned by the idea that not all governance components are critical, only 
a subset of provisions in the index determine the results (Bebchuck, Cohen & Ferrell, 
2009; Brown & Caylor 2006). However, there is no agreement as to which governance 
provisions are most important in the index (Carvalhal & Nobili, 2011; Chen et al., 
2007). The process of selecting governance provisions in self-constructed indices may 
be tinted with subjectivity, therefore Bozec, Dia and Bozec (2010) propose that testing 
the validity of the index can help to signal the reliability and robustness of the index. 
Lastly, indices with multiple provisions may increase the problem of endogeneity and 
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the risk of spurious correlation; however, this can be overcome by using fixed effects 
methodologies (Bozec & Bozec, 2012).  
 
In this study, the researcher constructs a board index that goes beyond the 
measurement of conventional governance variables and structural diversity measures, 
such as board size and board independence (Connelly, Limpaphayom & Nagarajan, 
2012). This is in order to assess and measure the actual quality of corporate governance 
practices of the boards of listed companies in the UK. In addition, this study’s board 
index is tailored to FTSE 350 companies and reflects different attributes considered 
as good corporate governance practice by the Financial Reporting Council in the UK. 
The board index specifically addresses various aspects of boards of directors such as 
board structure, board effectiveness and board accountability. This is consistent with 
the OECD principles that acknowledge corporate governance frameworks within 
companies should maintain strategic decision-making and guidance, effective 
monitoring of management and accountability to shareholders (OECD, 2015).  
 
This study’s index is not survey based and all the questions are answered from 
publicly available information disclosed by the companies to ensure objectivity, 
standardisation and comparability of the index. The board index is composed of 34 
questions developed from the five main principles of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2014, which are leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and 
relations with shareholders. The questions in the board index were set at 34 so that the 
index is neither too small nor too large but sufficient to capture the multivariate nature 
of corporate governance (Da Silva & Leal, 2005). Likewise, the board index takes into 
account various aspects of corporate governance as opposed to a single attribute, in 
order to form a proxy measure that evaluates a firm’s governance structure as a whole. 
The board index has no weighting amongst questions and the index score is calculated 
as the total sum of the points for each question. To test the reliability of the index, the 
Cronbach’s alpha test was used, as it is one of the most widely used objective measures 
of reliability in the literature (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Cronbach alpha is a measure 
of internal consistency of a test, index or scale and has a value that ranges between 0 
and 1. A value of 0.70 or higher is considered acceptable in most social science 
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research as lower values could indicate either an insufficient number of questions or 
poor inter-relatedness between the constructs (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). The results 
of the Cronbach alpha test for the board index are presented in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Cronbach’s Alpha Test Results 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's  
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.762 .838 33 
 
The alpha coefficient for the 33 items in the board index is 0.762, suggesting that the 
items have an acceptable internal consistency and the board index is reliable.  In 
addition, an appropriate methodology is employed in the data analysis to address the 
increased risk of endogeneity and this is discussed further in Section 4.5. 
 
Questions in the board index are based on the principles and guidance provided 
by the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 for several reasons. First, all the 
companies in the chosen sample are listed on the London Stock Exchange and are 
subject to the provisions set out by the code. Second, Black et al. (2012) note that good 
corporate governance is often local and varies from country to country, therefore a 
suitable measure of corporate governance for this research would be one that is tailored 
and country-specific to UK firms. Finally, Black et al. (2014) posit that there is a 
fundamental and unobserved concept of overall corporate governance which is 
composed of board structure, board procedure, disclosure and shareholder rights. 
These aspects of corporate governance are deemed to induce the board to act with true 
effectiveness by increasing firm value and performance (Black et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, these aspects are well captured in the main principles of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2014 and are rooted in corporate governance theories, 
finance theories and research findings from prior research (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 
2008; Crook et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). 
Appendix D shows the full set of questions in the board index and Table 4.7 shows 
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the complete scorecard and references used to construct the index over the five 
sections, which are discussed hereinafter. 
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Table 4.7 Board Index Scorecard and References 
SECTION SUBJECT AREAS SCORING REFERENCES 
 
Section A: Leadership  
 
Questions 1-5 
 
 
 
 CEO duality  
 Disclosure 
 Senior independent directors  
 
If the answer is yes give 1 
mark and if the answer is no 
award 0 marks 
 
Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011); Clemente & Labat 
(2009); Nandi & Ghosh (2013); Reeb & Zhao 
(2013) 
 
Section B: Effectiveness 
 
Questions 6-18  
 
 
 
 Board size  
 Board independence  
 Meetings attendance 
 Performance evaluation  
 Nomination committee 
 
 
If the answer is yes give 1 
mark and if the answer is no 
award 0 marks 
 
NB if attendance at meetings is 
not disclosed award 0 marks  
 
Cheng & Courtenay (2006); Darmadi (2013); 
Ferreira, Ferreira, & Raposo (2011); Lin, Yeh & 
Yang (2014); Liu, Wang & Wu (2016); 
Ramachandran et al. (2015)  
 
Section C: Accountability  
 
Questions 19-27  
 
 
 
 Directors’ responsibilities 
 Audit committee 
 Internal control and risk 
management  
 
 
 
If the answer is yes give 1 
mark and if the answer is no 
award 0 marks 
 
NB if corporate governance 
committee is combined with 
another sub-committee award 
1 mark 
 
Clemente & Labat (2009); Doyle, Ge & McVay 
(2007); Karamanou & Vafeas (2005); Magrane & 
Malthus (2010); Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman & 
Salleh (2016) 
 
Section D: Remuneration  
 
Questions 28-32  
 
 
 Remuneration committee  
 
If the answer is yes give 1 
mark and if the answer is no 
award 0 marks 
Ben-Amar & Zeghal (2011); Dell’Atti, Intonti & 
Iannuzzi (2013); Melis, Gaia & Carta (2015) 
 
 
Section E: Relations with 
shareholders  
 
Questions 33-34 
 
 
 Communication with 
shareholders  
If the answer is yes give 1 
mark and if the answer is no 
award 0 marks 
 
Hahn & Lasfer (2011); Zattoni & Cuomo (2010) 
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A) Leadership 
Section A of the index consists of five questions that focus on CEO duality, board 
meetings and the appointment of a Senior Independent Director. This section of the 
board index assesses the leadership within the board as the resource dependence theory 
views the board as an integral part of firm success (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). In 
addition, research by Mercer (2004) states that boards of directors serve as an 
instrument of internal assurance as investors place more confidence in a firm’s 
disclosure when the board is of high quality. The separation of the chairman and chief 
executive’s responsibilities enhances the monitoring function of the board and reduces 
agency problems according to Clemente and Labat (2009). In a similar vein, Ben-
Amar and Zeghal (2011) noted that CEO duality reduces a board’s independence, 
therefore when a chairman is independent on appointment this should also improve 
the board’s effectiveness in monitoring management and transparency. Although the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) does not specify how frequently board 
meetings should take place, it does state that “…the board should meet sufficiently 
regularly to discharge its duties effectively” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014, p.7). 
Finally, this section of the board index assesses whether companies appoint senior 
independent directors to add to the leadership quality of the board and to serve as an 
intermediary for non-executive directors and shareholders (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2014).  
 
B) Effectiveness 
Section B looks at the effectiveness of the board by considering board size, board 
independence and the nomination committee. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2014) requires companies to disclose on the effectiveness of their boards considering 
areas such as independence, skills, diversity and company knowledge. Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) contend that the effectiveness of a board is dependent on its size, 
independence and composition. Furthermore, the size of a board and its independence 
are correlated as the larger the board, the higher tends to be the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (Clemente & Labat, 2009). The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) states that “…the board should be of sufficient size that the 
requirements of the business can be met… and should not be so large as to be 
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unwieldy...” (Financial Reporting Council, 2014, p.10). Although, there is not one 
agreed optimal board size, the general consensus amongst previous studies has been 
that a good board size should have a maximum of 15 directors and a minimum of six 
(Ben-Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Coles et al., 2008; Darmadi, 2013). In regards to board 
independence, the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014 recommends a certain board 
structure for firms, where at least half of the board should be comprised of independent 
non-executive directors (NEDs) with the exception of smaller companies. 
 
Solomon (2010) states that the key role of NEDs is to give advice on strategic 
decisions and to monitor executive directors, and in order for NEDs to effectively play 
a monitoring role, they need to be independent. In addition, the majority of empirical 
studies on board independence have concluded that greater board independence is 
related to improved transparency and effective monitoring (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 
2008; Ferreira et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2007). The UK Corporate Governance Code 
recommends the board of directors to have a nomination committee that is composed 
of a majority of NEDs (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). The primary role of this 
committee is to evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the board 
and to advocate a transparent nomination procedure of directors (Mallin, 2013). 
Although this may not guarantee board effectiveness, studies by Darmadi (2013) and 
Clemente and Labat (2009) identified that board committees and attendance at 
meetings are important factors in corporate governance and transparency. 
 
C) Accountability  
Section C looks at accountability and focuses particularly on the work of the audit 
committee and internal control. The two main duties of directors are a duty of care and 
a duty of trust or fiduciary duty. The duty of care calls for directors to exercise 
independent judgement with reasonable skills, diligence and care. Whilst the fiduciary 
duties require directors to act in the best interests of the company, to avoid conflict 
between their duties and personal interests and to behave with integrity and honesty 
(Tricker, 2012). Scholars argue that the audit committee is the most important of the 
board’s subcommittees with its main objective being to review the scope and outcome 
of the audit and ensuring that the auditors’ objectivity is maintained (Farber, 2005; 
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Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Magrane & Malthus, 2010). Furthermore, the role of the 
audit committee has become increasingly significant over the past decade following 
high profile scandals (Magrane & Malthus, 2010). Research by Darmadi (2013) states 
that the audit committee helps in alleviating agency problems by ensuring unbiased 
and transparent financial information is released to shareholders and other 
stakeholders in a timely manner. The UK Corporate Governance Code requires the 
audit committee to be comprised of at least three independent NEDs and to have at 
least one member with recent and relevant financial experience (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2014).  
 
D) Remuneration 
Section D looks at the composition of the remuneration committee and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code requires the remuneration committee to be comprised of 
at least three independent NEDs (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). Lavelle (2002, 
p.108) addressed the issue of directors’ remuneration as, “…the most egregious 
governance failure of the 20th century...”. The main role of the remuneration 
committee is described by Ben-Amar and Zeghal (2011) as aligning managers and 
shareholders’ interests and reducing agency costs by determining directors’ 
remuneration packages in a formal, transparent and well-designed manner. Dell’Atti 
et al. (2013) argue that there is a positive relationship between financial performance 
and a high quality remuneration committee because when the committee is efficient 
agency costs are reduced and it improves incentive alignment. However, the 
effectiveness of these board committees is dependent on their size, independence, 
frequency of meetings and expertise of members (Ben-Amar & Zegal, 2011).  
 
E) Relations with Shareholders  
Section E looks at the relations of non-executive directors with shareholders. 
Agency theory perceives NEDs as monitors and advisors of management who work 
on behalf of shareholders to mitigate agency problems (Hahn & Lasfer, 2011). 
However, Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) argue that the effectiveness of NEDs as 
safeguards of shareholders’ interests is still an ongoing debate. The UK Corporate 
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Governance Code 2014 recommends that directors should have satisfactory dialogues 
with shareholders and the board should ensure NEDs develop an understanding of the 
views of major shareholders (Financial Reporting Council, 2014).  
 
4.4.3 Control Variables  
In addition to the variables discussed above, a number of control variables are 
included in the regression model to account for other potential influences on firm 
performance and board characteristics as recognised in the literature (Beck, Demirgüç‐
Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005; Chenhall & Moers, 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003; Kamardin, 
2014). This study controls for several variables to mitigate possible endogeneity 
problems and omitted variable bias (Black, Jang & Kim, 2006).  These variables were 
chosen based on data availability and are consistent with those used in previous 
empirical studies in corporate governance research (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Vo & 
Phan, 2013). Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) propose that the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance differs amongst industry sectors. 
Therefore, in addition to grouping the sample into industry sectors, this study controls 
for industry dynamism and year dummies. Firm level variables that are expected to 
influence either board composition or performance are also controlled for, namely firm 
size, firm leverage and firm age. Firm ownership structure is not included as a control 
variable as this data was inaccessible for the researcher in Bloomberg and other 
sources. In addition, Wang and Shailer (2015) state that the literature on firm 
ownership and performance is mixed and provides conflicting hypotheses based on 
different theoretical positions. Board size is also commonly included as a control 
variable in many corporate governance studies, however in this study, board size has 
already been incorporated in the board index that was discussed in the previous 
section. The next sections discuss each of the control variables and how they are 
measured in this study.  
 
Firm Age  
Firm age is considered a vital influence on firm performance and is commonly 
measured as the number of years from the date of incorporation (Jackling & Johl, 
2009). Firm age is expected to have a positive association with reputation, therefore 
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older firms may benefit from past experience and from having a known or established 
brand (Musteen et al., 2010).  Similarly, Black et al. (2006) argue that older firms 
would have had more time to enhance their corporate governance systems in response 
to internal needs and investor pressure. In contrast, Coad, Seggara and Tereul (2013) 
suggest younger firms have a greater need to improve their corporate governance 
practices in order to attract capital to optimise their capital structures. Empirical 
evidence exists to support the notion that good corporate reputation increases a firm’s 
value and is associated with superior financial performance (Musteen et al., 2010; 
Polonsky et al., 2005; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Following Jackling and Johl (2009), 
firm age is measured as the number of years from the date of incorporation.  
 
Firm Leverage  
The seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognised that firm 
leverage has an impact on the agency conflicts between a firm’s management and 
shareholders. The reasoning behind this proposition is that because managers are 
encouraged to act in the best interests of shareholders, their behaviours and decisions 
may be altered meaning the amount of leverage in the firm’s capital structure will 
impact firm performance (Brav, Lehavey & Michaely, 2005; El-Sayed Ebaid, 2009; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In addition, Khan, Kaleem and Nazir (2012) suggest that 
debt has a key role in reducing the agency costs of free cash flows by preventing the 
firm from investing in projects with negative net present values. Although empirical 
evidence regarding the relationship between leverage and firm performance is mixed, 
prior studies in corporate governance have included firm leverage as a control variable 
for financial performance (El-Sayed Ebaid, 2009; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Kamardin, 
2014; Prime & Qi, 2013). Therefore, consistent with prior studies, firm leverage is 
included as a control variable and is measured as the ratio of long term debt to total 
capital (Musteen et al., 2010; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). 
 
Firm Size  
Firm size is often used as a control variable in corporate governance studies 
that analyse financial performance (Coles et al., 2008; Vo & Phan, 2013). Influential 
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work by Fama and French (1992) revealed that firm size is related to market returns 
whilst other studies found that asset size is related to Tobin’s Q ratio (Carter et al., 
2010; Faleye, 2007). However previous corporate governance studies have found 
mixed results on the impact of firm size on financial performance as some studies have 
found a negative association between the two (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Welch, 2003). A 
different body of literature suggests firm size has a positive impact on corporate 
governance mechanisms because of differences in operations, market regulations and 
agency problems (Beiner et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2008). The study by Coles et al. 
(2008) notes that larger firms are more likely to have more external resources and are 
more likely to attract reputable non-executive directors. However, Black et al. (2006) 
argue that the control and management of large firms is more difficult and this 
increases agency costs, which may negatively affect financial performance. Consistent 
with Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) and Musteen et al. (2010), this study includes the 
natural log of total assets in the regression to control for firm size.  
 
Industry Dynamism  
Dynamism refers to any unpredictability or volatility in an environment or 
industry and Greckhamer et al. (2007) state that empirical evidence suggests industry 
dynamism is associated with firm performance. Henderson, Miller and Hambrick 
(2006) report findings consistent with this, as they find that any potential 
improvements in firm performance were contingent on the dynamism of the external 
environment or industry. In line with this, Sorenson (2003) found the determinant of 
firm success and performance in a particular period had no effect in a different volatile 
environment. In previous studies, scholars have commonly used dynamism as a 
moderator in explaining firms’ strategies, structures and outcomes (Farjoun & Levin, 
2011). In this study, industry dynamism is measured by dividing the standard error of 
the slope coefficient by mean value of sales similar to the measurement used by Dess 
and Beard (1984) and more recently by Nielsen and Nielsen (2013). 
 
4.5 Characteristics of Data Set  
This study uses a panel data set, whereby data of the observed variables is 
collected for a number of companies n, over a period of time t. As a result, the dataset 
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represents a time series of cross-sectional data making it panel data. The presence of 
both a cross-sectional and time-series element makes panel data more suitable for 
studying the dynamics of change rather than pure time series or pure cross sectional 
data.  It may be difficult to examine the impact of any change in board diversity on 
firm performance whilst using cross-section data, therefore analysing the impact of 
changes in firm performance over a period would be more beneficial. Further to this, 
panel data is useful for several reasons, which include “…more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity amongst variables and more degrees of freedom…” 
(Baltagi, 2008, p.7). Consequently, the multivariate techniques used in panel data 
estimation are particularly useful for controlling unobserved heterogeneity by 
allowing for individual-specific variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). A large number 
of existing empirical studies on corporate governance have used firm performance as 
a dependent variable of corporate governance mechanisms. The majority of these 
studies have often faced methodological problems related to endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity. Fauzi and Locke (2012) suggest that econometric issues, 
such as heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity and endogeneity problems, cause 
inconsistencies in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates that have been 
predominantly used in corporate governance research. Table 4.8 presents a summary 
of previous studies that have examined the relationship between board structure and 
firm performance and the methods of analysis employed.  
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Table 4.8 Prior Empirical Studies on the Relationship between Board Structure and Firm Performance 
Paper Sample Period Performance 
measure 
Methodology Econometric 
issues faced 
Relationship 
Bhagat & Black (2002)  934 1988-1991 Q, ROA, ROS, 
Market returns 
OLS, 2SLS Endogeneity, 
Reverse causality 
Negative 
Coles, Daniel & Naveen 
(2008)  
8165 1992-2001 Q OLS, 3LS Endogeneity 
 
Positive for large 
firms, negative for 
high R&D firms 
Guest (2009)  2746 1981-2002 Q, ROA OLS, Fixed effects, 
GMM 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity, 
Simultaneous 
endogeneity 
Positive 
Carter, D’Souza, Simkins & 
Simpson (2010)  
641 1998-2002 Q, ROA OLS, Fixed effects, 
3LS 
Endogeneity, 
Omitted Variables 
No relationship 
Rashid et al. (2010)  274 2005-2009 Q, ROA Linear regression Outliers Negative 
Fauzi & Locke (2012)  79 2007-2011 Q, ROA GLM Heteroskedasticity, 
Non-normal 
distribution, 
Endogeneity 
Positive 
Masulis, Wang & Xie (2012)  520 1998-2006 Q, ROA, Market 
capitalisation, Sales 
OLS, 2SLS, Fixed 
effects 
Heteroskedasticity, 
Endogeneity 
Positive 
Azeez (2015) 100 2010-2012 EPS, ROA, ROE OLS *none reported Positive for CEO 
duality and 
performance 
Negative for board 
size and performance 
Arora & Sharma (2016) 1922 2001-2010 ROA, ROE, NPM, 
Q 
System GMM Endogeneity No relationship 
Terjesen, Couto & 
Francisco  (2016) 
3876 2010 Q, ROA GMM Heteroskedasticity, 
Endogeneity 
Positive 
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Table 4.8 displays that the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model has 
been widely used in the corporate governance literature. In the class of linear unbiased 
estimators, OLS is considered to be the best estimator as it has the smallest variance 
under the Gauss-Markov assumptions (Wooldridge, 2016). The OLS model makes 
several assumptions about the distribution of the variables, which include linearity, 
homoscedasticity, normality of residuals, autocorrelation and no multicollinearity 
(Asteriou & Hall, 2016). If any of these assumptions are violated, the OLS estimators 
become inefficient as they are no longer considered BLUE i.e. the Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimators (Wooldridge, 2016). Therefore, before conducting the data 
analysis, several regression diagnostic tests were used to assess the appropriateness 
and compatibility of this study’s data based on the assumptions of classical linear 
regression model as suggested by De Souza and Junqueira (2005). The process 
undertaken is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Analysing Appropriateness of Data  
Test for multicollinearity
(Variance inflation factor, 
correlation coefficients)
Test of normality
(std skewness, std kurtosis, 
Shapiro Wilk test, Q-Q Plot)
Test of 
homoscedasticity
(Breusch-Pagan test, 
White’s test)
Test of independency
(Durbin-Watson)
Data Set 
Ordinary least squares 
method 
(x-y plot, intercept, residual, the 
retrospective variances and r2)
Residual Plot visual 
inspection 
Outliers
Testing Assumptions
Source: Adapted from De Souza and Junqueira (2005) 
 
4.5.1 Outliers  
In many data samples, the data points may be found to be further away from 
the sample mean than what would be expected and this could be for several reasons. 
Outlier data points can indicate the existence of effects that are not covered by the 
theoretical framework employed.  The OLS regression model is sensitive to the 
presence of outliers and a plot of the residuals can reveal a trend, if any is present (De 
Souza & Junqueira, 2005). Outliers were controlled for in this study in order to 
minimise their influence on the regressions and these results are presented in Appendix 
E. The appendix shows some extreme values in all the dependent variables that proxy 
financial performance and for some of the control variables: firm leverage and industry 
dynamism. For instance, the minimum and maximum values for Tobin’s Q are 0.47 
and 53.04 respectively; whilst for firm leverage the values are -680.00 and 638.18.  
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Previous corporate governance studies have either excluded outliers in the data or have 
winsorized the outliers (Black et al., 2012; Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Durnev & Kim, 
2005). Winsorization involves transforming the outliers to a specified value that is 
closer to the normal distribution curve. The presence of outliers can have a significant 
impact on the regressions, therefore in order to improve the statistical results of this 
study; winsorization is used for the outliers.9 The researcher follows scholars such as 
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) and Guest (2009) by winsorizing the variables to the first 
and 99th percentiles to remove influential outliers in order to reduce the effect of 
outliers. 
 
 
4.5.2 Normality Assumption  
The assumption of normality in linear regression looks at the error term by 
assessing the normality of the residual’s distribution. The violation of the normality 
assumption may arise due to several reasons, which include misspecification of the 
model, a strong presence of outliers and significant skewness of the dependent 
variables (Asteriou & Hall, 2016). According to Boldina and Beninger (2016) 
violation of this assumption is not as critical as other assumptions particularly for 
hypothesis testing in large samples i.e if N > 30. This is because the central limit 
theorem confirms that a sample’s distribution mean approaches normal distribution as 
the sample size increases (Fitzmaurice, Laird & Ware, 2012). The normality 
assumption was checked numerically using the values of skewness and standard 
kurtosis and the Shapiro-Wilk’s test and the normal Q-Q plot (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 
2012).10 These results are presented in Appendix F for all the dependent variables. A 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p value <0.05) and a visual inspection of the histogram and Q-Q 
plot suggests that Tobin’s Q was not approximately normally distributed with a 
skewness of 1.554 (SE = .079) and a kurtosis of 2.397 (SE =.159). The assumption of 
normality fails when the residuals show an arch above the diagonal line as displayed 
in Appendix F. However, in the case of strong non-normality in large data sets, 
                                                          
9 In line with prior literature, winsorization has not been used on the independent variables as 
generally corporate governance variables have fewer outliers than dependent and control variables 
(Durnev & Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
10 This was conducted on the winsorized values of the dependent variables that removed the extreme 
outliers. 
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Boldina and Beninger (2016) state that this can be addressed using generalised linear 
models (GLM). However, due to the study’s sample size being comparable with 
previous studies (Marinova et al., 2016; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Ooi et al., 2015) 
and the results not showing strong non-normality for Tobin’s Q, the central limit 
theorem can be assumed to apply.  
 
4.5.3 Homoscedasticity Assumption  
The assumption of homoscedasticity states that the variance of the unobserved 
error, µ, is constant for all values of the independent variable and, in linear models the 
focus is on the error term that is represented by the residuals (Verbeek, 2008). The 
homoscedasticity assumption fails when the variance of the unobserved factors varies 
across different segments of the population and where the segments are determined by 
the different values of the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2016). This problem is 
common in cross sectional data sets. The presence of heteroskedasticity in residuals 
does not necessarily lead to biased parameter estimates, however the OLS estimator 
will no longer be BLUE once this assumption is violated (Maddala & Lahiri, 2009). 
In addition, violation of the homoscedasticity assumption results in unreliable standard 
error estimates of the parameters, which in turn increases the probability of a Type I 
error and a bias in the confidence intervals (Zuur et al., 2009).11 A number of 
alternative statistical tests can be used to judge whether OLS results are misleading 
due to inappropriate standard errors caused by heteroskedasticity. Boldina and 
Beninger (2016) suggest that the Breusch-Pagan test is best suited for detecting linear 
forms of heteroskedasticity. Therefore, this study used the Breusch-Pagan to check for 
the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data. The results are presented in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9 Heteroskedasticity Test Results 
                                                          
11 The presence of heteroskedasticity causes the OLS model to underestimate the standard errors 
which leads to much higher values of t statistics and F-statistics (Asteriou & Hall, 2016).  
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of TobinQ_wins 
 
            chi2(1)      =    10.32 
            Prob > chi2  =   0.0013 
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The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity results in 10.32 (p-value 0.0013), 
indicating that variances amongst the independent variables are not constant. There 
are several ways of dealing with heteroskedasticity of residuals which include using 
robust standard errors, weighted least squares model or using generalised least squares 
which is more common in previous corporate governance studies (Fauzi & Locke, 
2012; Zuur et al., 2009). In this study, the researcher uses robust standard errors and 
an appropriate econometric model (generalised least squares) to deal with the presence 
of heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
4.5.4 Independency Assumption  
The independency assumption focuses on the serial independence of the 
residuals and states that the error terms in the regression model are independently 
distributed (Asteriou & Hall, 2016). The presence of autocorrelation in the error term 
means that some part of the error term is correlated with another part therefore serial 
independence of the residuals cannot be assumed (Boldina & Beninger, 2016). 
Although autocorrelation does not disturb the unbiasedness of the OLS estimator, the 
estimator will be no longer be the best linear unbiased estimator, as it does not have a 
minimum variance (Verbeek, 2008). De Souza and Junqueira (2005) argue that the 
biggest problem with autocorrelation is that once the variance of the least squares 
estimator is affected, it often results in an underestimation of σ2 and the confidence 
intervals. This in turn may lead to inaccurate inference and indicate a false significance 
of the regressors making hypothesis testing invalid. Boldina and Beninger (2016) state 
that positive autocorrelation in residuals creates standard errors of estimated 
parameters that are smaller than the true standard errors. Therefore, the probability of 
the Type I error, where the null hypothesis is rejected when it is true, is increased in 
the presence of autocorrelation.  
 
One of the most common tests for testing autocorrelation in residuals is the 
Durbin-Watson test statistic, which is used in this study’s diagnostic checks (see 
Appendix F).  The Durbin-Watson value ranges from 0-4, with a value of 2 indicating 
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no autocorrelation in the sample. De Souza and Junqueira (2005) note that values 
between 1.5 and 2.5 are commonly used as lower and uppercut off points for 
eliminating the presence of autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson test using the study’s 
main dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, resulted in a value of 1.415, which indicates 
positive autocorrelation is present in the residuals. In contrast to this, the Durbin-
Watson test results for ROE and ROA indicate no autocorrelation; therefore, these are 
used as alternative measures of financial performance for robustness purposes. When 
the assumption of the absence of autocorrelation fails, OLS is not an appropriate model 
to use and Maddala and Lahiri (2009) suggest the use of generalised least squares 
methods. Alternatively, other scholars suggest the use of lags in the dependent 
variables may resolve autocorrelation and for time series data, statistical software 
packages, such as STATA, can resolve autocorrelation by re-estimating the model 
using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure (Asteriou & Hall, 2016). This study uses 
generalised least squares and the alternative measures of financial performance to 
resolve autocorrelation.  
 
4.5.5 Non-perfect Collinearity Assumption  
The assumption of the absence of perfect multicollinearity requires no linear 
relationships between the independent variables because an approximate linear 
relationship may lead to unreliable regression estimates (Boldina & Beninger, 2016). 
The presence of perfect multicollinearity amongst the independent variables means 
the regression coefficients cannot be determined and their standard errors are high or 
infinite (Verbeek, 2008). Many scholars however, point out that it is important to 
identify if the degree of multicollinearity observed is high enough to create problems 
in the regression model (Asteriou & Hall, 2016; Wooldridge, 2016). In this study, the 
presence of multicollinearity was initially tested using the Pearson correlation matrix 
to check if significant collinearity exists across the independent variables. The 
Pearson’s correlation matrix in Appendix F, suggests relatively high levels of 
multicollinearity amongst some of the independent variables. Some of the highest 
correlations existed between highest education band and education diversity (33.0%); 
highest experience band and board index (29.8%); and highest experience band and 
directorships (26.0%). Gujarati and Porter (2009) argue that multicollinearity is only 
a problem when the correlation between any two independent variables exceeds 80%. 
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However, multicollinearity cannot only be detected using the Pearson’s correlation 
matrix, and Maddala and Lahiri (2009) together with other scholars suggest that a 
better method is to examine the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each independent 
variable.12 This is presented in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 Variance Inflation Factors for the Independent Variables 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
Highest Experience Band 1.21 0.824312 
Board Index 1.17 0.853796 
Education Diversity 1.16 0.863618 
Highest Education Band 1.15 0.870736 
Directorships  1.11 0.897102 
Experience Diversity  1.10 0.907997 
Gender Diversity  1.08 0.925359 
Age Diversity 1.04 0.962170 
   
Mean VIF 1.13  
  
          
 
Wooldridge (2016) suggests that a multicollinearity can be considered a problem when 
the VIF is above the value 10 as a rule of thumb. Table 4.10 displays that the highest 
VIF value is 1.21 therefore there is no significant evidence to suggest that 
multicollinearity is problematic for this data set. In addition, the software package 
STATA omits variables from the regression model if multicollinearity is present.  
 
 
4.5.6 Endogeneity  
Previous corporate governance and finance research that has examined the 
relationship between board composition, financial decision making and performance, 
has often faced serious endogeneity issues. Endogeneity arises when an explanatory 
variable is also a choice variable that correlates with the random error in the regression 
model (Ittner & Larcker, 2001). Such misspecification produces inconsistent 
parameter estimates and this makes hypothesis testing problematic. The challenge of 
endogeneity can arise from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and 
                                                          
12 VIF = 1/(1-R2) where R2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient between one variable (xi) 
and the other independent variables (Maddala & Lahiri, 2009).  
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simultaneity (De Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Liu et al., 2015). A large body of 
empirical corporate governance research suggests that certain governance mechanisms 
lead to improved firm performance, however Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) argue 
that this research suffers from endogeneity issues and consequently, cannot reveal if 
the causation is reversed. It is difficult to ascertain reverse causation i.e. if firm 
performance drives good governance or if good governance is just an indication of an 
unobserved underlying factor that also affects firm performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
For instance, Black, Jang and Kim (2006) argue that firms with a high Tobin’s Q may 
choose to adopt good governance practices as this may potentially enhance their 
market value. Therefore, there may be a causal association between governance and 
firm value that would be overestimated by the OLS coefficient.  
 
 
  It appears reasonable to assume the presence of such unobserved effects in this 
study as board structure is most likely endogenous. For instance, in this study, firm 
performance may be both influenced by board diversity and, itself, a driver that 
influences a firm’s decision to improve diversity in its boardroom. This endogeneity 
is problematic when the decision of the board composition is based on latent factors 
that are correlated with the error term in the regression model (Yang & Zhao, 2014). 
Roberts and Whited (2013) note that empirical work which faces the problem of 
endogeneity uses biased and inconsistent parameters, therefore reliable inferences 
become almost impossible. Researchers suggest that the best econometric solution to 
the problem of endogeneity is to have an exogenous shock to the board structure by 
using a model that relies on instrumental variables to generate a set of variables that 
are not correlated with the error term (Ittner & Larcker, 2001; De Andres & Vallelado, 
2008; Wintoki et al., 2012). This study used the test for endogeneity available in 
STATA to determine the explanatory variables in the data set that are endogenous.13 
In addition, Durbin and Wu Hausman tests both have small p values (p= 0.01) 
therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected indicating the variables age diversity, highest 
                                                          
13 This test takes the residual of each explanatory variable from the first stage in the 2SLS regression 
(this model is discussed in Section 4.6) and regresses this against the dependent variable in the second 
stage of the 2SLS. A large t statistic and significant p value indicates that the explanatory variable is 
endogenous.  
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education band and directorships are all endogenous variables. The results are 
presented in Table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.11 Test for Endogeneity Results 
Independent Variable t P>|t| 
Age Diversity  2.06 0.040* 
Gender Diversity  -1.30 0.193 
Education Diversity -1.84 0.067 
Highest Education Band -2.27 0.023* 
Experience Diversity 0.51 0.613 
Highest Experience Band 0.83 0.405 
Directorships -2.48 0.013* 
Board Index -0.89 0.373 
Tests of endogeneity 
  Ho: variables are exogenous 
 
  Durbin (score) chi2(3)          =  11.2171  (p = 0.0106) 
  Wu-Hausman F(3,933)         =  3.71997  (p = 0.0112) 
 
 
The results show that age diversity, highest education band and directorships are 
all endogenous variables. Therefore, the problem of endogeneity is applicable to this 
study’s data set. It is evident from the regression diagnostics that several assumptions 
of the classic linear regression were violated thus the OLS estimators would not be 
BLUE. Therefore, in order to address these and other econometric issues, an 
alternative method of analysis was required and this is discussed further in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
4.6 Two Stage Least Squares Regression 
Boldina and Beninger (2016) state that a violation of any of the assumptions of 
OLS regression means that a more robust or better-fitting model should be employed. 
Therefore, due to some of the violations of the OLS assumptions found in the 
regression diagnostics above, this study employs an alternative econometric method 
to address these issues. One of the biggest econometric issues faced in the data set is 
the problem of endogeneity and many previous corporate governance researchers have 
faced this problem. This study addresses the issue of endogeneity, the violation of the 
normality assumption, the issue of heteroskedasticity and the issue of autocorrelation 
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in several ways. First, appropriate and relevant control variables are used in order to 
account for other potential influences on firm performance and board characteristics 
as recognised in the literature. Second, robust standard errors are used in the 
econometric model to deal with the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data. Third, 
a Two-Stage Least Square regression (2SLS) model is performed using an 
instrumental variables approach to deal with endogeneity. In addition, the 2SLS is also 
estimated using the other dependent variables as the Durbin Watson tests results 
indicated no autocorrelation for ROE and ROA. Lastly, an alternative regression 
model is used to deal with the presence of autocorrelation.  
 
The 2SLS is an extension of OLS regression and is commonly used in applied 
econometrics to address the potential problem of endogeneity and reverse causality 
(Wooldridge, 2016). Specifically, this method deals with the possibility that the 
dependent variable has a correlation with the cause of the explanatory variable. 
Previous researchers have suggested that this is an issue of concern in corporate 
governance research due to the possibility that companies may change their 
governance and board structures, only after a period of poor performance (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010). 2SLS also deals with the problem where an 
explanatory variable has a value that is determined by other variables in the system 
and therefore correlates with the random error in the regression model. In order to 
make a causal claim, an exogenous variable that is uncorrelated with the error term is 
needed (Verbeek, 2008).14 This study focuses on testing hypotheses formulated in 
Chapter 3 by considering how a range of independent variables individually affect a 
dependent variable. This relationship can normally be assessed through a basic 
econometric model that uses linear regressions estimated by OLS. This is the starting 
point for the analysis and the equation is represented below:  
 
𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 𝜒𝑖𝑡−2𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4.1) 
                                                          
14 An endogenous variable is different to an exogenous one in that, it is an inherent function of the 
other variables in the study (Verbeek, 2008).  
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Where Yit is the dependent variable, 𝜺𝒊𝒕 is the random error term, Xit denotes 
the vector of all independent variables and their associated parameters, 𝜷.  The FTSE 
350 companies in the study’s sample are represented by subscript i and the years by 
subscript t. In equation 4.1 t-2 represents a two-year lag that was incorporated in the 
data set because the effects of board structure on firm performance are not likely to be 
immediate. However, as previously displayed in the diagnostic checks, the regression 
model needs to address the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Two error terms are 
included in the model; the first term is 𝝁𝒊 to cover unobserved heterogeneity at firm 
level; whilst the second is 𝜺𝒊𝒕 which is an idiosyncratic error term. This gives the 
following equation:  
𝛾𝑖𝑡 =  𝜒𝑖𝑡−2𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4.2) 
 
In order to deal with endogeneity, this study uses a multi-equation model with 
joint estimation using two-stage least squares. In this equation (4.3), a new dependent 
variable is denoted by 𝒛𝒊𝒕, whilst α, 𝜹 and 𝜽 denote the new parameters that will be 
estimated in the model. Lastly, in these equations, 𝝊𝒊𝒕 represents the idiosyncratic error 
term. The 2SLS equations are as follows:  
 
 
𝛾𝑖𝑡 =  𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝜒𝑖𝑡−2𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4.3) 
 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝜒𝑖𝑡−2𝜃 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡   (4.4) 
 
Further to this, in order for this study to measure a causal relationship, a structural 
equation is included in the second stage of the 2SLS model. These equations include 
𝝌𝟏𝒊𝒕−𝟐 as an endogenous regressor that is a subset of 𝝌𝒊𝒕−𝟐 and in equation 4.6, 𝝌𝟐 
denotes a different subset of regressors with a causal effect on 𝝌𝟏𝒊𝒕−𝟐.  
 
 
𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 𝜒𝑖𝑡−2𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4.5) 
𝜒1𝑖𝑡−2 =  𝜒2𝑖𝑡−2𝜃 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡  (4.6) 
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Although both the literature and the diagnostic checks have identified the 2SLS 
model as an appropriate method of analysis for this research, there are some limitations 
of using this model. Wooldridge (2016) states that one of the biggest limitations of 
using 2SLS, or any other instrumental variables approach, is the difficulty in obtaining 
instrumental variables that are adequately uncorrelated with the error term and 
adequately correlated with the explanatory variables.  Previous research suggests that 
an ideal instrument (z) should satisfy two main conditions (Black et al., 2006b; 
Castineira & Nunes, 1999; Wooldridge, 2016). The first condition is that a good 
instrumental variable must not be correlated to the disturbance in the equation, the 
error terms, and the second condition is that good instrumental variables should be 
correlated with the endogenous variables. Black et al. (2006b) argue that the majority 
of previous governance studies lacked plausible instruments. Similarly, Wintoki et al. 
(2012) stated that although instrumental variables techniques can mitigate 
endogeneity, in corporate governance studies it is difficult to find instrumentals that 
are not affected by any firm characteristics.  
 
The natural choice for corporate governance researchers has been to use lagged 
values of the endogenous regressors as instruments (Terjesen et al., 2016). However, 
the data set employed in this research has already incorporated a time lag in the data 
to capture the stance that the effects of a change in the governance structure on firm 
performance are not likely to be immediate. Therefore, the researcher uses a different 
set of instrumental variables following the work of Jermias and Gani (2014). The 
instrumental variables used are total equity, total sales, capital intensity, operating 
margin,15 length of operating cycle16 and sales growth. These instruments are selected 
in line with previous research that suggests these variables are all credible instruments 
for corporate governance because there is no theoretical reason for these variables to 
be endogenous to firm performance or corporate governance (Black et al., 2006b; 
Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Jermias & Gani, 2014). The validity of the instrumental 
variables is tested using Basmann’s (1957) and Sargan’s (1958) test for over identified 
                                                          
15 Operating margin is calculated as sales minus cost of goods sold divided by sales (Jermias & Gani, 
2014).  
16 Length of operating cycle is calculated as average receivables divided by sales plus average 
inventory divided by cost of goods sold (Jermias & Gani, 2014).  
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restrictions. These tests both examine the correlation between the instruments and the 
models’ residuals in order to check whether the instrumental variables are uncorrelated 
with the error term (Arora & Sharma, 2016). The results indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the instrumental variables and the error term 
cannot be rejected (chi2(3) =  2.64474  p = 0.4497 for Sargan’s test and  chi2(3) =  
2.60742  p = 0.4562 for Basmann’s test). In addition, STATA has its own test for 
testing overidentifying restrictions and the score for this was chi2(3) =  4.05304  (p = 
0.2558). This means that the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid is accepted. 
For this and theoretical reasons, the instrumental variables selected are considered to 
be plausible and valid instruments.  
 
4.7 Robustness Checks and Generalised Least Squares  
The regression diagnostic checks conducted on the data suggested that the 
assumptions of normality, homoscedasticity and independency were violated. In these 
cases, the extant literature recommends the use of generalised least squares as a 
regression model (Boldina & Beninger, 2016; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Zuur et al., 2009).  
Therefore, for robustness purposes, this study conducts a generalised least squares 
(GLS) regression model in addition to the 2SLS regression. The GLS estimator is a 
transformed model of the OLS estimator and is considered the best linear unbiased 
estimator for β in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Verbeek, 
2008). The GLS estimators for correcting heteroskedasticity are also referred to as 
weighted least squares. This is because parameters in this model minimise the 
weighted sum of squared residuals such that observations with a higher error variance 
are given the least weights in the estimation (Verbeek, 2008).  Therefore, the GLS 
estimator can also estimate the structure of heteroskedasticity from OLS and this 
method is referred to as feasible generalised least squares regression (FGLS). 
Consequently, FGLS involves transforming an OLS regression model with 
heteroskedastic errors into a model with homoscedastic errors and, this in turn satisfies 
the Gauss-Markov assumptions (Wooldridge, 2016).  Haddad, Rahman and Kuczera 
(2011) note that a GLS model provides more accurate estimates than OLS because its 
estimators have regression coefficients with smaller mean-square errors than OLS 
estimates. This makes FGLS an attractive alternative to OLS with some scholars, such 
as Wooldridge (2016) proposing that the FGLS estimator is generally more consistent 
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and asymptotically more efficient than OLS. Equation 4.7 below shows the FGLS 
model.  
 
𝛾 ∗𝑖𝑡= 𝜒 ∗𝑖𝑡−2 𝛽 + 𝜇 ∗𝑖𝑡    (4.7) 
 
Where Yit is the dependent variable, 𝝁𝒊𝒕 is the random error term, Xit denotes the vector 
of all independent variables and their associated parameters, 𝜷. In addition, 𝝌 ∗𝒊𝒕−𝟐 = 
1/√hi and all the other starred variables signify the corresponding original variables 
divided by 1/√hi. In this case h (x) is some function of the independent variables that 
determines heteroskedasticity.17 Equation 4.7 is linear in its parameters, the standard 
error (𝝁𝒊) has a zero mean and a constant variance (𝝈
𝟐), conditional on the explanatory 
variables. Therefore, in this case, FGLS is an unbiased and efficient estimator 
(Wooldridge, 2016).  
 
4.8 Research Ethics 
Research ethics is concerned with the moral principles and standards of 
behaviour that guide the researcher’s choices on designing research, gaining access, 
collecting data and analysing the data (Zikmund et al., 2010). Therefore, ethical 
considerations are an integral part of the research process, as they can impact 
participants, organisations and the overall quality, integrity and reliability of the 
research and research methods used (Bryman, 2016). High ethical standards are 
important for several reasons, which include the protection of both researchers and 
participants, generating ‘clean’ research and guarding the reputation of the University 
and institutions associated with the research. This study was designed and 
implemented in line with the research and governance policy and guidelines of 
Northumbria University. These guidelines endeavour to maintain the highest standards 
of academic integrity and ethical practice in research. In line with this, the researcher 
ensured that throughout the research process, their conduct was consistent with the 
ethical imperative of respect, the intent to do no harm and, to contribute to knowledge 
and practice in the society (Northumbria University, 2019). Full approval for this 
                                                          
17 hi is merely a function of xi therefore 𝝁𝒊/√𝒉𝒊 has a zero expected value conditional on x
i.  
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research was obtained from Northumbria University’s Ethics Committee and given 
ethical clearance prior to data collection.  
 
This study used secondary data from Bloomberg and the annual reports of the 
sample companies.  This data is accessible in the public domain thus eliminating 
ethical issues concerning access, informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity in 
obtaining the information. However, Cooper and Dent (2011) note that when using 
secondary data available in the public domain, some key ethical issues to consider 
relate to the process of analysing, reporting and publishing the results. Similarly, 
Zikmund et al. (2013) state that the results of research should not be misrepresented 
and researchers should maintain high standards to ensure that their data is accurate 
and, that the results are not overstated or understated. The researcher acknowledges 
that data gathered should not be misrepresented to suit the needs of this research, or 
the ideas of the researcher. O’Leary (2010) states that it is vital for researchers to 
maintain objectivity throughout the research process. This study has employed a 
consistent method of analysis for all the data gathered, including robustness checks 
and validity tests, to ensure internal consistency. For instance, the Cronbach’s Alpha 
test results discussed in section 4.4.2 showed that this study’s board index had an 
acceptable internal consistency and is therefore reliable. The researcher has taken 
every possible measure to maintain integrity and objectivity throughout the different 
stages of the research process in this study. In addition, the interpretations presented 
in subsequent chapters reflect data generated and analysed rather than the researcher’s 
personal judgements. 
 
All of the data gathered for this study was kept securely and stored on a secure 
hard disk and U-Drive, which both require the researcher’s username and password 
for access. The data for this study has been retained for future use for writing journals 
within a limited timeframe and with the aim of contributing further to knowledge and 
practice in the society. This is in line with the retention schedule of Northumbria 
University that is detailed in the research ethics and governance handbook 
(Northumbria University, 2019). 
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4.9 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology, sampling strategy and the 
measurements of the variables in this study. This chapter has covered three main 
issues: i) issues related to research philosophy, sample selection and data collection; 
ii) discussing the measurement of all the variables employed in this study; and iii) 
discussing the construction of the board index that was constructed for this study. The 
first section discusses the research methodology, which follows a deductive approach 
and is based on a realist ontology and positivist epistemological stance. After the 
sample is screened, the final sample size consisted of 198 companies that were broken 
down into 16 industry sectors according to their SIC classification codes. This process 
forms part of the study’s contribution to literature and is consistent with the 
propositions of the upper echelons framework. The next section discussed the 
measurement of all the dependent, independent and control variables employed in this 
study. As explained, this study uses a self-constructed board index that examines 
specific attributes of the board of directors and is country specific to the UK. This 
chapter also presented the characteristics of the study’s data set and diagnostic 
regression checks in order to evaluate the most appropriate model to be used in the 
analysis. It was evident that several of the classic linear regression model assumptions 
were violated, such as the assumption of homoscedasticity and the assumption of 
independency. Therefore, the OLS estimators would be not be considered to be the 
best unbiased linear estimators. Consequently, the two-stage least squares regression 
method using the instrumental variables approach and robust standard errors is 
considered to be an appropriate technique for this study as it addresses the issues in 
the data set that were highlighted in the diagnostic checks. In addition, the GLS 
estimation method will be used as an alternative analysis model for robustness 
purposes. This is also in line with the extant literature that suggests GLS is the best 
alternative to the OLS model where there are heteroskedastic errors and where there 
is autocorrelation. The next chapter presents the summary descriptive statistics and 
multivariate analysis for all the variables used to examine the impact of board diversity 
on financial performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION PART I 
 
5.1 Introduction to Chapter 
The research objective of this study is to examine the impact of board diversity 
on the financial performance of FTSE 350 companies in the UK. Therefore, this 
chapter examines the association between board diversity and financial performance 
and in so doing, it addresses research questions 1 and 2 and the hypotheses formulated 
in Chapter 3. The multivariate analysis presented in this chapter examines and presents 
different regression models based on the ordinary least squares regression (OLS), two 
stage least squares regression (2SLS) and generalised least squares regression (GLS). 
The main dependent variable used to measure financial performance in this study is 
Tobin’s Q; however, alternative measures of financial performance are used for 
robustness purposes, namely ROA and ROE.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Sections 5.2 to 5.4 present the descriptive 
statistics for all the dependent variables, the independent variables and the control 
variables, respectively. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present the multivariate analysis and 
Akaike Information Criteria test results that address research question 1, whilst 
Section 5.7 presents the multivariate analysis that addresses research question 2 and 
the study’s hypotheses. Section 5.8 discusses the differences in the findings using 
market based versus accounting based measures of performance, whilst Section 5.9 
discusses the control variables. Section 5.10 discusses how the findings contribute to 
knowledge and lastly, Section 5.11 summarises the chapter.  Table 5.1 presents a 
summary of the research questions, hypotheses formulated and the analysis to be 
conducted.  
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Table 5.1 Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Questions Hypotheses Analysis 
 
Research Question 1: 
Which theoretical framework is the best modelling tool 
of board diversity and financial performance? 
 
 
- 
 
OLS regression and AIC analysis of different models  
 
Research Question 2: 
Is there a relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance? 
 
Hypothesis 1.  The board index is positively associated 
with financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Age diversity on the board of directors is 
positively associated with financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Gender diversity on the board of 
directors is positively associated with financial 
performance 
 
Hypothesis 4.  The education level of the board of 
directors is positively associated with financial 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 5.  The educational diversity of the board of 
directors is positively associated with financial 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The experience level of directors is 
positively associated with financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 7. The experience diversity of directors is 
positively associated with financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 8. Multiple directorships on the board of 
directors are positively associated with financial 
performance. 
 
 
OLS, 2SLS, GLS 
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Research Question 3: 
Does the relationship between board diversity and 
financial performance differ amongst industries? 
 
 
Hypothesis 9.  The association between the board 
index and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
Hypothesis 10. The association between age diversity 
of the board of directors and financial performance 
differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 11. The association between gender 
diversity of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 12. The association between education 
levels of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 13.  The association between education 
diversity of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 14. The association between experience 
levels of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 15. The association between experience 
diversity of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 16. The association between Multiple 
directorships on the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
OLS, 2SLS, GLS 
 
*to be discussed in Chapter 6.  
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables  
This section shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, Tobin’s 
Q, ROA and ROE. Initially, a series of descriptive statistics was conducted on these 
variables in order to display their measures and distribution. In Chapter 4, it was noted 
that these variables were winsorized to values that are closer to the normal distribution 
curve. Therefore, Table 5.2 summarises the descriptive statistics conducted after the 
dependent variables were transformed for normality, as well as separately for each of 
the two yearly periods between the years 2004 and 2014. Appendix G shows the 
descriptive statistics before they were winsorized and transformed for normality. The 
sample of this study comprises a total of 198 companies listed in the FTSE 350 index 
and the sample data was collected for the period 2004 to 2014. Three performance 
measures, Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA, were used in this study for robustness purposes 
where a higher value indicates a higher level of financial performance. Table 5.2 
shows that Tobin’s Q has a mean of 1.712 across all the years, with a minimum value 
of 0.47 and a maximum value of 4.82. This is consistent with previous studies that 
have found the mean of Tobin’s Q in listed companies ranges from 1.5 to 3.9 and these 
values indicate good performance (Hejazi, Ghanbari & Alipour, 2016; Firth et al., 
2012; Ma & Khanna, 2016). In regards to ROE, it has a mean of 14.285, with a 
minimum value of -26.27 and a maximum value of 57.66. ROA has a mean of 7.015, 
with a minimum value of -18.47 and a maximum value of 33.91. These results show 
similar trends with the descriptive statistics in Appendix G, and they all show that the 
mean values of all the dependent variables saw a sharp decrease between the years 
2006 and 2008. In addition, lowest minimum values can be seen in the year 2008 for 
all the dependent variables and this may indicate the effect of the 2007/8 financial 
crisis as these values start to improve from 2010 onwards.   
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables after Transformation for 
Normality 
  
                                                          
18 The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables start from the year 2006 as a two-year lag was 
incorporated in the data for financial performance therefore the data was collected from 2006 
onwards.  
Variables   200618 2008 2010 2012 2014 All Years 
 
 
Tobin’s Q 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 1.972 1.489 1.694 1.654 1.805 1.712 
Std. Dev 0.909 0.748 .838 0.836 0.915 0.861 
Min 0.90 0.47 0.62 0.56 0.64 0.47 
Max 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.82 
Skewness  1.307 1.932 1.580 1.690 1.385 1.554 
Kurtosis 4.247 7.642 5.668 5.940 4.599 2.397 
 
ROE 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 18.066 14.172 13.657 13.301 13.013 14.285 
Std. Dev 13.935 16.565 11.437 12.599 13.493 13.783 
Min -22.00 -26.27 -8.82 -22.98 -26.27 -26.27 
Max 57.49 57.49 57.49 57.66 57.49 57.66 
Skewness  .686 .458 1.605 1.060 1.198 0.896 
Kurtosis 4.203 4.092 6.843 6.209 6.452 2.348 
 
 
ROA 
 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 8.561 6.420 6.973 6.527 6.912 7.015 
Std. Dev 7.477 9.076 6.358 6.702 7.875 7.581 
Min -16.00 -18.47 -5.07 -18.47 -18.47 -18.47 
Max 33.71 33.91 33.71 33.71 33.71 33.91 
Skewness  .789 .194 1.477 0.309 0.735 0.576 
Kurtosis 4.792 4.922 6.579 5.697 5.767 2.752 
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables, age 
diversity, gender diversity, highest education band, education diversity, highest 
experience band, experience diversity, directorships and the board index. The 
measurements and description of these variables was previously discussed in Section 
4.4 of Chapter 4.  The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are presented 
in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
 
Variables   2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 All 
Years 
 
 
Age Diversity 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean .403 .408 .405 .382 .380 .395 
Std. Dev .120 .121 .111 .132 .138 .125 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.69 
Skewness  -1.113 -1.314 -1.023 -1.125 -.980 -1.137 
Kurtosis 4.825 5.297 4.641 4.072 3.708 4.497 
 
Gender 
Diversity 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 5.972 8.031 8.743 9.731 14.729 9.591 
Std. Dev 7.894 8.797 8.398 8.813 9.763 9.235 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 37.5 37.5 43 37.5 44.44 44.44 
Skewness  1.380 .884 .866 .625 .260 .748 
Kurtosis 4.703 3.017 3.913 2.844 2.881 3.090 
 
Highest 
Education Band 
 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 1.306 1.343 1.349 1.303 1.389 1.339 
Std. Dev .539 .582 .583 .503 .557 .554 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Skewness  1.558 1.482 1.454 1.329 1.065 1.386 
Kurtosis 4.494 4.161 4.080 3.721 3.127 3.951 
 
Education 
Diversity  
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean .504 .507 .502 .497 .496 .501 
Std. Dev .144 .121 .121 .132 .131 .129 
Min 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.74 
Skewness  -1.052 -.739 -.809 -1.310 -1.211 -1.056 
Kurtosis 4.138 3.233 3.801 5.596 5.007 4.552 
 
Highest 
Experience 
Band 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 2.694 2.783 2.788 2.849 2.879 2.803 
Std. Dev .704 .644 .649 .540 .519 .613 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Skewness  -2.591 -3.427 -3.441 -4.174 -4.741 -3.571 
Kurtosis 9.330 14.468 14.339 20.854 25.295 15.580 
 
Experience 
Diversity 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean .462 .436 .412 .383 .386 .414 
Std. Dev .170 .179 .179 .189 .186 .183 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.74 
Skewness  -.847 -.779 -.589 -.571 -.550 -.655 
Kurtosis 3.345 3.126 2.745 2.656 2.629 2.838 
 
Directorships  
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean .935 .965 .908 .769 .767 .866 
Std. Dev .424 .403 .416 .424 .386 .418 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 2.333 2.111 2.4 3.33 2.71 3.33 
Skewness  .482 .279 .662 1.385 .685 .688 
Kurtosis 3.583 2.853 4.079 8.813 5.225 4.676 
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Board Index 
 
 
 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 24.127 25.601 26.985 28.111 29.919 27.071 
Std. Dev 3.823 2.997 2.838 2.929 3.286 3.712 
Min 6 6 7 7 4 4 
Max 30 31 32 33 34 34 
Skewness  -1.558 -2.052 -2.302 -2.552 -3.883 -1.632 
Kurtosis 6.899 12.404 15.458 17.105 26.328 8.993 
 
 
 
Age diversity was calculated using the Blau’s index measure, which ranges from 
0-0.75 with higher values representing greater diversity. The mean value for age 
diversity across all the years was 0.395 which represents moderate age diversity as the 
maximum value that could have been achieved for age diversity using the Blau index 
measure was 0.75. The mean value of age diversity steadily decreased each year 
between 2008 and 2012, which is notably after the financial crisis of 2007/8. This 
contradicts previous scholars who suggest that diversity improved after the financial 
crisis in order to move away from the ‘groupthink’ phenomenon (Ford, 2010). Gender 
diversity has a mean value of 9.591% across all the years, and the mean value saw a 
steady yearly increase in the sample period. The largest yearly increase was between 
2010 and 2012, and this may have been in response to the Davies review in 2011 that 
challenged FTSE 100 companies to review gender diversity on their boards and 
achieve a target number of 25% of women directors by 2015 (Lord Davies Review, 
2011). The highest education band variable has a mean value of 1.339 for all the years 
and this is consistent across each year. This band represents an undergraduate degree 
or equivalent and the minimum value for this variable was 1, showing that the 
minimum highest education level on the boards of each company was at least an 
undergraduate degree.  
 
The descriptive statistics for education diversity and experience diversity show 
similar trends to that of age diversity, with a mean value of 0.501 and 0.414 
respectively across all the years. In addition, the mean values of these two variables 
steadily decreased between the years 2008 and 2012. This shows that the educational 
diversity and experience diversity of the boards decreased from the year 2008 
onwards. The minimum value of both variables was 0 whilst the maximum value was 
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0.74 and this covers the spectrum of Blau’s index in which a value of 0 indicates 
perfect homogeneity and a value of 0.75 represents perfect diversity. Education 
diversity and experience diversity are the only variables in the data set that were the 
closest to achieving perfect diversity on the scale of Blau’s index. The highest 
experience band variable has an average value of 2.803 across all the years and this 
band (rounded up to 3) represents previous appointments as either a director or CEO. 
This was the highest experience band on the scale, in line with Gray and Nowland 
(2013) who suggest that prior experience as a director or equivalent is the best possible 
experience a director can possess. The minimum value for highest experience band, 
as shown in Table 5.3, was 0 which represents no previous appointments at director 
level, managerial level or in a core functional background having been held. The mean 
value for the variable directorships was 0.866 across all the years and the mean values 
steadily decreased each year in the sample period. The largest decrease in mean value 
was between the years 2008 and 2010. This trend is consistent with the 
recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) that suggests the 
independence of non-executive directors may be affected when these directors hold 
multiple directorships or when they hold significant links with other directors. The 
variable board index has a mean value of 27.071 for all the years and generally, the 
mean, minimum and maximum values of the board index increased yearly over the 
sample period. In 2012, the maximum value was 34 which is highest score that could 
be achieved for this variable. This suggests that the board structure and procedures of 
the sample companies improved over the sample period.  
 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables 
This section shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables, firm age, 
firm leverage, firm size and industry dynamism. Table 5.4 displays the descriptive 
statistics of all the control variables used in this study. The analysis of skewness and 
kurtosis shows that the variables firm leverage and industry dynamism were not 
normally distributed, therefore these variables were transformed for normality as 
discussed in Chapter 4 relating to the regression diagnostics. Table 5.4 shows that the 
mean value of firm leverage decreased over the years in the sample period suggesting 
that the companies were decreasing their levels of debt over the period. In addition, 
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the mean value of industry dynamism decreased from 13.241 in the year 2008, to 7.765 
in 2010, and continued to decrease thereafter. This suggests that the market 
environment was highly volatile in 2008 and became less volatile from 2010 onwards. 
The descriptive statistics for firm age and firm size are as expected.  
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables 
Variables  200619 2008 2010 2012 2014 All Years 
 
Firm Age 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 34.382 32.672 34.667 36.662 38.652 35.451 
Std. Dev 34.250 33.365 33.380 33.373 33.367 33.510 
Min 0 0 1 3 5 0 
Max 137 139 141 143 145 145 
Skewness 1.240 1.381 1.380 1.380 1.380 1.347 
Kurtosis 3.455 3.906 3.906 3.905 3.905 3.820 
 
Firm Leverage 20 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 34.670 28.346 29.671 27.978 29.433 29.819 
Std. Dev 56.181 56.264 24.857 23.580 24.649 39.402 
Min 0 -680 -9.52 0 0 -680 
Max 638.18 98.38 108.65 103.3 160.43 638.18 
Skewness 8.203 -10.071 .867 .830 1.207 -1.973 
Kurtosis 86.599 128.281 3.388 3.208 6.123 172.225 
 
Firm Size 
 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 8.185 8.294 8.368 8.462 8.546 8.379 
Std. Dev 1.846 1.888 1.910 1.898 1.875 1.885 
Min 4.980 3.890 3.926 3.696 3.766 3.696 
Max 14.437 14.743 14.714 14.806 14.784 14.806 
Skewness .989 1.056 1.038 1.028 1.020 1.024 
Kurtosis 3.955 4.278 4.001 4.011 4.034 4.058 
 
Industry 
Dynamism 21 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 11.951 13.241 7.765 6.845 1.697 8.142 
Std. Dev 18.774 27.657 30.757 21.730 15.591 24.064 
Min -51.06 -50.69 -62.57 -29.04 -77.88 -77.8 
Max 97.6 210.22 365.85 165.46 70.2 365.85 
Skewness .913 3.497 8.108 4.056 .153 5.419 
Kurtosis 6.969 27.015 94.526 25.781 9.233 67.026 
 
Firm 
Leverage_wins22 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 30.454 31.737 29.671 27.978 29.188 29.778 
Std. Dev 25.404 24.780 24.857 23.580 23.556 24.386 
Min 0 -8.52 -9.52 0 0 -9.52 
Max 111.87 98.38 108.65 103.3 111.87 111.87 
Skewness 1.072 .547 .867 .830 .757 .812 
Kurtosis 4.109 2.571 3.388 3.208 3.258 3.298 
 
 
Industry 
Dynamism_wins23 
N= 157 198 198 198 198 949 
Mean 11.565 11.597 6.035 5.407 1.780 7.092 
Std. Dev 17.211 19.020 16.122 14.543 14.550 16.737 
Min -44.94 -44.94 -45.94 -29.04 -44.94 -45.94 
Max 58.47 58.47 58.47 58.47 58.47 58.47 
Skewness .393 -.146 .467 1.418 .525 .500 
Kurtosis 4.778 4.165 5.526 7.153 6.368 5.034 
                                                          
19 The descriptive statistics for the control variables start from the year 2006 as a two-year lag was 
incorporated in the data and this was also applicable to the control variables. 
20 This is the data for the variable firm leverage before it was transformed for normality.  
21 This is the data for the variable industry dynamism before it was transformed for normality.  
22 This is the data for the variable firm leverage after it was transformed for normality. 
23 This is the data for the variable industry dynamism after it was transformed for normality. 
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5.5 Multivariate Analysis: Research Question 1 
In this section results from the ordinary least square regressions (OLS) that relate 
to research question 1 will be presented and discussed. The first research question of 
this study is: which theoretical framework is the best predictor of board diversity and 
financial performance? Carter et al. (2010) posit that no one theory can directly predict 
the nature of the relationship between board diversity and financial performance; 
therefore, it is important to adopt several theories across different disciplines to 
provide insight into this relationship. This study addresses research question 1 in three 
ways. First, in Chapter 2, a review of the literature showed that the majority of 
previous corporate governance studies are dominated by a single theoretical 
framework and they do not adopt an integration of different theories. Second, the 
chosen theoretical framework of the study that comprises agency, resource 
dependence and upper echelons theories is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 also 
discusses the need to adopt a theoretical framework that encompasses these three 
theories in order to predict the relationship between board diversity and performance 
including the variables that arise from this study’s theoretical framework.  
 
Lastly, the first research question is addressed in this section by evaluating four 
OLS models comprised of different variables in order to find the model that best 
explains any variations in the dependent variable. The first model displays the OLS 
results for all the variables derived from the theoretical framework. Model two 
displays the OLS results for the variables derived from agency theory, these are, 
highest experience band, experience diversity and the board index. Model three 
displays the OLS results for the variables derived from resource dependence theory; 
these are highest education band, education diversity, highest experience band, 
experience diversity and directorships. Model four displays the OLS results for the 
variables derived from upper echelons theory; these are age diversity, gender diversity, 
highest education band, education diversity, highest experience band, experience 
diversity and directorships.24 Examining the four models is useful in identifying the 
                                                          
24 Table 3.2 in the theoretical framework chapter presented a summary of the research questions and 
theories alongside a summary of the variables that arise from each theory. 
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explanatory variables of the individual theories and assessing whether there was a need 
to combine the three theories together to gain greater explanatory power.  
 
5.5.1 OLS Regression and Akaike Information Criteria Findings  
The OLS regression results are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Table 5.5 
presents the OLS results using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable whereas Table 5.6 
presents the OLS results using ROE and ROA as alternative measures of financial 
performance. The sign of coefficients and significance together with the R-squared 
and F statistics are reported in the tables. The diagnostics presented in Chapter 4 
displayed that OLS was not the best linear unbiased estimator for this study’s data set. 
However, when addressing the first research question, OLS is the most appropriate 
technique in comparing the regression models and evaluating the model fit. Three 
statistics in the OLS regression can be used to evaluate the model fit, R-squared, F-
test and the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE). The R-squared measures the overall fit 
of the model and looks at the proportion of the variation on the dependent variable that 
is explained by the independent variables (Flora, 2018). Table 5.5 shows that the 
applicable R-squared values range from 0.2394 to 0.1976 for the models, with model 
one explaining the greatest proportion of the variation on Tobin’s Q by the 
independent variables. Notably, model four has an R-squared of 0.2368, which is 
slightly lower than that of model one.  
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Table 5.5 Full Sample OLS results of Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sample consists of 949 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2014. Model 1 presents the OLS results for all the variables derived from the theoretical framework. 
Model 2 presents the OLS results for the variables derived from agency theory, whilst model 3 presents the OLS results for the variables derived from resource 
dependence theory. Model 4 presents the OLS results for the variables derived from upper echelons theory. The dependent variable used is Tobin’s Q. The independent 
and control variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4. Robust standard errors are used in the OLS regression to account for heteroskedasticity. The coefficients 
are reported in the unstandardized form. Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) 
Explanatory variables         
AgeDiversity -.446** (.206)     -.465** (.206) 
GenderDiversity .012*** (.003)     .013*** (.003) 
HighestEducationband .175*** (.049)   .208*** (.050) .178*** (.049) 
EducationDiversity .229 (.194)   .233 (.191) .249 (.192) 
HighestExperienceband .071* (.038) .091** (.036) .098*** (.034) .094*** (.035) 
ExperienceDiversity .043 (.149) -.091 (.150) -.030 (.152) .041 (.150) 
Directorships .138** (.062)   .128** (.063) .135** (.062) 
BoardIndex .013 (.009) .022** (.009)     
         
Control Variables         
FirmAge -.002** (.001) -.002** (.001) -.001* (.001) -.001** (.001) 
FirmSize -.221*** (.013) -.190*** (.013) -.203*** (.013) -.219*** (.014) 
Firmlev_Wins -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) -.002 (.001) 
IndDyna_Wins .006*** (.001) .006*** (.001) .005* (.001) .006*** (.001) 
         
Number of obs     949 
24.26 
0.0000 
.75573 
0.2394 
949 
31.66 
0.0000 
.77415 
0.1976 
949 
28.55 
0.0000 
.7666 
0.2149 
949 
26.03 
0.0000 
.75665 
0.2368 
F 
Prob > F 
Root MSE 
R-squared   
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Table 5.6 Full Sample OLS results of ROE and ROA 
 
The sample consists of 949 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2014. Model 1 presents the OLS results for all the variables derived from the theoretical framework. 
Model 2 presents the OLS results for the variables derived from agency theory, whilst model 3 presents the OLS results for the variables derived from resource 
dependence theory. Model 4 presents the OLS results for the variables derived from upper echelons theory. The dependent variable used is Tobin’s Q. The independent 
and control variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4. Robust standard errors are used in the OLS regression to account for heteroskedasticity. The coefficients 
are reported in the unstandardized form. Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA 
 Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Explanatory variables                 
AgeDiversity -6.679** (3.419) -4.816** (1.945)         -6.78** (3.430) -4.952** (1.958) 
Gender Diversity .154*** (.045) .079*** (.023)         .159*** (.045) .086*** (.023) 
Highest Education band 1.776** (.825) 1.067** (.457)     2.17*** (.822) 1.31*** (.458) 1.792** (.824) 1.089** (.456) 
Education Diversity -.156 (3.113) .422 (1.639)     -.253 (3.082) .463 (1.632) -.053 (3.125) .567 (1.652) 
Highest Experience band .398 (.637) .108 (.382) .734 (.616) .306 (.378) .588 (.595) .328 (.362) .516 (.603) .273 (.363) 
Experience Diversity 6.001** (2.550) 2.368* (1.364) 4.340* (2.546) 1.448 (1.356) 5.114** (2.561) 1.870 (1.368) 5.992** (2.547) 2.356* (1.361) 
Directorships 2.506** (.987) 1.268** (.568)     2.437** (.998) 1.245** (.576) 2.490** (.986) 1.245** (.566) 
BoardIndex .068 (.103) .095 (.059) .170 (.104) .153** (.060)         
Control Variables                 
FirmAge -.036*** (.012) -.009 (.006) -.037*** (.012) -.009 (.006) -.034*** (.012) -.007 (.006) -.036*** (.012) -.008 (.006) 
FirmSize -2.49*** (.226) -1.53*** (.120) -2.11*** (.212) -1.30*** (.116) -2.27*** (.220) -1.39*** (.118) -2.48*** (.227) -1.51*** (.121) 
Firmlev_Wins -.065*** (.021) -.050*** (.010) -.066*** (.021) -.051*** (.010) -.064*** (.021) -.049*** (.010) -.065*** (.021) -.049*** (.010) 
IndDyna_Wins .128*** (.027) .069*** (.015) .127*** (.027) .069*** (.015) .118*** (.027) .062*** (.015) .126*** (.027) .067*** (.015) 
                 
Number of obs 949 
15.30 
0.0000 
12.621 
0.1721 
949 
18.91 
0.0000 
6.826 
0.1994 
949 
22.61 
0.0000 
12.775 
0.1473 
949 
27.82 
0.0000 
6.9222 
0.1723 
949 
18.73 
0.0000 
12.708 
0.1580 
949 
22.52 
0.0000 
6.8909 
0.1815 
949 
16.68 
0.0000 
12.617 
0.1718 
949 
20.25 
0.0000 
6.8299 
0.1977 
F 
Prob > F 
Root MSE 
R-squared   
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The results in Table 5.5 suggest that the variables derived from upper echelons 
theory alone explain a large proportion of the variance in the dependent variable and 
are highly comparable with those derived from the three integrated theories. Table 5.6 
shows a similar trend with R-squared values ranging from 0.1473 to 0.1721 when 
using ROE as a dependent variable and R-squareds ranging from 0.1723 to 0.1994. In 
both instances, model one had the highest R-squared and model two had the lowest R-
squared. Further to this, the F-test indicates whether the predicted relationship between 
the dependent variable and the set of predictors is statistically reliable. The F statistics 
for all the models show that all of the regression models are significant, with p-values 
that are zero to four decimal points. In regards to the RMSE, it is an absolute measure 
of fit that indicates how accurately the model predicts response. As lower values of 
RMSE indicate a better fit, it is evident in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 that model one has the 
lowest RMSE in most cases, indicating that this model is a better fit. However, Table 
5.6 shows that when using ROE as the dependent variable, model four has the lowest 
RMSE. These results suggest that model one with the variables derived from this 
study’s theoretical framework is overall a better fitting model than the models with 
variables from the individual theories.  
 
In order to further assess and compare the four models, the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) was used. AIC was developed by Akaike (1974) and is one of the most 
popular techniques used to compare different models based on maximum likelihood. 
Model selection is important as an over-fitted model may lose generality whist an 
under-fitted model may not show the true nature of the variability in the dependent 
variable (Snipes & Taylor, 2014). Akaike (1974) proposed that selection of the best 
model can be determined by an AIC score, which STATA calculates as follows:  
 
AIC = -2*ln (likelihood) + 2*k (5.1) 
 
Where k is the number of parameters estimated and ln is the log. AIC is a 
measure that combines both fit and complexity, whereby fit is calculated negatively 
by -2*ln (likelihood) and complexity is calculated positively by 2*k (Akaike, 1974).  
The model with the lowest AIC score is considered the most parsimonious model, that 
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is, the simplest model with the least assumptions and greatest explanatory power for 
the given data (Snipes & Taylor, 2014). The results from this measure are presented 
in Table 5.7. Model one received the lowest AIC scores when using Tobin’s Q and 
ROA as dependent variables (AIC = 2174.474, AIC =6351.608), whereas model four 
had the lowest AIC score (AIC =7516.514) when using ROE as the dependent 
variable. However, there is a significant difference in the AIC scores using the 
different dependent variables and the models that use Tobin’s Q have much lower AIC 
scores. Overall the regression statistics and AIC scores indicate that model one with 
the variables derived from the study’s theoretical framework is the best model for the 
given data. These findings have several implications on the literature and theoretical 
perspectives of board diversity and financial performance.  
 
Table 5.7 AIC Results 
 
 
5.6 Discussion of OLS and AIC findings  
The weakest model in these findings was model two with the variables derived 
from agency theory. This is in line with Carter et al. (2003) who suggest that although 
a board’s monitoring function and board independence may improve through a diverse 
board, agency theory does not provide a clear prediction of the link between board 
Model Dependent 
Variable 
Obs 
 
11(null) 
 
11(model) df AIC 
1 Tobin’s Q 949 -1204.094 -1074.237 13 2174.474 
2 Tobin’s Q 949 -1204.094 -1099.62 8 2215.240 
3 Tobin’s Q 949 -1204.094 -1089.308 10 2198.615 
4 Tobin’s Q 949 -1204.094 -1075.898 12 2175.796 
       
1 ROE 949 -3835.709 -3746.1 13 7518.200 
2 ROE 949 -3835.709 -3760.088 8 7536.177 
3 ROE 949 -3835.709 -3754.121 10 7528.241 
4 ROE 949 -3835.709 -3746.257 12 7516.514 
       
1 ROA 949 -3268.345 -3162.804 13 6351.608 
2 ROA 949 -3268.345 -3178.614 8 6373.229 
3 ROA 949 -3268.345 -3173.305 10 6366.61 
4 ROA 949 -3268.345 -3163.852 12 6351.704 
       
160 | P a g e  
 
diversity and financial performance. This is further supported by Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) who suggest the main limitation of agency theory is that it has not explicitly 
considered the board’s ability to perform its monitoring function and overlooked the 
heterogeneity of this monitoring function. Low et al. (2015) suggest that because 
boards are essential in overcoming agency problems, more emphasis should be placed 
on incorporating board characteristics, such as diversity, that enhance their monitoring 
role. Further to this, an incorporation of agency theory allows this study to not only 
focus on demographic diversity, but also include a focus on structural diversity, which 
is commonly measured by board independence and CEO duality (Ararat et al., 2015). 
However, the biggest contribution that agency theory makes to this theoretical 
framework is that unlike upper echelons theory, it views the most powerful actors and 
decision makers in an organisation as the board of directors (Hambrick, Misangyi & 
Park, 2015; Nielsen, 2010). In addition, empirical literature in corporate governance 
studies has identified that conventional governance variables such as board size, board 
committees and board independence, are aspects of board structure that should be 
included when assessing the link between board composition and performance (Ben-
Amar & Zeghal, 2011; Clemente & Labat, 2009; Darmadi, 2013). This data was 
captured in the corporate governance board index that was constructed and derived 
from agency theory. Therefore, inclusion of agency theory in the theoretical 
framework provides a more holistic picture of board structure by not only focusing on 
directors’ demographics but also on board practices, procedures and other corporate 
governance attributes.  
 
Model three with the variables derived from resource dependence theory was 
neither the weakest nor the strongest model from the tests conducted. Carter et al. 
(2010) propose that resource dependence perspective offers stronger support for the 
financial benefits of board diversity than agency theory. Further to this, Carter et al. 
(2010) suggest that resource dependence theory provides some of the most substantial 
theoretical arguments for a business case for board diversity. This is primarily because 
diverse directors are more likely to have unique information and should be able to 
provide wider access to key constituencies in the external environment. In simpler 
terms, diverse boards have a wider pool of talent and this may send a positive signal 
to the market (Carter et al., 2010). This study’s findings contradict this proposition, 
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because although model three was not the weakest, the results show that its R-squared 
values and AIC scores were much lower than models one and four. Rather, model four 
with variables from upper echelons theory was the most comparable model to model 
one with only slightly lower statistics. Nonetheless, resource dependence theory 
suggests that board diversity can have a positive influence on market valuation by 
linking an organisation to its external environment (Ntim, 2015). This and other 
factors discussed in Chapter 3 warrants its inclusion in the theoretical framework. 
Model four overall had the second greatest explanatory power based on the statistical 
tests conducted and in some cases, it had slightly higher values than that of model one. 
These findings imply that upper echelons theory provides a sound theoretical 
foundation upon which to assess the link between diversity and financial performance. 
However, its main limitation is that it considers top executives and senior management 
as the most powerful actors in the organisation (Hambrick, 2007). This assumption 
omits a broader set of position holders, the board of directors, whom Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) state have the ultimate responsibility for the success and performance 
of a firm. Ararat et al. (2015) note that although boards and top management teams 
are different with some overlap, research on top management teams, such as upper 
echelons theory, provides valuable insights into boards as a decision-making group.  
 
5.7 Multivariate Analysis: Research Question 2 
This section presents and discusses the regression models used (OLS, 2SLS, 
GLS) to examine the association between board diversity and financial performance. 
The OLS model uses robust standard errors to account for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the data, however it was already noted that due to several 
violations of the classic assumptions of  linear regression, OLS was no longer the best 
linear unbiased estimator. Therefore, the second model uses 2SLS regression with an 
instrumental variables approach. This model accounts for heteroskedasticity through 
robust standard errors, and endogeneity using the instrumental variables estimation. 
Lastly, the GLS model is used for robustness purposes in line with the extant literature 
that suggests that the GLS estimator is considered the best linear unbiased estimator 
for β in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Verbeek, 2008). A 
series of 12 regressions were conducted to test this study’s hypotheses, which focus 
on testing the association between board diversity attributes and financial performance 
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for the full sample over the sample period.  Financial performance is measured as 
Tobin’s Q and for robustness purposes, ROA and ROE as used as alternative measures 
of accounting based financial performance. Table 5.8 presents the overall results for 
the full sample using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable whilst Table 5.9 presents 
the overall results for the full sample using ROA and ROE as dependent variables. 
The regression equations were discussed in Chapter 4, and the definitions of the 
variables were discussed in Chapter 3. The hypotheses developed and tested in the 
regression analyses were previously presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.8 Full Sample OLS, 2SLS and GLS results of Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sample is based on 198 companies listed on the FTSE 350 and consists of 949 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2014. Model 1 presents the OLS results for 
all the variables and uses robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. Model 2 presents the 2SLS results for all the variables using an instrumental 
variables estimation. The instruments used in the 2SLS are total equity, total sales, capital intensity, operating margin, length of operating cycle and sales growth. 
Model 3 presents the FGLS results for all the data and the model estimates indicate that the data set is homoscedastic and no autocorrelation is present. The dependent 
variable used is Tobin’s Q. The independent and control variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4.  The coefficients are reported in the unstandardized form. 
Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) 
Explanatory variables       
AgeDiversity -.446** (.206) -2.337 (1.891) -.446** .(202) 
GenderDiversity .012*** (.003) .012*** (.004) .012*** (.002) 
HighestEducationband .175*** (.049) .621 (.397) .175*** (.047) 
EducationDiversity .229 (.194) -.557 (.548) .229 (.206) 
HighestExperienceband .071* (.038) -.081 (.068) .071 (.045) 
ExperienceDiversity .043 (.149) .286 (.201) .043 (.141) 
Directorships .138** (.062) .979** (.418) .138** (.063) 
BoardIndex .013 (.009) .009 (.011) .013* (.007) 
       
Control Variables       
FirmAge -.002** (.001) -.002** (.001) -.002** (.001) 
FirmSize -.221*** (.013) -.289*** (.026) -.221*** (.014) 
Firmlev_Wins -.002 (.001) -.001 (.002) -.002** (.001) 
IndDyna_Wins .006*** (.001) .006*** (.002) .006*** (.002) 
       
Number of obs      949 
24.26 
0.0000 
0.2394 
949 949 
198 
 
Number of groups 
F 
Prob > F 
R-squared   
Wald chi2(12)  211.10 
0.0000 
298.73 
0.0000 Prob > chi2 
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Table 5.9 Full Sample OLS, 2SLS and GLS results of ROE and ROA 
 
The sample is based on 198 companies listed on the FTSE 350 and consists of 949 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2014. Model 1 presents the OLS results for 
all the variables and uses robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. Model 2 presents the 2SLS results for all the variables using an instrumental 
variables estimation. The instruments used in the 2SLS are total equity, total sales, capital intensity, operating margin, length of operating cycle and sales growth. 
Model 3 presents the FGLS results for all the data and the model estimates indicate that the data set is homoscedastic and no autocorrelation is present. The dependent 
variables used are ROE and ROA. The independent and control variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4.  The coefficients are reported in the unstandardized 
form. Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.    
                 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA 
 Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. 
err.) 
Coef. (Std. err.) 
Explanatory variables             
AgeDiversity -6.679** (3.419) -4.816** (1.945) -53.20 (34.137) -42.44* (22.23) -6.680** (3.380) -4.816*** (1.828) 
GenderDiversity .154*** (.045) .079*** (.023) .204*** (.074) .079* (.046) .154*** (.047) .078*** (.025) 
HighestEducationband 1.776** (.825) 1.067** (.457) -.683 (8.781) 4.095 (6.062) 1.776** (.790) 1.067** (.427) 
EducationDiversity -.156 (3.113) .422 (1.639) -.176 (11.076) -4.740 (7.635) -.156 (3.438) .422 (1.860) 
HighestExperienceband .398 (.637) .108 (.382) -1.616 (1.343) -.680 (.720) .398 (.742) .108 (.402) 
ExperienceDiversity 6.001** (2.550) 2.368* (1.364) 9.084*** (3.481) 3.419* (1.922) 6.001** (2.348) 2.368* (1.270) 
Directorships 2.506** (.987) 1.268** (.568) 12.812 (8.241) 2.982 (4.736) 2.506** (1.045) 1.268** (.565) 
BoardIndex .068 (.103) .095 (.059) .023 (.146) .010 (.092) .068 (.121) .095 (.065) 
             
Control Variables             
FirmAge -.036*** (.012) -.009 (.006) -.053*** (.018) -.020** (.010) -.036*** (.013) -.009 (.007) 
FirmSize -2.49*** (.226) -1.53*** (.120) -3.44*** (.540) -2.11*** (.265) -2.487*** (.237) -1.525*** (.128) 
Firmlev_Wins -.065*** (.021) -.050*** (.010) -.052** (.026) -.033** (.015) -.065*** (.017) -.050*** (.009) 
IndDyna_Wins .128*** (.027) .069*** (.015) .136*** (.034) .072*** (.020) .128*** (.025) .069*** (.013) 
             
Number of obs      949 
15.30 
0.0000 
0.1721 
949 
18.91 
0.0000 
0.1994 
949 949 949 
198 
 
949 
198 
 
Number of groups 
F 
Prob > F 
R-squared   
Wald chi2(12)   120.37 
0.0000 
155.86 
0.0000 
197.26 
0.0000 
236.40 
0.0000 Prob > chi2 
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5.7.1 Board Index: Findings and Hypothesis Testing  
This study investigates the association between the board index and financial 
performance from a sample of 198 firms listed on the FTSE 350. Corporate 
governance scholars have debated in the literature on what are the best methods of 
empirically measuring the corporate governance quality of a company. In this study, 
a corporate governance board index was selected as a suitable method as previously 
discussed in Section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4. The researcher constructed a board index that 
specifically assesses and measures the actual quality of corporate governance practices 
of the boards of listed companies in the UK. The association between the board index 
and financial performance is tested using OLS, 2SLS and GLS regression and the 
results are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. The results show that there is no significant 
association between the board index and financial performance using all three 
dependent variables and in all the three models. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is rejected, 
the board index is not positively associated with financial performance.  
 
5.7.2 Board Index: Discussion and Literature  
One of the most common mechanisms of corporate governance that is 
researched by scholars is the board of directors as an internal control point that 
alleviates agency problems and helps companies create value and maximise 
shareholder wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014). Rashid (2015) 
notes that from an agency theory perspective, the primary role of the board is to 
exercise the governance function and to include independent non-executive directors 
to who can reduce agency costs by exercising ‘decision control’ through monitoring 
managers’ decision making and performance. Corporate governance researchers have 
proposed a variety of ways that improve the monitoring function and capabilities of 
boards (Hambrick et al., 2015). Prominent proposals in the literature include the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors, appropriate board size, eliminating 
CEO duality, the composition and existence of board committees and enhancing 
directors’ accountability (DeFond, Hann & Hu, 2005; Dowell, Shackell & Stuart, 
2011; Hambrick et al., 2015; Tuggle et al., 2010). Traditionally corporate governance 
researchers have measured the relationship of corporate governance and firm 
performance using either one or more variables of corporate governance mechanisms 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Malik & Makhdoom, 2016). Although there is no one best 
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measure of corporate governance, the use of corporate governance indices has become 
the most dominant approach in evaluating the quality of a company’s corporate 
governance (Bhagat et al., 2008; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Da Silva & Leal, 2005; Korent 
et al., 2014).  
 
This study’s findings are surprising as the elements included in the board 
index25 reflect different attributes that are considered as good corporate governance 
practice by the Financial Reporting Council in the UK. The board index specifically 
addresses the five main principles of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, which 
are leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and relations with 
shareholders. Previous governance studies have either used self-constructed corporate 
governance indices or ones generated by commercial firms (Carvalhal & Nobili, 2011; 
Epps & Cereola, 2008; Gompers et al., 2003). These studies have produced mixed 
findings, for instance Black et al. (2006b) examined 525 firms in Korea based on a 
self-constructed corporate governance (CG) index that included provisions on 
disclosure, board structure, board procedure and shareholders rights. They found a 
significant and positive association between their CG index and Tobin’s Q using OLS 
and 2SLS regressions. Similarly, Cheung et al. (2011) examined the corporate 
governance practices of large listed companies in Hong Kong using a CG index that 
included sections on disclosure, board responsibilities and equitable treatment of 
shareholders. Their results provided evidence in support of the notion that good 
corporate governance can predict future market valuation. In contrast, several scholars 
have used CG indices to examine the link between corporate governance practices and 
firm performance and have found no association between the two (Bebchuk et al., 
2009; Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009; Diavatopoulos & Fodor, 2016). Price, Román and 
Rountree (2011) looked at the impact of corporate governance and performance in 
Mexican firms using a self-constructed index based on the recommendations of the 
National Banking and Security Exchange Commission. Their regression results 
showed no association between the CG index and ROA, sales growth and stock 
returns. Further to this, Price et al. (2011) concluded that compliance to the provisions 
set out in the code is not associated with improved performance or transparency, 
                                                          
25 This was described in detail in the methodology chapter; please refer to Section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4.  
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suggesting that monitoring alone is not sufficient for good corporate governance and 
greater compliance may force firms to adopt costly measures in order to reduce agency 
costs. These findings are consistent with this study’s findings and their conclusion 
reinforces one of the biggest limitations of agency theory in focusing solely on the 
attributes discussed above. That is, agency theory does not focus on the attributes of 
individuals (directors) who improve the board’s effectiveness and monitoring 
capabilities (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Similarly, Fabel (2004) acknowledges that 
even when directors have the correct links, incentives and power to implement their 
decisions, they make good or bad decisions because they differ in their capabilities. 
Considering this, the findings suggest that adherence with the provisions in the 
Corporate Governance Code alone may not be sufficient to improve monitoring and 
performance, rather there should be a wider focus on the individual and collective 
capabilities of directors to provide effective monitoring and improve financial 
performance.  
 
5.7.3 Age Diversity: Findings and Hypothesis Testing  
This study examines the association between age diversity of directors and 
financial performance from a sample of 198 firms listed on the FTSE 350. Age 
diversity is measured using Blau’s index of diversity. The association is tested using 
OLS, 2SLS and GLS regressions as presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. The results show 
a significant and negative association between age diversity and Tobin’s Q at the 5% 
significance level in models one and three. These findings are similar when using the 
accounting based measures ROA and ROE, particularly based on ROA, the 
association between age diversity and financial performance is negative and 
significant at 1% in model three and at 5% in model one. Model two does not provide 
any significant evidence of an association between age diversity and financial 
performance. However, it is important to note that in Chapter 4 it was identified that 
age diversity is an endogenous variable; therefore, the most appropriate model to 
consider in analysing these results would be model two that uses the instrumental 
variables technique to address endogeneity. Consequently, based on the study’s 
findings, hypothesis 2 is rejected, age diversity on the board of directors is not 
positively associated with financial performance. 
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5.7.4 Age Diversity: Discussion and Literature  
Literature on age diversity suggests that differences in generations are 
beneficial to boards as this may prevent groupthink and, from an agency theory 
perspective, it may lead to more effective monitoring. Ararat et al. (2015) propose that 
enhanced monitoring by the board can be achieved through a balance of enthusiasm 
and larger risk appetite that is associated with younger directors, and, the experience 
and risk averse appetite of older directors. In addition, from a resource dependence 
and upper echelons perspective, age diversity offers a wide range of perspectives and 
skills and therefore is a valuable resource upon which firms can draw upon to improve 
their performance (Li et al., 2011). This is contrary to another stream of literature that 
suggests companies with older directors perform better because such directors have 
more experience and in decision-making are less likely to engage in value destroying 
activities (Nguyen, Hagendorff & Eshraghi, 2015). In line with this, Adams et al. 
(2015) state that it can be argued that the appointment of younger directors on boards 
can be detrimental to firm value because younger directors may be more inclined to 
engage in risky and value-destroying activities. However, Grund and Westergård-
Nielsen (2008) argue that younger directors can create shareholder wealth and 
improve firm performance through their innovative nature, creative ideas and ability 
to learn new technologies. The literature on age diversity is inconclusive as to which 
age group of directors is more beneficial on boards. However, this study’s theoretical 
framework proposes a board that consists of a diverse age group should lead to better 
decision-making through different perspectives and ultimately improve financial 
performance.  
 
In contrast to the theoretical framework developed in this study, the results 
found no association between age diversity and financial performance using 2SLS 
regression and a negative association using GLS regression. These results are in 
contrast to the findings of several scholars who have examined the relationship 
between age diversity and financial performance (Darmadi, 2011; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Nguyen et al., 2015). For instance, Kim and Lim (2010) found that greater age 
diversity of directors was associated with higher firm value in Korea. Letting et al. 
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(2012) found a significant positive relationship between director’s age and ROA using 
OLS regression. Likewise, Mahadeo et al. (2012) examined the influence of board 
diversity on financial performance in an emerging economy and found a positive 
relationship between different age groups of directors and firm performance. Notably, 
this study’s results may be different because the majority of the prior studies stated 
used OLS regression, which may not be the best linear unbiased estimator when the 
classic assumptions of linear regression are not met. In addition, the majority of 
previous corporate governance studies have faced serious endogeneity issues that 
cannot be addressed by using OLS regression (e.g. Azeez, 2015; Rashid et al., 2010). 
Therefore, by using a 2SLS regression with instrumental variables, this study 
addresses the issue of endogeneity and provides more robust results on the link 
between age diversity and financial performance. This is consistent with Akpan and 
Amran (2014) who examined Nigerian listed companies and found no relationship 
between age diverse boards and firm performance. Eulerich, Velte and Van Uum 
(2014) suggested that a negative relationship between age diversity and performance 
may be found due to large age differences, which may weaken the decision-making 
process of the board. The Pearson’s correlation matrix in Appendix F shows a 
significant but negative correlation between age diversity and highest experience band 
and no correlation between age diversity and experience diversity. This suggests that 
an age diverse board could lead to lower levels of experience on the board and this 
could result in a negative effect on financial performance as seen in the GLS regression 
results. However, in Chapter 4, age diversity was found to be an endogenous variable, 
therefore the 2SLS results are the most appropriate results. The results suggest that 
age diversity of directors does not improve nor worsen financial performance, and this 
may be due to the risk seeking appetite of younger directors being balanced out by the 
risk averse appetite of older directors.  
 
5.7.5 Gender Diversity: Findings and Hypothesis Testing  
This study examines the association between gender diversity on the board of 
directors and financial performance from a sample of 198 firms listed on the FTSE 
350. Gender diversity is measured as the proportion of female directors on the board. 
The association is tested using OLS, 2SLS and GLS regressions as presented in Tables 
5.8 and 5.9. The results show strong evidence of a significant and positive association 
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between gender diversity and Tobin’s Q in all the three models at the 1% significance 
level. These results are similar when using ROE and ROA as the dependent variables, 
strong evidence a positive and significant association with gender diversity is found. 
Therefore, based on the study’s findings, hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected, gender 
diversity on the board of directors is positively associated with financial performance. 
 
5.7.6 Gender Diversity: Discussion and Literature  
The extant literature on gender diversity states that female directors can 
positively contribute to the boards of directors several ways. From agency theory and 
upper echelons perspectives, it can be argued that gender diversity can improve board 
monitoring because having directors from various backgrounds adds multiple 
diversity aspects to the oversight lens and prevents the group think effect (Low et al., 
2015). In other words, a diverse board is more likely to challenge the status quo (Yi, 
2011). Supporting this view, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that female directors 
have the capability to increase board independence and implement stricter monitoring 
as they do not belong to the ‘old boys club’. In addition, they find improved meeting 
attendance amongst male directors with more gender diverse boards (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). A different stream of literature states the board of directors represents 
the interests of stakeholders, some of which have wider expectations than just financial 
performance (Low et al., 2015). Female directors have been shown to display a greater 
sensitivity to social and environmental issues; therefore, the presence of female 
directors on boards can increase social and environmental performance and lead to a 
better reputation with a wider group of stakeholders (Bear et al., 2010; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008). Consequently, these stakeholders may provide easier access to 
resources they control which will ultimately have a positive effect on firm value and 
financial performance (Low et al., 2015). From a resource dependence theory 
perspective, firms operate in increasingly complex and uncertain environments; 
therefore, their boards must be composed of diverse individuals who can provide a 
breadth of resources (Terjesen et al., 2009). Hillman at al. (2007) further state that 
women have the potential to link firms to different networks or resources from men 
by virtue of their different skills, values, experiences and beliefs. In light of this, the 
study’s theoretical frameworks proposes that greater gender diversity on boards 
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enhances and improves financial performance due to the positive contributions female 
directors make on boards.  
 
This study’s findings on the association between gender diversity and financial 
performance are consistent with the propositions of the study’s theoretical framework 
and with several previous studies. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found a 
significant and positive relationship between gender diversity and ROA, whilst Carter 
et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between firm value and gender diversity. In 
Mahadeo et al.’s (2012) study, their regression results revealed a strong positive effect 
on performance of gender-diverse boards relative to boards with no female 
representation. They further concluded that, in the case of female representation on 
the board, the impacts of its symbolism might be sufficient to bring significant changes 
to perspectives in the boardroom, which leads to better performance (Mahadeo et al., 
2012). Other studies have documented findings that are contrary to those of this study 
when examining the association between gender diversity and firm performance. 
Darmadi (2011) examined a sample of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange and found a significant but negative association between gender diversity 
and ROA and Tobin’s Q. This is consistent with Lee and James (2007) who found a 
significant and negative reaction by the stock market to the news of female CEO 
appointments. A study with data of more than 1,900 companies by Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) found a negative effect of gender diversity on firm performance when 
measured using Tobin’s Q. Marinova et al. (2016) suggested such negative effects 
may be due to ‘over monitoring’ in companies with strong governance which may 
decrease firm performance. This is contrary to this study’s regression results and the 
descriptive statistics presented in the correlation matrix in Appendix F. The correlation 
matrix shows a significant and positive correlation between gender diversity and the 
board index which proxies different corporate governance attributes including 
accountability and effectiveness of the board. Therefore, the findings suggest that 
greater gender diversity improves the corporate governance practices of the board, 
which include effective monitoring.  
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5.7.7 Directors’ Education: Findings and Hypothesis Testing  
This study examines the association between directors’ education and financial 
performance from a sample of 198 firms listed on the FTSE 350. The measurement of 
directors’ education in this study was in two parts. First, to assess the directors’ 
education levels, a four-point scale that reflects the highest level of education attained 
was used and this variable is termed highest education band. Second, to assess the 
educational diversity of the board the Blau’s index for diversity was used, and this 
variable is termed education diversity. The study employs OLS, 2SLS and GLS 
regressions and the results are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. The results show a 
significant and positive association between highest education band and Tobin’s Q in 
models one and three at the 1% significance level. However, in model two, the results 
show no association between highest education band and financial performance. These 
results are similar when using the ROA and ROE as dependent variables, there is 
evidence of a significant and positive association with highest education band in 
models one and three and no association in model two. Although these findings are 
contradictory, it is important to note that highest education band was identified as an 
endogenous variable in Chapter 4; therefore, the most appropriate model to use in this 
analysis is model two that incorporates the instrumental variables estimation. 
Considering this, the findings show that there is no association between highest 
education band and financial performance and therefore hypothesis 4 is rejected. In 
regards to education diversity, Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show no significant association 
between education diversity and financial performance when using all three dependent 
variables and in all three models. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is rejected, the educational 
diversity of the board of directors is not positively associated with financial 
performance. 
 
5.7.8 Directors’ Education: Discussion and Literature  
Literature on directors’ education, together with this study’s theoretical 
framework, suggests that director’s educational backgrounds can positively contribute 
to a company’s decision-making process. From an agency theory perspective, a highly 
educated board enhances corporate governance by providing a more effective advisory 
and monitoring role (Khanna et al., 2014). The business environment, particularly for 
large firms such as those listed on the FTSE 350, is increasingly complex and therefore 
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scholars argue that a wide array of knowledge/education can allow the board to tackle 
complex decisions through an in depth assessment of the implications of those 
decisions (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2017). Further to this, Mahadeo et al. 
(2012) note that most corporate governance codes encourage board committees to 
have specific strategic-led mandates implying that the board of directors should be 
drawn from an array of educational backgrounds. Similarly, upper echelons theorists 
propose that the educational level provides an indication of skill base, human capital 
and knowledge (Certo, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Hambrick and Mason’s 
(1984) earliest upper echelon model recognised that one’s formal educational 
background might yield rich information. Therefore, to some extent, the skills and 
knowledge base of a person can be reflected through their educational background and 
qualifications (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Individuals with higher education levels 
are assumed to have higher intellectual potential and tend to give more reasons and 
objectives in the decision making process and this in turn improves firm performance 
(Zhihua, 2010). Similarly, other scholars in the upper echelon field contend that the 
directors’ education level can affect a board’s reputation and prestige (D’Aveni 1990; 
Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993). Certo (2003) suggests that highly educated 
directors can enhance the board’s prestige and its organisational legitimacy. Wang et 
al. (2017) note that several studies show that a company’s perceived legitimacy can 
allow the managers and directors to influence the perceptions of stakeholders and 
acquire resources that are key to a company’s survival. For instance, Mizruchi (1996) 
found that highly educated directors can signal to investors the legitimacy and prestige 
of the company and reduce the cost of external capital which then improves firm 
performance. This is consistent with resource dependence theory perspective as 
acquiring lower external finance is one way that highly educated directors can expand 
their firms’ boundaries through linkages to important external resources as evidenced 
by Mizruchi (1996) and Wang et al. (2017). 
 
The results from the 2SLS estimation for highest education band and from all 
three models for educational diversity are largely inconsistent with the literature and 
with the study’s theoretical framework. Several scholars who have examined the 
association between director’s education and financial performance have found a 
positive association. For instance, Nguyen et al. (2015) found that the education of 
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executive directors in the US banking sector was positively and significantly related 
to stock market returns. Several other studies show that directors’ educational level is 
positively and significantly associated with firm performance because of their 
expertise and more effective monitoring (Akpan & Amran, 2014; Khanna et al., 2014; 
Reeb & Zhao, 2013; Yermack, 2006). Phenomenal work in this area from an earlier 
study by Bantel (1993) found that greater diversity in educational backgrounds of the 
top management teams in the banking industry led to better strategic decision-making, 
which led to improved performance. However, the results from Mahadeo et al.’s 
(2014) study challenge the findings of Bantel (1993) as they found boards that selected 
a higher mix of educational backgrounds experienced lower firm performance. The 
descriptive statistics in Table 5.4 show that the mean value of education diversity 
across the sample period was 0.501, which is moderately diverse, and the minimum 
value for education diversity was 0 in some years, indicating that some boards of 
directors had similar educational backgrounds. These findings together with the 
regression results suggest that educational diversity and the highest education bands 
of directors neither improves nor worsens financial performance. The study’s findings 
may differ to other studies due to differences in the measurement of directors’ 
education. For instance, Khanna et al. (2014), measure directors’ education as the 
number of years of schooling whereas Akpan and Amran (2014) use the percentage of 
directors on the board with a Master’s degree or a Doctorate as a proxy of directors’ 
education.  
 
5.7.9 Experience Diversity: Findings and Hypothesis Testing  
This study examines the association between directors’ experience and 
financial performance from a sample of 198 firms listed on the FTSE 350. The 
measurement of directors’ experience in this study was in two parts. First, a four-point 
scale that reflects the highest previous positions held was used in order to assess the 
directors’ previous experience and this variable is termed highest experience band. 
Second, in order to assess the diversity of experience of directors, the Blau’s index for 
diversity was used and this variable is termed experience diversity. The study employs 
OLS, 2SLS and GLS regressions and the results are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. 
The results do not provide any significant evidence of an association between highest 
experience band and financial performance in all three models and when using Tobin’s 
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Q, ROE and ROA as dependent variables. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is rejected; the 
experience level of directors is not positively associated with financial performance. 
In regards to experience diversity, the results show no significant association with 
financial performance in all three models when using Tobin’s Q as a dependent 
variable. In contrast, when using ROE as the dependent variable, there is a positive 
and significant association between experience diversity and financial performance at 
the 5% significance level in models one and three and at the 1% significance level in 
model two. When using ROA, the results display weak evidence of a positive 
association with experience diversity. Therefore, taking into account the accounting 
based measures of performance, hypothesis 7 cannot be rejected, the experience 
diversity of directors is positively associated with financial performance.  
 
5.7.10 Experience Diversity: Discussion and Literature  
The extant literature and this study’s theoretical framework proposes that the 
experience of directors on the board enhances the decision making process and 
improves financial performance. From an agency theory perspective, directors with 
suitable knowledge gained through experience will not only be better monitors, but 
will also be useful advisors to top managers (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Resource 
dependence theory views director experience as a vital intangible resource that is more 
likely to produce competitive advantage due to experience being unique and hard to 
imitate (Crook et al., 2011). Furthermore, upper echelons scholars suggest that senior 
executives carry essential and unique skills that are displayed through their 
perceptions and beliefs, and these perceptions and beliefs are ultimately based on 
executives’ experiences (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). Hambrick (2007) also states that 
executives’ idiosyncratic experiences influence their strategic choices, decision 
making and performance levels, particularly in complex issues such as those faced by 
large corporations. Therefore, boards of directors who do not have relevant and 
suitable experience may be incapable of fully contributing to the strategic decision 
making of a firm (Kroll et al., 2008). It is important to note that previous studies have 
used different measures as proxies of prior experience as discussed previously in the 
theoretical framework chapter. This study uses previous experience as a director and 
incorporates the functional background of directors in the four-point scale constructed. 
Phenomenal work by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggests that there 
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are unique skill sets and managerial abilities that are acquired by individuals with 
previous experience as directors that sets them apart from other individuals. Further to 
this, directors with previous executive experience exhibit a better understanding of 
international markets, expansion strategies and associated risks and such knowledge 
leads to better decision making (Volonté & Gantenbein, 2016).  Therefore previous 
experience as a director in listed companies can signal a director’s proven track record, 
accomplishments and social ties and networks with other companies (Nguyen et al., 
2015). 
 
This study’s findings on the association between highest experience band and 
financial performance are inconsistent with the study’s theoretical framework. 
However, the findings on the association between experience diversity and financial 
performance are consistent with the theoretical framework. This is reflective of prior 
studies as the empirical evidence on the relationship between director experience and 
financial performance is mixed. Previous studies in management literature have 
examined the impact of director experience on different aspects of firm performance. 
For instance, a study by Fich (2005) revealed that shareholders react positively to the 
appointment of non-executive directors with past CEO experience in other firms. Gray 
and Nowland (2013) found that both the depth and breadth of directors’ prior 
experience is valued by the market at the time of the directors’ appointment. Custodio 
and Metzger (2013) examined merger and acquisition activity and found that when the 
CEO of the acquiring firm had experience working in the target industry, the acquiring 
company would experience higher announcement returns. This indicates that the stock 
market values the prior experience of directors (Custodio & Metzger, 2013). Similarly, 
Nguyen et al. (2015) looked at market responses to announcements of new executive 
directors and found that the prior experience of executive directors was positively and 
significantly related to stock market returns. In contrast, Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz 
(2010) found evidence that rejected the claim that the stock market reacts positively 
when former CEOs are appointed as directors. In addition, consistent with this study’s 
findings on higher experience levels, Stevenson and Radin (2009) found no significant 
relationship between previous CEO or director experience on the board and the 
decisions of the firm. It is also possible that higher experience levels may only need 
to reach a critical mass and anything after that may not contribute anything to 
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performance. In addition, when directors all have similar levels of experience, the 
element of diverse perspectives enhancing the decision-making process would be lost. 
Conversely, the study’s findings of a positive association between experience diversity 
and financial performance support the literature that states directors with diverse 
experience are able to look at problems from different perspectives and consider 
different aspects of the issues (Jhunjhunwala & Mishra, 2012).  
 
5.7.11 Multiple Directorships: Findings and Hypothesis Testing  
This study investigates the association between multiple directorships and 
financial performance from a sample of 198 firms listed on the FTSE 350. Multiple 
directorships in this study are a proxy of directors’ networks and ties and are measured 
as the average number of directorships held by each director on the board. The 
association is tested using OLS, 2SLS and GLS regression and the results are 
presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. The results show a significant and positive association 
between multiple directorships and Tobin’s Q in all three models at the 5% 
significance level. These results are similar when using ROA and ROE as dependent 
variables, there is a positive and significant association between multiple directorships 
and financial performance at the 5% significance level in models one and three. 
However, in model two there is no association between multiple directorships and 
financial performance when using ROE and ROA as dependent variables. Notably, 
the variable multiple directorships was identified as endogenous variable in Chapter 
4, therefore the most appropriate model to use in interpreting the results is model two 
that incorporates the instrumental variables estimation. Considering this, the findings 
display that there is a significant and positive association between multiple 
directorships and market based measures of performance rather than accounting based 
measures. Hypothesis 8 cannot be rejected, multiple directorships on the board of 
directors are positively associated with financial performance. 
 
5.7.12 Multiple Directorships: Discussion and Literature  
There are different theoretical views on multiple directorships and director 
effectiveness; however, this study’s theoretical framework predicts that multiple 
directorships will have a positive impact on financial performance. Multiple 
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directorships are common in listed companies in the UK, directors who occupy board 
positions in other firms are able to create valuable connections for themselves and for 
the company (Renneboog & Zhao, 2014). This line of thinking is consistent with this 
study’s findings and is predominantly from a resource dependence theory perspective 
as well as is in line with propositions of upper echelons theory about human capital. 
The main argument is that the networks and ties of directors through multiple 
directorships, provide better access to information which is beneficial to the firm in 
decision-making (Renneboog & Zhao, 2014). Further to this, Kor and Sundaramurthy 
(2008) state that directors with external ties and networks have greater social and 
human capital as they have quicker access to timely information, have a higher status, 
have critical resources and ideas that are more diverse. Other scholars maintain the 
view that directors with multiple directorships possess relevant knowledge and 
expertise, which can be industry specific, and this is beneficial to companies (Grove 
et al., 2011). Consequently, Adams et al. (2015) note that some boards choose 
directors with such directorships due to their high ability and their capacity to deal 
with uncertainty through leveraging network (interlock) resources (Martin, 
Gözübüyük & Becerra, 2015).  
 
From an agency theory perspective, interlocking directorate ties can help 
directors to gain relevant strategic knowledge and perspectives that enable them to be 
more effective in their monitoring and advisory roles (Chen et al., 2016). Similarly, 
some scholars propose that multiple directorships endorse a director’s reputation as an 
expert in advising and monitoring. This suggests that boards with multiple 
directorships can add value to a company through their certified human capital (Liu & 
Paul, 2015). In addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) state that multiple directorships are 
a good signal of director quality, as better quality directors are more likely to serve on 
numerous boards. A different stream of literature looks at the over-commitment view 
of multiple directorships and argues that competing pressures from numerous board 
appointments creates “busy” directors that compromise firm performance (Nguyen et 
al., 2015). This line of thinking contends that serving on a corporate board requires a 
significant amount of time and effort, therefore ‘busy’ directors are at risk of being too 
busy to be effective in their advisory and monitoring roles, which in turn, negatively 
impacts firm performance (Liu & Paul, 2015). This view supports the theoretical 
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arguments in Jensen and Meckling (1976) of a residual loss due to difficult 
contracting. The National Association of Directors in 2005 recommended that boards 
should limit the number of additional directorships in order to fully commit to 
providing an outstanding service (National Association of Corporate Directors, 2005). 
 
This study’s findings are consistent with the propositions of the theoretical 
framework, particularly from a resource dependence theory perspective. This is 
because, in the 2SLS regression, the results show a positive and significant association 
with market based measures of performance rather than accounting based measures 
thus reflecting that multiple directorships are a good signal of director quality that is 
valued by the market. Previous studies that have examined the link between multiple 
directorships and performance have produced inconsistent findings. Numerous studies 
have found strong evidence that multiple directorships are associated with increased 
firm value and improved firm performance (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011; Larcker et 
al., 2013; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). These studies conclude that multiple directorships 
result in improved financial reporting quality and allow directors to gain valuable 
industry knowledge and expertise that can make them more effective in monitoring 
and advising. Consistent with this, Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) found that 
directors with multiple directorships have a positive contribution to the firm value of 
firms that need sophisticated advisory services. Other scholars have investigated the 
stock market’s reaction on the appointment of directors with multiple directorships. 
For instance, in Australia, a study by Gray and Nowland (2017) found a positive 
reaction from shareholders on the appointment of directors with other directorships. 
In a similar vein, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) found that firms with inside directors that 
have multiple directorships make better acquisition decisions that those with inside 
directors with no external directorships. They further found evidence that the stock 
market reacts positively to multiple directorships and this improves shareholder wealth 
(Masulis & Mobbs, 2011). Other studies have highlighted and evidenced negative 
consequences of multiple directorships including excessive CEO remuneration, less 
effective monitoring and lower firm performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn 
et al., 2009; Méndez, Pathan & García, 2015). These scholars have criticised directors 
with multiple directorships for being too busy to effectively perform their monitoring 
and advisory roles. For instance, Sharma and Iselin (2012) found a significant and 
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positive association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and 
financial misstatements after Sarbanes-Oxley reform. On the other hand, Falato, 
Kadyrzhanova and Lel (2014) found a negative reaction from the stock market to an 
increase of multiple directorships and they concluded that markets perceive ‘busy’ 
directors as being detrimental to firm value. Similarly Adams et al. (2015) note that 
the appointment of executive directors with multiple directorships results in negative 
returns because investors expect busy executives to perform worse than more 
committed executives. Contrary to this, the correlation matrix in Appendix F displays 
a strong and positive correlation between directorships and the board index, which 
included sections on director attendance and leadership. This finding suggests that 
multiple directorships do not negatively affect the commitment of directors to the firm; 
rather they enhance corporate governance practices.  
 
5.8 Market Measures versus Accounting Measures of Financial 
Performance 
Khanna et al. (2014) noted that in corporate governance research, firm 
performance is better represented in accounting based measures such as ROA and 
ROE. This is because accounting based measures indicate the effectiveness of the 
governance of a firm whilst market based measures are based on investors’ perceptions 
(Khanna et al., 2014). However, Ntim (2015) notes that there is no agreement amongst 
corporate governance researchers as to which is the best measurement of financial 
performance. This study uses both accounting based measures and market based 
measures in order to allow for robustness when checking the findings. Table 5.9 
presented the regression results using ROE and ROA as alternative proxies for 
financial performance. In models one, two and three, the results are very similar to the 
regressions using Tobin’s Q. However, experience diversity only had a positive and 
significant association with ROE and ROA and no association with Tobin’s Q. This 
suggests that experience diversity only impacts accounting based measures of 
performance which better represent what the company is actually doing, rather than 
the market’s perception. This is in line with Karmadin and Haron (2011) who note that 
accounting based measures are more appropriate for investigating the agency costs on 
performance, and experience diversity presents a wider range of knowledge and skills 
that is vital for complex firms and effective monitoring (Mahadeo et al., 2012).  
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Notably, in model two, the variable multiple directorships which is an 
endogenous variable only has a significant and positive association with Tobin’s Q. 
This is consistent with the literature that states that directors’ external networks are 
associated with prestige, visibility and reputation making directors’ networks a vital 
resource for firm legitimacy (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Therefore, the impact of the 
directors’ external ties are better represented in a market based measure of 
performance, such as Tobin’s Q, rather than accounting based measures. Azeez (2015) 
notes that it is unlikely that one performance indicator could sufficiently capture the 
governance-performance link, and this study’s results demonstrate that the use of 
alternative measures of performance was necessary, as accounting based measures and 
market based measures can capture different aspects of governance. In addition, the 
study’s findings contribute to knowledge by providing empirical evidence that 
director’s networks have a positive impact on the value of the firm as represented in 
Tobin’s Q. Experience diversity enhances the effectiveness of the board in performing 
their roles and duties as represented in the accounting based measures of performance.  
 
5.9 Control Variables  
With respect to the control variables, based on the market based measure, 
Tobin’s Q, there is a significant but negative association between the control variables 
firm age and firm size in all the models. However, firm leverage has a significant and 
negative association with Tobin’s Q in model three only. These results are similar 
when using ROE and ROA as dependent variables, there is a significant and negative 
association between firm age, firm size and firm leverage at both the 1% and 5% 
significance levels. These findings are consistent with previous literature that has 
found a negative association between these variables and firm performance (Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Jackling & Johl, 2009). In contrast, other studies have found a 
positive association between these control variables and firm performance (Azeez, 
2015; Shan & McIver, 2011). In regards to firm size, the findings contradict the stream 
of literature that suggests larger firms enjoy economies of scale and specialisation and 
therefore predict a positive relationship between firm size and performance (Al-
Malkawi & Pillai, 2013; Fallatah & Dickins, 2012). However, Klapper and Love 
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(2004) note that larger companies may also have more agency problems and incur 
inefficiencies that may lead to poor performance.  
 
Marinova et al. (2016) find a negative association between firm age and firm 
performance and contend that this may be due to the weakening ability over time of 
firms to compete. In addition, Pillai and Al-Malkawi (2018) note that older firms are 
associated with larger boards, degenerated governance policies and obsolescence in 
assets which can all pave the way for a negative financial performance. Furthermore, 
Pillai and Al-Malkawi (2018) document a negative relationship between firm leverage 
and firm performance and Azeez (2015) notes that this may be due to debt reducing 
the free cash flow and thus affecting company performance. In order to control for 
industry effects, this study uses industry dynamism as a control variable. Dynamism 
refers to the level of environmental predictability and, is exhibited in the variance in 
the rate of market and industry change, and the level of uncertainty about forces that 
are beyond the individual company’s control (Robert-Baum & Wally, 2003). The 
regression results in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that industry dynamism is significantly 
and positively associated with Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA in all the models at the 1% 
significance level. These results are consistent with Henderson et al. (2006) who found 
that any potential improvements in firm performance were contingent on the 
dynamism of the industry and the external environment.  
 
5.10 Contribution to Knowledge  
The findings presented and discussed in this chapter contribute to the extant 
literature and existing body of knowledge in several ways. First, this study contributes 
to the extant literature by integrating agency, resource dependence and upper echelons 
theories, which helps in overcoming a current myopia within the three streams of 
research based on a single theory perspective. In addition, the provision of a multi-
theory perspective enables the study to provide a more complete understanding of the 
link between board diversity and financial performance. The findings in Section 5.5 
display evidence of the benefits of adopting such an interdisciplinary set of theories 
and contribute to the extant literature in several ways. Specifically, the AIC scores and 
R-squared values show that the most parsimonious model was found when using 
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Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. This contributes to the ongoing debate in 
literature as to which is the best measure of financial performance by suggesting that 
when assessing the link between board diversity and financial performance, Tobin’s 
Q is a better indicator of performance. In addition, many proponents of board diversity 
predominantly base their arguments on resource dependence theory, however this 
study’s findings suggest that an adaptation of upper echelons theory offers a better 
theoretical perspective of board diversity. However, overall this study confirms the 
need to utilise theoretical paradigms that combine two or more theories when assessing 
the link between board diversity and financial performance, in this case, the researcher 
proposes an integration of agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theories.  
 
Second, the findings from the board index also add to the existing body of 
literature in several ways. The researcher constructed a corporate governance board 
index that is a comprehensive measure of the board practices of listed companies in 
the UK. Cheung et al. (2011) noted that previous corporate governance studies 
employed indices that were biased towards the US market and this meant it had little 
applicability in other markets. Conversely, Bhagat et al. (2008) noted that some 
governance indices and ratings do not take into account country differences and firm 
specific circumstances. Therefore, in line with Bozec and Bozec’s (2012) 
recommendations, this study’s board index selects governance provisions that are 
relevant and tailored to the study’s sample. In addition, the board index takes into 
account several corporate governance board measures that go beyond the 
measurement of conventional governance variables, such as board size and board 
independence. Further to this, the study adds to the literature by using a comprehensive 
and robust econometric approach that takes into account the endogenous nature of the 
relation between corporate governance and performance in order to address the 
limitations of previous corporate governance research as stated in the literature (De 
Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Wintoki et al., 2012). This study further adds to the large 
body of literature that has explored the link between corporate governance practices 
and firm performance by providing more empirical evidence of no association 
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between the board index and financial performance from a sample of listed companies 
in the UK.26 
 
Third, academic research on board diversity has predominantly focused on 
studying gender diversity and often assumes that the findings from one dimension of 
demographic diversity can be applied to other dimensions of demographic diversity 
(Li et al., 2011). Therefore, Li et al. (2011) called for researchers to provide more 
empirical evidence on the effect of age diversity on performance, in order to contribute 
to developing theories regarding organisational demography. This study extends prior 
work on board diversity by examining the link between age diversity and financial 
performance on sample of firms listed on the FTSE 350. The study contributes to the 
existing body of literature by first providing evidence that age diversity is an 
endogenous variable that needs to be examined using an estimation technique that 
addresses endogeneity. Through addressing this, the study provides empirical 
evidence that the age diversity of directors has no association with financial 
performance and concludes that this may be due to a ‘trade off’ between the risk loving 
appetite of younger directors and risk averse appetite of older directors.  
 
Fourth, with regards to gender diversity the findings presented in this chapter 
displayed strong evidence of a positive association between gender diversity and 
different measures of financial performance in a sample of UK firms. This not only 
provides more positive results in the European context, it also provides strong support 
for the business case for diversity and the propositions of the European Commission. 
The European Commission has noted that the progress of greater gender diversity on 
boards has been slow and proposed that the European legislation speeds up so that by 
2020 40% of non-executive director positions on boards are filled by women in 
publicly listed companies (European Commission, 2012b). The descriptive statistics 
in Table 5.3 show that although the yearly average percentage of gender diversity 
increased over the sample period, the mean in 2012 was 14.729%. Although the 
                                                          
26 Further analysis was conducted on the separate sections of the board index to determine if there were 
any sections that were associated with financial performance. The results are presented in Appendix I 
and they do not show many significant results. The only significance found was a positive association 
between shareholder relations and financial performance.  
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maximum value was 44.44% in 2012 the minimum value was 0% indicating that some 
companies still had no female representation on their boards. The proposal by the 
European Commission (2012a) is not only motivated by equality concerns but also 
refers to the business case, citing that gender diversity on boards is a key driver of firm 
performance. However, in contrast to this, Marinova et al. (2016) noted that the 
majority of research in European countries depicts negative results on the relationship 
between gender diversity and financial performance. Further to this, Low et al. (2015) 
note that despite strong theoretical support for gender diversity on boards, the 
empirical evidence is still largely mixed. Some scholars attribute the mixed findings 
to poor estimation methods, failure to account for endogeneity and lack of control 
factors such as controlling for firm size and firm leverage (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 
2008; Wang & Clift, 2009). Therefore, this study also contributes to the existing body 
of literature on board gender diversity and financial performance by addressing key 
methodological issues in the analysis which include using appropriate controls and 
employing two stage least squares regression that addresses the issue of endogeneity. 
Accordingly, the use of three estimation techniques that address the econometric 
issues found in the data provides results that are more robust.  
 
Fifth, Wang et al. (2017) note that directors’ education has received 
insufficient scholarly attention, and suggest that given the challenges in identifying 
and measuring board effectiveness, directors’ education is essential in studying 
governance mechanisms because it is relatively observable and objective. Therefore, 
together with Terjesen et al. (2016), they call for researchers to investigate other types 
of diversity, including education, in order to extend the research on observable and 
non-observable diversity in the boardroom. This study responds to these calls and is 
an extension of the research on board diversity and firm performance. The study 
extends prior work by examining directors’ education from two perspectives. On one 
hand, the highest education levels of directors is examined, and on the other hand, the 
educational diversity of directors is examined.  The results from this study contribute 
to the existing body of knowledge by providing empirical evidence that the education 
diversity and higher levels of education on the board of directors have no impact on 
financial performance.  When comparing educational diversity and highest education 
band, a meta-analysis conducted by Bell et al. (2011) showed that educational level 
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was a better predictor of cognitive bases than educational diversity in top management 
team research. However, Ararat et al. (2015) argue that educational diversity should 
lead to more diverse perspectives in the decision-making process. The results from 
this study do not display which measure of directors’ education is a better predictor of 
directors’ skills and cognitive bases as both measures show no association with 
financial performance. These results support the work of Mahadeo et al. (2012) who 
proposed that prior educational background may not fully show a director’s expertise 
and experience as some directors engage in occupations that do not have much in 
common with their academic studies. This line of thinking would then predict no 
association between director’s education and financial performance. 
 
Sixth, this thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on the link 
between director experience and financial performance by providing evidence that 
when measuring director experience through previous appointments, there is no 
association between the experience level of directors and financial performance. In 
regards to experience diversity, the study’s findings provide evidence that experience 
diversity on the board improves the accounting based measures of financial 
performance rather than the market-based measure. This is consistent with Khanna et 
al. (2014) who note that accounting based measures of performance are better 
indicators of the effectiveness of corporate governance practices than market-based 
measures which reflect investor’s perception. In light of this, the study concludes that 
the experience diversity of the board may not be a signal of director quality or 
reputation to the market, rather it is a measure that reflects the skills that directors 
bring to their jobs and it reflects the effectiveness of directors in their roles, which 
ultimately leads to improved performance.  
 
Finally, the findings on the association between multiple directorships and 
financial performance in this study provide empirical evidence that disproves the 
‘busyness hypothesis’ of directors’ external ties and that proposes a negative impact 
on performance. Rather, this study supports the notion that multiple directorships 
produce high quality directors who are more effective in their monitoring role, are 
valuable resources to the company and who improve financial performance. The 
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correlation matrix in Appendix F shows a strong and positive correlation between the 
variable directorships and highest education band and highest experience band. This 
suggests that directors with multiple directorships have more educational 
qualifications and more experience, which may be attributes of high quality directors 
as noted by Fama and Jensen (1983). Martin et al. (2015) noted that previous studies 
that have examined the association between multiple directorships and performance 
have been criticised for not accounting for endogeneity in their analysis. This study 
identified that the variable multiple directorships is an endogenous variable, therefore 
it contributes to and extends prior work by providing more empirical evidence that 
confirms a significant and positive association between multiple directorships and 
financial performance using a rigorous methodology that accounts for endogeneity. 
 
5.11 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter has presented and discussed the descriptive statistics for the 
dependent, independent and control variables. In addition, the regression results that 
address research questions 1 and 2 were presented and discussed. In addressing 
research question 1, the study’s results displayed that the model with the variables 
derived from the theoretical framework was the strongest. Therefore, there was a need 
to combine agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theory to offer a multi-
theory perspective on board diversity. In regards to research question 2, the results 
displayed that a positive association was found between gender diversity, experience 
diversity, multiple directorships and financial performance. No association was found 
between age diversity, highest education level, education diversity, highest experience 
level, the board index and financial performance. The chapter discussed the various 
implications of these findings to the existing body of knowledge and to practice. For 
instance, the positive association between gender diversity and financial performance 
supports the business case for diversity in the boardroom and is consistent with the 
propositions of the European Commission. Table 5.10 presents a summary of the 
study’s findings. The next chapter presents the regression results when the companies 
are grouped into industry sectors in order to analyse industry differences amongst the 
sample.
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Table 5.10 Summary of Hypothesis Findings 
 
 Research Hypotheses 
Dependent 
Variable  
H1 
(Board 
Index) 
H2 
(Age 
Diversity)  
H3 
(Gender 
Diversity) 
H4 
(Education 
Level) 
H5 
(Education 
Diversity) 
H6 
(Experience 
Level) 
H7 
(Experience 
Diversity) 
H8 
(Multiple 
Directorships) 
 
          
Tobin’s Q rejected* rejected confirmed rejected rejected rejected* rejected confirmed  
          
ROE rejected rejected confirmed rejected rejected rejected confirmed rejected  
          
ROA rejected rejected confirmed rejected rejected rejected rejected* rejected  
          
*there is evidence of an association at the 10% significance level.  
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CHAPTER 6 INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings that address research question 
3: does the relationship between board diversity and financial performance differ 
amongst industries? The multivariate analysis presented in this chapter examines and 
presents different regression models based on the ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS), two stage least squares regression (2SLS) and generalised least squares 
regression (GLS) for each industry sector. The main dependent variable used to 
measure financial performance in this study is Tobin’s Q, however, alternative 
measures of financial performance are also used for robustness purposes, namely ROA 
and ROE. The study’s sample is broken down by industry according to SIC codes, 
which classify companies in industry sectors according to the economic activities that 
the companies are engaged in. Industry sectors with closely linked SIC codes and 
similar economic activities were merged together and this is displayed in Appendix B. 
The full results for each industry sector are presented in Appendix J and Tables 6.2, 
6.3 and 6.4 show a summary of the industry findings by presenting the association 
found for each independent variable in each industry.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Sections 6.2 to 6.9 discuss the industry 
findings on the board index, age diversity, gender diversity, highest education band, 
education diversity, highest experience band, experience diversity and multiple 
directorships respectively. Each of these sections will present the key industry 
findings, discuss the main literature and apply the literature to the findings. Section 
6.10 discusses the overall industry analysis and the contribution to knowledge and to 
practice and lastly, Section 6.11 summarises the main results and key points from this 
chapter. Table 6.1 presents a summary of the hypotheses formulated for the industry 
analysis.  
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Table 6.1 Summary of Hypotheses Addressing Research Question 3 
  
Research Question Hypotheses 
 
 
Does the relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance 
differ amongst industries? 
Hypothesis 9. The association between the 
board index and financial performance differs 
between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 10. The association between age 
diversity of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 11. The association between gender 
diversity of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Hypothesis 12. The association between 
education levels of the board of directors and 
financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
Hypothesis 13. The association between 
education diversity of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
Hypothesis 14. The association between 
experience levels of the board of directors and 
financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
Hypothesis 15. The association between 
experience diversity of the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
Hypothesis 16. The association between 
Multiple directorships on the board of directors 
and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
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Table 6.2 Summary of Industry Analysis Findings using Tobin’s Q 
Industry Board Index Age Diversity Gender Diversity Highest Education 
Band 
Education Diversity Highest Experience 
Band 
Experience Diversity Directorships 
 
Accommodation, Food and Beverages 
Services  
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
positive** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Banking  
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Business Support, Leasing, Employment, 
Public Administration Activities 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Construction and Development of Buildings 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
positive *** 
 
negative ** 
 
none 
 
Electricity, Gas, Water collection and 
Sewerage 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
- 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural 
Gas 
 
none 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
positive ** 
 
Financial Services, Auxiliary Services to 
Finance and Real Estate Activities 
 
 
negative ** 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
Insurance 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
negative ** 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
IT, Media, Broadcasting and Publishing 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
negative ** 
 
none 
 
 
negative *** 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
Management Consultancy, Head Offices 
Activities, Architectural and Engineering 
Services 
 
none 
 
 
negative *** 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
positive ** 
 
none* 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
 
positive *** 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
positive ** 
 
Mining and Quarrying 
 
none 
 
 
positive *** 
 
positive *** 
 
positive ** 
 
positive ** 
 
positive *** 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
Retail Sales, Gaming and Betting Activities 
 
 
none 
 
 
negative ** 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
Telecommunications 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
Transport 
 
 
none 
 
 
none* 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
 
Wholesale 
 
 
none 
 
 
negative ** 
 
positive ** 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
 
none 
 
The table shows a summary of the association between each of the independent variables and financial performance in each industry using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. The independent variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4. Positive 
depicts a positive association; negative depicts a negative association whereas none depicts no association. Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The 
10% significance level displays weak evidence of an association, therefore the study concludes that there is no association between the variables at this significance level. 
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Table 6.3 Summary of Industry Analysis Findings using ROE 
Industry Board Index Age Diversity Gender Diversity Highest Education 
Band 
Education Diversity Highest Experience 
Band 
Experience Diversity Directorships 
 
Accommodation, Food and Beverages 
Services  
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Banking  
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Business Support, Leasing, 
Employment, Public Administration  
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Construction and Development of 
Buildings 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Electricity, Gas, Water collection and 
Sewerage 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none  
 
negative *** 
 
 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
 
none 
 
none * 
 
 
negative ** 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Financial Services, Auxiliary Services to 
Finance and Real Estate  
 
none 
 
none * 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
 
negative ** 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Insurance 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
 
none 
 
IT, Media, Broadcasting and Publishing 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
Management Consultancy, Head 
Offices Activities, Architectural and 
Engineering Services 
 
none * 
 
 
negative *** 
 
 
none * 
 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
none * 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Mining and Quarrying 
 
 
none * 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
Retail Sales, Gaming and Betting 
Activities 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none * 
 
 
none 
 
none * 
 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
negative ** 
 
 
Telecommunications 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Transport 
 
 
none 
 
negative *** 
 
 
positive *** 
 
none * 
 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Wholesale 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
The table shows a summary of the association between each of the independent variables and financial performance in each industry using ROE as the dependent variable. The independent variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4. Positive depicts 
a positive association; negative depicts a negative association whereas none depicts no association. Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The 10% 
significance level displays weak evidence of an association, therefore the study concludes that there is no association between the variables at this significance level. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of Industry Analysis Findings using ROA 
Industry Board Index Age 
Diversity 
Gender 
Diversity 
Highest Education 
Band 
Education 
Diversity 
Highest Experience 
Band 
Experience 
Diversity 
Directorships 
 
Accommodation, Food and Beverages Services  
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Banking  
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Business Support, Leasing, Employment, 
Public Administration  
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Construction and Development of Buildings 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
Electricity, Gas, Water collection and Sewerage 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative *** 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none  
 
negative *** 
 
 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural 
Gas 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Financial Services, Auxiliary Services to 
Finance and Real Estate Activities 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Insurance 
 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
negative *** 
 
 
none 
 
IT, Media, Broadcasting and Publishing 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive ** 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
Management Consultancy, Head Offices 
Activities, Architectural and Engineering 
Services 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
negative *** 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Mining and Quarrying 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
none 
 
Retail Sales, Gaming and Betting Activities 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
positive *** 
 
negative ** 
 
Telecommunications 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Transport 
 
 
none 
 
negative ** 
 
positive *** 
 
negative *** 
 
 
positive ** 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none 
 
Wholesale 
 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
none 
 
none* 
 
none 
 
none 
The table shows a summary of the association between each of the independent variables and financial performance in each industry using ROA as the dependent variable. The independent variables are defined in Table 4.5 of Chapter 4. Positive depicts 
a positive association; negative depicts a negative association whereas none depicts no association. Superscripts ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance based on two-tailed tests at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The 10% 
significance level displays weak evidence of an association, therefore the study concludes that there is no association between the variables at this significance level. 
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6.2 Board Index: Industry Findings and Discussion 
The industry findings summarised in Table 6.2 show that there was a positive 
and significant association between the board index and Tobin’s Q in the 
accommodation, business support, IT/media and manufacturing industries. 
Conversely, the results from the financial services industry showed a negative 
association between the board index and Tobin’s Q. Table 6.3 shows a positive 
association between the board index and ROE in the accommodation industries, and 
no significant association is observed in any of the other industries. In regards to ROA, 
Table 6.4 displays a significant and positive association between the board index and 
ROA in the business support, construction and manufacturing industries and no 
significant association is observed in the other industries. Overall, at least 10 industries 
displayed no significant association between the board index and financial 
performance. However, hypothesis 16 cannot be rejected, the association between the 
board index and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
The extant literature suggests that a conflict of interest arises between principals 
and agents in firms when there is poor governance characterised by the absence of 
effective monitoring (Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010). Therefore, firms can 
reduce agency costs and conflicts of interest by adopting good governance practices, 
and this in turn, should result in improved company performance (Reguera-Alvarado 
& Bravo, 2017). This line of thinking is based on agency theory and corporate 
governance researchers have proposed a variety of good governance practices that can 
improve the monitoring function and capabilities of boards. Prominent proposals in 
the literature include the proportion of independent non-executive directors, 
appropriate board size, eliminating CEO duality, the composition and existence of 
board committees and enhancing directors’ accountability (DeFond et al., 2005; 
Dowell et al., 2011; Hambrick et al., 2015; Tuggle et al., 2010). The board index 
constructed by the researcher takes into account these attributes that are considered as 
good governance practices and therefore a positive association between the board 
index and financial performance is expected. The board index constructed had a 
maximum of 31 points upon which firms could be scored and the average board index 
scores for each industry are presented in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.1 Average Board Index Scores by Industry (2004-2014) 
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One of the most interesting findings from the industry analysis is that the 
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas industry had the highest average board 
index score of 29.20 across the years. However, the multivariate analysis showed no 
association between the board index and financial performance in this industry. This 
finding contradicts previous studies and the literature that states better corporate 
governance practices enhance and improve firm value and firm performance (Garay 
& González, 2008; Renders et al., 2010). Previous work by Kang et al. (2007) noted 
that companies in the materials sector have more independent boards which may be 
due to the high political costs in this industry sector. Therefore, firms in the materials 
industry may be more inclined to demonstrate their willingness to main good corporate 
governance practices (Kang et al., 2007). An earlier study by Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) further argued that firms with high political costs often had too many 
independent NEDs on the board, which may not help in improving firm performance. 
This study’s findings therefore suggest that maintaining good corporate governance 
practices may not always lead to improved performance, especially in industries with 
high political costs such as the crude petroleum industry. On the other hand, the 
construction and IT/media industries had the lowest average board index scores of 
25.99 and 25.71 respectively across all the years. In addition, a positive association 
between the board index and financial performance was observed in these industries. 
Notably, in the construction industry findings, the board index only had a positive 
association with ROA and not with the other measures of financial performance. ROA 
shows the earnings generated from invested capital assets and it incorporates the 
profitability of the firm thus representing the actual performance of a firm (Zabri, 
Ahmad & Wah, 2016). Therefore, Khanna et al. (2014) state that accounting based 
measures of performance are better indicators of the effectiveness of the governance 
of a firm. This is consistent with Bhagat and Bolton (2008) who after controlling for 
endogeneity, found a positive link between a number of corporate governance 
measures and operating performance and no link with market value.  
 
The industry findings also provide strong evidence of a significant and positive 
association between board index and financial performance in the accommodation, 
business support and manufacturing industries. This suggests that the board practices 
of companies in these industry sectors have a positive effect on financial performance. 
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Guillet and Mattila (2010) studied the corporate governance practices of companies in 
the hospitality industry, hotels and restaurants, and found that these companies are 
highly sensitive to changes in the economy; therefore, shareholders may demand that 
directors play a greater monitoring role. Therefore, the finding of a positive association 
between the board index and financial performance in the accommodation industry 
could be attributed to shareholders demanding that directors play a greater monitoring 
role. The board index includes different attributes that are considered as good 
corporate governance in line with the principles of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2014.27 Therefore, these findings contribute to, and are consistent with, the 
extant literature that proposes good corporate governance has a positive impact on 
firm performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Velnampy & Pratheepkanth, 2013). The 
industry findings also revealed that only one industry, the financial services industry, 
displayed a negative association between the board index and Tobin’s Q. This finding 
contradicts the majority of empirical literature that has shown that corporate 
governance ratings and indices have a positive impact on firm and market value 
(Durnev & Kim, 2005; Garay & Gonzalez, 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004). However, 
other studies have also indicated a negative association between corporate governance 
practices and firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2013). Reguera-Alvarado and Bravo (2017) argue that the mixed results from some 
previous studies are due to methodological differences with many studies not 
accounting for endogeneity. Further to this, Wachudi and Mboya (2012) note that the 
majority of studies that have examined board diversity and corporate governance 
practices of firms have excluded the financial sector. Therefore, previous studies do 
not adequately indicate the relationship between board practices and firm performance 
in the financial services sector. This study contributes to the existing body of literature 
by providing empirical evidence of a negative association between board practices and 
financial performance of firms in the financial services industry sector using a 
methodology that accounts for endogeneity.  
 
                                                          
27 At the time when the board index was constructed, the most recent governance code was the 2014 
Code. However, the researcher is aware that currently the most recent one is the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2018. The main principles used in the board index are similar in both codes.   
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6.3 Age Diversity: Industry Findings and Discussion  
The results presented in Tables 6.2 to 6.4 show that the majority of the industry 
findings on age diversity display no association with financial performance. This is 
also reflected in the main analysis results that were discussed in Chapter 5. The results 
vary between industries, for instance, the findings from the mining and quarrying 
industry show a positive association between age diversity and Tobin’s Q, whilst the 
findings from the insurance industry show a positive association between age diversity 
and ROA. In contrast, the findings from the retail sales and wholesale industries 
display a negative association between age diversity and Tobin’s Q, whilst the findings 
from the transport industry display a negative association between age diversity and 
ROE and ROA. Lastly, the findings from the management consultancy industry 
display a negative association between age diversity and all the financial performance 
variables. Therefore, hypothesis 9 cannot be rejected, the association between age 
diversity of the board of directors and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
The study’s theoretical framework and the extant literature on age diversity 
suggests that differences in generations may help in preventing the ‘group think’ effect 
on the board and lead to enhanced monitoring (Bekiroglu, Erdil & Alpkan, 2011). 
Further to this, Ararat et al. (2015) note that age diversity on boards may improve 
monitoring and the decision making process by balancing the energy and risk appetite 
of younger directors with the experience and risk averseness of older directors. This 
is consistent with the upper echelons theory perspective that contends differences in 
executives’ characteristics influence their decisions and perceptions which leads to 
heterogeneity and improved decision making in top management teams (Hambrick, 
2007). From an agency theory perspective, it can be argued that age diversity can 
increase board independence because individuals of different ages essentially perceive 
things differently which leads to a more analytical and ‘questioning’ board (Rao & 
Tilt, 2016). From a resource dependence theory perspective, an age diverse board can 
capitalise on the wider range of networks and resources delivered by directors from 
different backgrounds and generations (Miller & Triana, 2009). The findings of a 
positive association from the mining and insurance industry sectors are consistent with 
this literature. Ali et al. (2014) note that in some industries, such as high-tech 
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manufacturing and technology businesses, younger directors can contribute more 
through their knowledge and insights on technological advances. This is particularly 
applicable to the mining industry that has become more innovative and uses 
technologically sophisticated equipment (Bartos, 2007).  
 
Abdullah, Ismail and Izah (2017) note that directors in UK firms are 
predominantly white males over the age of 60 years and, similar to Australian firms, 
there has been a lack of diversity with respect to age in these firms. The majority of 
the industry findings in this study display that the market seems to be indifferent to 
the issue of age diversity as no association is found with financial performance in 12 
out of 16 industries. These findings are consistent with some previous studies that 
found non-significant associations on the age diversity–performance relationship, with 
some scholars concluding that this may be attributed to this association having a 
curvilinear relationship (Ali et al., 2014; Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan, 2004; 
Jhunjhunwala & Mishra, 2012). Further work should be done to expand on the 
suggested curvilinear relationship between age diversity and financial performance, 
and this is discussed further in Chapter 7. In contrast, other studies argue that age 
diversity on boards can lead to conflicts in communication and teamwork which 
results in negative effects on firm performance (Dobbin & Jung, 2011). This was 
evident in the industry results from the management consultancy, retail sales, 
wholesale and transport industries. This line of thinking is consistent with social 
identity theory that was discussed in Chapter 2, and that contends younger or older 
directors are more likely to interact with directors within the same age group as 
themselves which can create conflict on the board (Twenge et al., 2010). Studies by 
Ali et al. (2014) and Abdullah et al. (2017) both document negative associations 
between age diversity and financial performance. They further conclude that the 
resources and benefits produced by age diversity are less significant than the 
psychological categorisation into older and younger directors that leads to negative 
group behaviours (Ali et al., 2014).  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this study’s industry findings and the extant 
literature on age diversity. First, the retail sales and management consultancy 
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industries had average values of 0.44 and 0.39 respectively which is relatively high 
considering the mean value of age diversity for the full sample was 0.40 (see Appendix 
K).28 This suggests, that in comparison to other industries, these industry sectors had 
a wider age range of directors and in particular more younger directors, considering 
the UK context as previously discussed. Therefore, in line with the propositions of 
Abdullah et al. (2017), it could be argued that younger directors who are more 
dynamic, who have riskier appetites and are more forward-looking may be willing to 
take on more risks that could be harmful to performance in the short term. If this is the 
case, then the negative effect on firm performance displayed in the retail sales and 
management consultancy industry sectors would be expected. Second, a different 
conclusion that could be drawn from the industry analysis is based on the idea of a 
curvilinear relationship between age diversity and financial performance. That is, 
lower levels of age diversity on boards are beneficial as this brings valuable resources 
and skills to the board without the risk of triggering negative group behaviours with 
higher levels of age diversity (Ali et al., 2014). For instance, the mining and quarrying 
industry had one of the lowest mean values of age diversity, 0.35, and the industry 
analysis displayed strong evidence of a significant and positive association with 
financial performance at the 1% significance level in this industry sector. This finding 
suggests that lower levels of age diversity on the board coupled with a high tech 
industry can positively impact financial performance.  
 
6.4 Gender Diversity: Industry Findings and Discussion 
The results in Table 6.2 display that there was a positive association between 
gender diversity and Tobin’s Q in several industries such as accommodation, retail 
sales and mining industry sectors. In contrast, seven industries displayed no 
association between gender diversity and Tobin’s Q such as, the banking, construction 
and crude petroleum industry sectors. However, in the insurance and IT/media sectors, 
there was evidence of a negative association between gender diversity and Tobin’s Q.  
With regards to ROE and ROA, the industry findings revealed that a large number of 
industries displayed no association between gender diversity and these accounting-
based measures. Therefore, hypothesis 10 cannot be rejected, the association between 
                                                          
28 Age diversity in this study is measured using Blau’s index and ranges from 0 to 0.75, with higher 
figures representing greater diversity.  
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gender diversity of the board of directors and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
The study’s theoretical framework and the extant literature on gender diversity 
proposes that male and female directors have different skills, knowledge and 
perspectives, therefore an integration of these different attributes should enhance the 
decision making process of firms (Ali et al., 2014). From an agency theory perspective, 
a gender diverse board will have a wider range of opinions and perspectives which 
increases board independence and enhances the monitoring role of directors (Kuhç & 
Kuzey, 2016). Therefore, board gender diversity can be a corporate governance 
mechanism that reduces the cost associated with agency problems (Reguera-Alvarado 
et al., 2017). This is in line with Catalyst’s (2004) study that provided evidence of how 
women on boards pay more attention to audit, risk oversight and control. From a 
resource dependence theory perspective, different networks maintained by male and 
female directors give the firm access to more market segments and enable the firm to 
access a wider range of critical resources (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). For 
instance, Simpson, Carter and D’Souza (2010) note that female directors have 
different socialisation experiences and social networks which may benefit firms 
through these unique experiences, information and knowledge bases. Additionally, 
Isidro and Sobral (2015) note that the presence of women on boards can improve a 
firm’s legitimacy and public image by signalling to investors and stakeholders that the 
firm promotes gender equality and diversity. From an upper echelons theory 
perspective, it can be argued that a gender diverse board is associated with higher 
quality decisions than a homogenous male only board. This is because males and 
females differ systematically in their core values, risk attitudes, backgrounds, and 
perspectives as concluded by Adams and Funk (2012) using a large survey of 
directors. Post and Byron (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of women on boards and 
articulated that female directors are more likely to value different opinions and adopt 
a cooperative decision-making approach on the board that stimulates teamwork. This 
in turn helps to reduce ‘groupthink’ and encourages a more critical evaluation of 
alternative ideas and viewpoints (Conyon & He, 2017).  
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The extant literature has postulated a number of  benefits associated with gender 
diversity on boards including enhanced decision making quality, stringent board 
monitoring and improved financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Terjesen 
et al., 2009). The empirical evidence in support of these claims however has been 
mixed (Ferreira, 2015; Post & Byron, 2015). Academic research also indicates that 
there are fewer women on boards relative to their presence in the population (Conyon 
& He, 2017). Figure 6.1 displays the mean values of the percentage of women on 
boards in each of the industry sectors across all years in the sample period (2004-
2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Average Percentage of Women on Boards by Industry (2004-2014) 
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Figure 6.1 displays that overall the accommodation, electricity/water and retail 
sales industries were amongst some of the sectors that had relatively higher levels of 
women on boards. In addition, in these three industries, a significant and positive 
association with financial performance was found.  Guillet and Mattila (2010) studied 
the corporate governance practices of companies in the hospitality industry, hotels and 
restaurants, and found that these companies are highly sensitive to the changes in the 
economy. Therefore, shareholders may demand directors to play a greater monitoring 
role. Grosvold et al. (2007) found that the utilities sector was one of the leading 
industries in the UK when it came to board diversity. This study’s results are consistent 
with the findings of McCormick-Hyland and Marcellino (2002) who noted that 
women are most highly represented in service industries such as wholesale and retail 
trade. This is similar with the line of thinking that boards should reflect diversity 
among relevant stakeholder constituencies, and for that reason board composition is 
expected to vary across different sectors (Brammer et al., 2007). Similarly, it is argued 
that some companies appoint female directors in order to maintain good relations with 
their female customers (Liu, Wei & Xie, 2014). Further to this, numerous scholars 
suggest that industries such as retail and service industries, that predominantly serve 
final consumers, as opposed to business customers, tend to have higher proportions of 
women on their boards (Brammer et al., 2007; Pathan & Faff, 2013). This is consistent 
with the work of Stephenson (2004) who posed the question: who better than a female 
board member to offer insights on the female customer? This study suggests that 
gender diversity on boards has a positive impact on the performance of companies that 
operate in service industries reflecting the stakeholders they serve.  
 
A different stream of literature postulates that until a certain threshold or a 
critical mass of women on the board is reached, the different skills and abilities that 
women have will be insignificant (Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 2013). One of the earliest 
scholars that explored this line of thinking, Kanter (1977), noted that when this critical 
mass is not reached, women will be seen as tokens and therefore will either be 
overlooked or they may hide their individual characteristics behind stereotypes. This 
is consistent with Konrad et al.’s (2008) study that concluded a critical mass of three 
or more women on boards will break the stereotypes of women, change the all-male 
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communication dynamic and will be more beneficial in fostering change in the 
boardroom. This stream of literature may be applicable to industries such as banking, 
business support and construction that had an average of 10% or less of women on 
their boards and whose regression results revealed no association with financial 
performance. The mining and quarrying industry sector had the lowest average 
percentage of women on boards, however the regression results revealed strong 
evidence of a positive relation with financial performance. Previous studies have 
commonly excluded the mining sector from their samples (Carter et al., 2003; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003). However, Kang et al. (2007) noted that companies in the materials 
industry have high political costs and therefore are more likely to demonstrate their 
willingness to main good corporate governance practice. This is unlike other industries 
such as the construction industry, that is predominantly male dominated and appears 
to be less willing to appoint female directors (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, 2011; Grosvold et al., 2007). The insurance and IT/media industries 
displayed evidence of a negative association between gender diversity and financial 
performance, and they did not have the lowest percentages of female on boards. This 
is consistent with the literature that suggests that diversity of boards might lack 
sufficient cohesion and lead to team conflicts that would  impede the quality of 
decision making and negatively affect performance (Conyon & He, 2017; Marinova 
et al., 2016).  
 
6.5 Highest Education Band: Industry Findings and Discussion 
The results in Table 6.2 display that there is a positive association between the 
highest education band and Tobin’s Q in the electricity/water, manufacturing, mining 
and wholesale industries. In the other 12 industries there was no association between 
the highest education band on the board and Tobin’s Q. Table 6.3 displays evidence 
of a positive association between the highest education band and ROE in the 
manufacturing industry only and no association in all the other industries. In regards 
to ROA, Table 6.4 displays similar results with the exception of a negative association 
between the highest education band and ROA in the management consultancy and 
transport industries. Therefore, hypothesis 11 cannot be rejected, the association 
between education levels of the board of directors and financial performance differs 
between industries. 
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The extant literature on directors’ education levels and performance suggests 
that individuals with higher education levels are assumed to have higher intellectual 
properties and tend to give more reasons and objectives in the decision making 
process; and this in turn improves firm performance (Zhihua, 2010). Tulung and 
Ramdani (2016) note that the level of education is a reflection of an individual’s 
cognitive ability, therefore higher education is related to a higher capacity of 
information processing. This is consistent with upper echelons theory that proposes 
that the educational level provides an indication of skill base, human capital and 
knowledge (Certo, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Similarly, it can be argued that 
from a resource dependence theory perspective, highly educated directors may 
enhance the legitimacy and prestige of a firm (Wang et al., 2017). From an agency 
theory perspective, a highly educated board can enhance corporate governance by 
providing a more effective advisory and monitoring role (Khanna et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the literature proposes that the knowledge gained from formal education is 
useful to directors in carrying out their daily tasks and in maintaining the competitive 
position of the firm by improving firm performance (Tulung & Ramdani, 2016).  
 
The findings from the manufacturing, electricity/water, mining and wholesale 
industries on highest education band and financial performance support the literature 
that states highly educated directors have greater knowledge and skills that improve 
the decision making process and success of the firm (Bell et al., 2011). Notably, these 
four industries all displayed a positive association between highest education and 
Tobin’s Q whereas only the manufacturing industry displayed an association between 
highest education band and ROE and ROA. The findings of a positive association with 
Tobin’s Q are in line with the propositions of scholars in the upper echelons field who 
contend that directors’ education level can affect a board’s reputation and prestige 
(D’Aveni 1990; Johnson et al., 1993). Certo (2003) further suggests that highly 
educated directors can enhance the board’s prestige and its organisational legitimacy. 
If this is the case, then the impact of directors’ education level would be best 
represented in a market measure such as Tobin’s Q. In addition, Wang et al. (2017) 
note that several studies show that a company’s perceived legitimacy can allow the 
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managers and directors to influence the perceptions of stakeholders and acquire 
resources that are key to a company’s survival. In regards to the findings from 
manufacturing industry, Ooi et al. (2015) note that in industries such as manufacturing 
and agriculture, the human capital of the board of directors, including the skills gained 
from education, is more important than the social capital when it comes to the 
effectiveness of the decision making process.  
 
The majority of the industry findings displayed no association between the 
highest education band and financial performance. This is similar to the work of 
Bhagat, Bolton and Subramanian (2010) who found that education was a critical factor 
in the appointment of CEOs, however they found no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between education and performance. This study further concluded that 
firms may enjoy short term profits when a new CEO with higher education is 
appointed, however this is short lived. This suggests that the education of directors 
may only have a short-term impact on performance and this would not be reflected in 
this study because a two year lag was incorporated in the data. The negative 
association between highest education band and ROA in the management and 
transport industries is consistent with Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert’s (2002) study that 
found a negative relationship between CEO education and ROA. They concluded that 
the evidence of the association between the education of CEOs and firm performance 
shows a weak correlation, however it may be that the type of degree is of more 
importance.  
 
6.6 Education Diversity: Industry Findings and Discussion 
The industry findings in Table 6.2 show that there was a positive association 
between education diversity and Tobin’s Q in the construction and mining industries, 
whereas a negative association was displayed in the accommodation and IT/media 
industries. The majority of the industry findings (12 out of 16), however showed no 
significant association between education diversity and Tobin’s Q. These results are 
similar when using ROE as the dependent variable, as a positive association with 
education diversity is only found in the management and transport industries and a 
negative association is found in the financial services industry. Overall, the industry 
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findings do not provide strong evidence of a positive association between education 
diversity and financial performance. However, hypothesis 12 cannot be rejected, the 
association between education diversity of the board of directors and financial 
performance differs between industries. 
 
Scholars argue that the business environment for large firms is increasingly 
complex therefore a wide array of knowledge, education and occupations can allow 
the board to tackle complex decisions (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2017). 
Further to this, educational diversity on the board can potentially lead to a more in 
depth assessment of decisions which would address information asymmetry issues 
between the board and management, and reduced agency costs (Mahadeo et al., 2012). 
A different body of literature has argued that individuals with diverse backgrounds 
and diverse formal education can increase creativity and innovation which are 
essential skills in decision-making (Østergaard, Timmermans & Kristinsson, 2011). 
However, some upper echelons theorists have noted that education can serve as an 
indicator of one’s values and cognitive preference only if it is assumed that most 
people take decisions about their education very seriously (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Looking at business education, other theorists and critics have argued that MBA 
programmes attract conservative, risk-averse students who are taught analytic skills 
geared towards avoiding big mistakes or losses (Barker & Mueller, 2002). Therefore 
MBA programmes are perceived as doing little towards developing innovative or risk 
taking skills in students. A similar argument may be applied for legal education which 
also seems to place little emphasis on innovation (Barker & Mueller, 2002). When 
taken together these arguments suggest that rather than focusing on higher education 
levels or a particular type of education, it could be more beneficial for firms to have 
directors from diverse educational backgrounds to provide more diverse perspectives 
(Bell et al., 2011). This is consistent with Ararat et al.’s (2015) study that suggested 
firms should value both high and low levels of education based on their proposition of 
directors with limited education having  more intuitive skills. 
 
The findings from the construction, mining, management consultancy and 
transport industries are consistent with the extant literature and propositions of the 
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upper echelons theory discussed above. However, in contrast to the literature, the 
majority of the industry findings find no association between education diversity and 
financial performance. These findings are in line with Murray’s (1989) study which 
found that in some industries (e.g. oil industry) a homogenous board in terms of 
educational background would perform better due to the specialist knowledge required 
in that industry. Notably, the industry findings revealed an association between 
education diversity and financial performance in the crude petroleum industry which 
Murray (1989) termed a ‘specialist’ industry. Similarly, although Bantel (1993) found 
some evidence that greater educational diversity leads to better decision-making and 
firm performance, he suggested that industry effects should be taken into account. 
Other industries such as the accommodation, IT/media and financial services 
industries displayed evidence of a negative association between education diversity 
and financial performance. These findings are consistent with the literature that argues 
diverse perspectives and backgrounds may interfere with group dynamics and, create 
problematic group processes such as miscommunication which could slow down the 
decision making process and negatively impact performance (Østergaard et al., 2011). 
Notably, the mean values of education diversity on the board for these industries were 
0.50 for the accommodation and IT/media industries and 0.44 for the financial services 
industries. This displays moderately high levels of diversity as the maximum value for 
diversity for this measure was 0.75. Pechlaner and Sauerwein (2002) noted that unlike 
other industries, companies in the tourism industry are required to be more innovative 
and must frequently revise their strategies in line with the rapidly changing 
environment in which they operate. Considering this, the study suggests that in 
industries such as the accommodation and IT/media, where the environment rapidly 
changes, education diversity on the board may interfere with the board’s cohesiveness 
and negatively impact performance.  
 
6.7 Highest Experience Band Industry Findings and Discussion 
The industry findings in Table 6.2 display a significant and positive association 
between highest experience band and Tobin’s Q in the accommodation, construction, 
IT/media and mining industries. Similarly, the industry findings in Table 6.3 display 
a positive and significant association between highest experience band and ROE in the 
accommodation, IT/media and wholesale industries. In addition, there is a positive 
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association between highest experience band and ROA in the accommodation and 
IT/media industries. The business support, financial services, construction and 
manufacturing industries display a negative association between the highest 
experience band and ROE and ROA, respectively. Overall, the majority of the 
industries show no association between highest experience band and financial 
performance. However, hypothesis 13 cannot be rejected, the association between 
experience levels of the board of directors and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
This study’s theoretical framework and the extant literature propose that 
directors’ decision-making is influenced by their prior work experience, therefore 
prior experience on a board makes directors more effective in their roles (McDonald, 
Westphal & Graebner, 2008). This line of thinking is consistent with upper echelons 
theory. Anderson et al. (2011) further argue that prior board experience gives directors 
a better understanding of group dynamincs, corporate culture, advising and providing 
strategic advice which enhances the skills they bring to the board. Kroll et al. (2008) 
note that learning takes place by doing, therefore experienced directors have a vital 
skill of learned knowledge. Hambrick, Werder and Zajac (2008) also note that ideally 
directors should be highly qualified to provide professional advice to the firm’s 
management and directors who lack relevant experience are incapable of fully 
contributing to corporate strategy and advising managers. From a resource dependence 
theory perspective, the experience of directors can signal the prestige and reputation 
of a director and, highly experienced directors are associated with higher quality 
(Anderson et al., 2011). Agency theory does not elaborate on the issues pertaining to 
directors’ experience, however in practice it can be assumed that a director with prior 
experience of the role can reduce agency costs and improve the quality of monitoring 
and advising on the board (Shiah-Hou & Cheng, 2012). Taken together the theory and 
literature propose that highly experienced directors should have a positive impact on 
the financial performance of the firm.  
 
The industry findings from several industries are consistent with the 
aforementioned literature. Particularly, the accommodation and IT/media industries 
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provide strong evidence of a positive association between the highest experience band 
and both market and accounting based measures of financial performance. Guillet and 
Mattila (2010) studied the corporate governance practices of companies in the 
hospitality industry, hotels and restaurants, and found that these companies are highly 
sensitive to the changes in the economy. Therefore, shareholders may demand that 
directors play a greater monitoring role. Interestingly, in Section 6.5 the industry 
findings on education diversity suggested that in industries such as the accommodation 
and IT/media, where there is a rapidly changing business environment, quicker 
decision making is required and education diversity hindered this. Conversely, these 
industries display that highly experienced directors have a positive impact on financial 
performance, therefore this study suggests that in rapidly changing business 
environments, directors with prior experience as a director can positively contribute 
to the decision-making process of firms and improve financial performance. This is 
consistent with the work of Huse (2007) who states that in highly competitive or 
unstable environments, quicker decision-making is needed therefore directors should 
have the best insight and knowledge of complex situations.  
 
The industry findings also reveal that in the construction and mining industries 
there was a positive association between highest experience band and market based 
measures of performance, no association with accounting based measures for the 
mining industry and a negative association with ROA was observed for the 
construction industry. This has two implications, first, this finding is consistent with 
previous studies that find when CEOs are appointed as directors, the stock market 
reacts positively (Fich, 2005; Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2011). This is in line 
with the stream of literature that states prior experience as a director can signal a 
director’s proven track record, accomplishments, social ties and networks with other 
companies (Nguyen et al., 2015). In this case, the impact of the directors’ prior 
experience would be better represented in a market based measure of performance 
such as, Tobin’s Q, rather than in accounting based measures. Khanna et al. (2014) 
state that accounting based measures of performance are better indicators of the 
effectiveness of the governance of a firm. Taken together, the findings from the 
construction industry suggest that highly experienced directors in this industry provide 
a good signal of director quality to the market but do not necessarily improve the 
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governance of the firm. In addition, Anderson et al. (2011) noted that shareholders 
seem to place greater value on the experience and profession of directors than their 
gender, ethnicity and age. In regards to the business support, financial services and 
manufacturing industry a negative association between highest experience band and 
financial performance was observed. These results suggest that in these industries, the 
greater the experience of the board, the worse the financial performance and this could 
attributed to the argument of too much board monitoring that would decrease 
shareholder value (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).   
 
6.8 Experience Diversity Industry Findings and Discussion 
The industry results in Table 6.2 display that there was a positive association 
between experience diversity and Tobin’s Q in the crude petroleum, insurance, 
management consultancy, mining, retail sales and transport industries. In the 
construction industry, a negative association was displayed between experience 
diversity and Tobin’s Q. When using ROE as a measure of financial performance, the 
industry analysis revealed a positive association with experience diversity in the IT 
and media, management, mining and retail sales industries and a negative association 
in the insurance industry. These results are similar when using ROA as a measure of 
financial performance. Overall, eight out of 16 industries displayed no significant 
association between experience diversity and financial performance. Therefore, 
hypothesis 14 cannot be rejected, the association between experience diversity of the 
board of directors and financial performance differs between industries. 
 
This study’s theoretical framework and the existing body of literature propose 
that in modern day complex business environments, a much wider array of knowledge 
and occupations is vital in order for boards to tackle multiple dimensions of the 
decision making process (Mahadeo et al., 2012). These dimensions include financial, 
legal, environmental, operational, ethical and human resources issues. Therefore, 
directors with expertise or experience in any of these areas, or with prior director 
experience would have developed complex decision-making and problem solving 
skills in their area of expertise, which will be beneficial in improving the decision 
making of firms and firm performance (McDonald, 2008). Upper echelons theorists 
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propose that executives’ prior experiences are particularly significant in board roles 
such that executives should be able to leverage their vast and diverse sets of knowledge 
and skills and, in so doing, improve firm performance (Hambrick, 2007; Kroll et al., 
2008). Further to this, resource dependence theorists suggests that such diversity may 
be beneficial in accessing vital resources for the firm and in expanding the collective 
networks and ties of the board (Johnson et al., 2013). Agency theory, does not directly 
acknowledge that directors may require different skills in order to adequately exercise 
their duties, however, earlier proponents of agency theory underlined the importance 
of independent NEDs with specific expertise (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, based 
on the notion that experience diversity brings multiple perspectives and expertise in 
the boardroom, it can be argued that this will make the board more effective in 
exercising control, monitoring and advising management (Anderson et al., 2011).  
 
The industry analysis reveals that the findings from several industries are 
consistent with the study’s theoretical framework and the extant literature. Strong 
evidence of a positive association between the experience diversity of directors and 
financial performance is found in the retail sales and mining industries. Figure 6.2 
presents the average values of experience diversity in each of the industry sectors 
across all the years in the sample period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Average Experience Diversity by Industry (2004-2014) 
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The mining and retail sales industries displayed a positive association between 
experience diversity and financial performance when using all three dependent 
variables, notably however, the mean values of experience diversity were 0.43 and 
0.37, respectively. Other industries that displayed evidence of a positive association 
between experience diversity and financial performance, such as transport and 
management industries, had mean values of 0.35 and 0.37, respectively. Considering 
that the highest value of diversity from the Blau’s index measure was 0.75, these 
values represent moderate diversity. Conversely, the construction industry had the 
highest mean value of 0.51 and the findings displayed a negative association between 
experience diversity and Tobin’s Q. This is in line with the work of Østergaard et al. 
(2011) who argued that there should be an adequate balance of experience diversity in 
a group, such that it does not hinder the cohesiveness of the group or become too 
specialised. In addition, Golden and Zajac (2001) concluded that some diversity is 
beneficial but after a certain point it constrains action and impedes strategic change. 
In contrast, the crude petroleum industry had a mean value of 0.50 and displayed a 
positive association with Tobin’s Q. This suggests that higher levels of experience 
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diversity do not always impede the cohesiveness and decision-making process of the 
board, dependent upon the context. The insurance industry displayed a negative 
association between experience diversity and the accounting measures of 
performance. Other scholars who have investigated the mix of occupations and 
experience diversity on the board have found evidence that the diversity of the 
opinions can create conflict and prohibit strategic change or allow the CEO to exert 
greater control (Johnson et al., 2013).  
 
6.9 Multiple Directorships: Industry Findings and Discussion 
The industry findings presented in Table 6.2 show that there is a positive and 
significant association between multiple directorships and Tobin’s Q in the crude 
petroleum and manufacturing industries. Conversely, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show a 
negative association between multiple directorships and the accounting measures of 
performance, ROE and ROA, in the retail sales and electricity/water industries. 
Overall, the industry analysis reveals that in the majority of the industries there was 
no significant association between multiple directorships and financial performance. 
However, hypothesis 15 cannot be rejected, the association between multiple 
directorships on the board of directors and financial performance differs between 
industries. 
 
Corporate governance literature that has examined the effectiveness of directors 
on the board has also paid attention to the commitments of directors in regards to the 
external directorships they hold in other firms (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2008). This literature has suggested that the effect of multiple 
directorships is twofold. The first stream of literature suggests that directors with 
multiple appointments have richer experiences and connections and therefore can 
provide access to various important resources that improve firm performance (Sarkar 
& Sarkar, 2009). In addition, through external appointments directors acquire broader 
knowledge that can be beneficial in enhancing the decision making process of the 
board (Reguera-Alvarado & Bravo, 2017). This view is consistent with the resource 
dependence theory propositions as the external ties of directors can help in acquiring 
specific external resources, acquiring support from stakeholders and establishing the 
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legitimacy of the firm they serve on (Østergaard, 2011; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Further to this, an increase in the number of directorships enhances the reputation of 
directors. This is because a director who serves on several boards has a verified ability 
to provide advice and counsel and this increases their demand as a director (López 
Iturriaga & Morrós Rodríguez, 2014). Reguera-Alvarado and Bravo (2017) further 
argue that this reputation effect can give directors incentives to be more engaged, to 
improve corporate strategies and firm performance in order to maintain their 
reputation. Similarly, directors’ prestige and reputation can be an informational signal 
to the market and to stakeholders about the firm (Johnson et al., 2013). The other 
stream of literature suggests that multiple directorships may make directors too busy 
to adequately perform their monitoring role and dedicate sufficient time to the 
organisation (Johnson et al., 2013). In addition, serving on too many boards can limit 
directors’ time and preparation for board meetings which narrows their ability to 
provide useful advice and effectively contribute to strategic decisions (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Reguera-Alvarado & Bravo, 2017). This in turn would negatively 
impact firm value and firm performance (Lei & Deng, 2014).  
 
The findings from the industry analysis reveal that a positive association 
between multiple directorships and financial performance was only found in the crude 
petroleum and manufacturing industries using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. 
Traditionally, oil companies have been blamed for undermining good governance and 
it is only recently that oil companies have begun to attach greater importance to good 
governance and to their social impact (Frynas, 2010). With this mind, the findings 
suggest that directors with multiple directorships in the crude petroleum industry can 
positively contribute to firm value and legitimacy through their prestige, visibility and 
connections (López Iturriaga & Morrós Rodríguez, 2014). In addition, the value of 
such reputational capital is best represented in a market based measure of performance, 
such as Tobin’s Q, rather than accounting based measures and this was evident in the 
industry findings. On the other hand, a negative association between multiple 
directorships and ROE and ROA, was observed in the retail sales and electricity/water 
industries. These findings are consistent with the over commitment view of multiple 
directorships where such appointments compromise a directors’ ability to effectively 
monitor management and provide strategic advice (Laoworapong, Supattarakul & 
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Swierczek, 2015). In addition, this is in line with Kamadin and Haron (2011) who 
noted that accounting based measures are more appropriate for investigating the 
agency costs on performance. These results are similar to previous studies that found 
‘busy directors’ were associated with less monitoring and poorer firm performance 
(Hoitash, 2011; Jiraporn et al. 2008). Therefore, this study suggests that in the retail 
sales and electricity/water industries, multiple directorships may lead to less effective 
monitoring which would increase agency costs and negatively impact performance. 
The majority of the industry findings revealed no association between multiple 
directorships and financial performance and this is similar to several other studies 
(Ferris & Jagannathan, 2001; Ferris et al., 2003; Harris & Shimizu, 2004). Kiel and 
Nicholson (2006) concluded that the number of directorships held by a director might 
not mean they are unable to handle their commitments; rather it may be that ‘busy’ 
directors are busy because they are good at their jobs.  
 
6.10 Overall Discussion of Industry Analysis 
Johnson et al. (2013) note that greater board diversity may be viewed as a 
method to balance trade-offs between creating a cohesive board and gathering 
different perspectives. In addition, greater board diversity can be viewed as a method 
of accessing a wider range of resources and networks (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). 
Therefore, Johnson et al. (2013) contend that depending on the context, board diversity 
can either facilitate positive outcomes, constrain these outcomes or balance them for 
a given firm. Thus, taking into account contextual factors and conducting an industry 
analysis can help in reconciling conflicting findings from previous studies. This is 
evident in the industry analysis conducted in this study as different diversity variables 
displayed differing impacts on the various industries. The industry analysis revealed 
that gender diversity and experience diversity had the most positive associations with 
financial performance in the different industry sectors. Overall, the industry analysis 
provides empirical evidence to support the notion that ‘one size does not fit all’. Table 
6.5 presents a summary of the hypotheses findings in this chapter.  
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Table 6.5 Summary of Industry Analysis Hypotheses 
 
 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE  
H9 
(Board 
Index)  
H10 
(Age 
Diversity) 
H11 
(Gender 
Diversity) 
H12 
(Education 
Level) 
H13 
(Education 
Diversity) 
H14 
(Experience 
Level) 
H15 
(Experience 
Diversity) 
H16 
(Multiple 
Directorships) 
 
TOBIN’S Q 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
ROE 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
ROA 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
 
confirmed 
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The industry analysis reveals a much stronger business case for board diversity 
in the mining and quarrying industry as the variables age diversity, gender diversity, 
highest education band, education diversity, highest experience band and experience 
diversity had a positive and significant association with financial performance. The 
mining industry is considered a hi-tech industry with a complex business environment 
and the extant literature proposes that in such industries, a wide array of knowledge, 
education and occupations can allow the board to be more effective in tackling 
complex decisions (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2017). Notably, the mining and 
quarrying industry was one of the only two industries in the sample that displayed a 
positive association between age diversity and financial performance. This finding is 
in line with the work of Ali et al. (2014) who suggest in some industries, such as high-
tech manufacturing and technology, younger directors can contribute their knowledge 
and insights on technological advances. Therefore, age diversity is expected to 
positively impact performance in an industry such as mining that has become more 
innovative and uses technologically sophisticated equipment (Bartos, 2007). Previous 
research has argued that industries with final consumers and with a higher female 
workforce are expected to have more women on the board in comparison to male-
oriented industries such as the mining and oil industries (Hillman et al., 2007; Terjesen 
et al., 2009). In line with this, Figure 6.1 shows that the mining industry had the lowest 
average percentage of women on boards in comparison with other industries. 
However, a significant and positive association was found between gender diversity 
and financial performance in this industry, therefore the study suggests that greater 
gender diversity on the boards of firms in the mining and quarrying industry may have 
a positive impact on financial performance. Further analysis of the board gender 
diversity in this industry reveals some interesting findings on the split between 
executive and non-executive female directors. This is displayed in Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.4 Executive vs Non-Executive Female Directors in Mining Industry 
 
 
Figure 6.4 displays that in the years 2004 to 2006, there were no executive 
female directors on the boards of firms in the mining industry. However, from 2008 
onwards, there was an increase in both the number of women on boards and the 
number of female executive directors. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) conducted a 
survey of female directors in the FTSE 100 companies and found that 88% of these 
companies had no female executive directors on the board. They further concluded 
that the low numbers of executive female directors could affect corporate reputation 
as an employer of choice as it represents few opportunities for senior women to 
progress within their own companies (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). This line of 
thinking is more consistent with the ethical case for board diversity. Gregory-Smith, 
Main and O’Reilly (2014) examined firms listed on the FTSE 350 in the UK over the 
years 1996-2011 and found that there were more female non-executive directors than 
female executive directors in these firms. In addition, their study found evidence of a 
gender bias in the appointment of non-executive female directors, in that most firms 
appointed a female non-executive director when a female non-executive director had 
previously stepped down from the board (Gregory-Smith et al., 2014). Therefore, 
these scholars suggest that since their study found that FTSE 350 firms had fewer 
executive female directors, and that there was no evidence of a gender bias in 
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executive appointments, policy makers should strive to increase gender diversity by 
focusing more on female executive appointments (Gregory-Smith et al., 2014). In 
regards to the business case for diversity, it is not clear whether female executive 
directors exert greater influence on the board than non-executive directors do.  This 
stream of research has not been fully explored in the literature and is an area in which 
future research could be focussed.  
 
The mining industry has been traditionally viewed as a source of environmental 
degradation and social upheaval and a report by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (2002) noted the mining industry has a wider 
obligation to adopt positive and proactive approaches to social development and to 
recognise the interests of a broader group of stakeholders. Thus, Yongvanich and 
Guthrie (2005) suggest that the mining industry is more willing to demonstrate an 
active role in seeking approval from their stakeholders. Interestingly, the findings for 
this industry revealed more positive associations between board diversity measures 
and financial performance when using the market measure Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable. This suggests that board diversity in the mining industry could be a means of 
maintaining public visibility and legitimacy to stakeholders. The majority of studies 
that have examined corporate governance practices in the mining industry have 
focused on South Africa and commonly explored structural diversity measures such 
as board size and independence (Semosa, 2012). Therefore, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this study is one of the first to examine the link between board 
diversity and financial performance in the mining and quarrying industry in the UK. 
 
The industry analysis also revealed that in telecommunications there were no 
significant associations between all of the board diversity variables and financial 
performance. Grosvold et al.’s (2007) study found very low levels of diversity in the 
telecommunications industry and this is consistent with this study’s findings as the 
average values of the board diversity measures in the telecommunications industry 
were relatively low (see Appendix K). Therefore, it could be argued that there was no 
association between the diversity measures and financial performance in the 
telecommunications industry because a certain threshold or critical mass was not 
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reached (Joecks et al., 2013). However, more research would need to be conducted on 
the link between board diversity and financial performance in this industry to gain 
more insights. The industry findings for the banking industry also show no association 
between all of the study’s independent variables (age diversity, gender diversity, 
highest education band, education diversity, highest experience band, experience 
diversity, directorships and board index) and Tobin’s Q in all the regression models. 
These results remain unchanged when using ROE and ROA as alternative measures 
of performance. In light of the 2007/8 financial crisis and the exposure of banking 
directors to legal liability, García-Meca, Garcia-Sanchez and Martínez-Ferrero, (2015) 
suggested that the banking industry is a good framework upon which to expand studies 
on the consequences or effects of board diversity on performance. In a similar vein, 
Sánchez-Lasheras et al. (2012) note that directors of banks are generally subject to 
more scrutiny than other directors. This is because directors of banks play a key 
advisory role in strategy implementation and they face greater liability risk, as they 
are accountable to a wider range of stakeholders such as, depositors, securities and 
exchange regulators, banking regulators and shareholders (García-Meca et al., 2015). 
Further to this, Pathan and Faff (2013) argue that banks can help in facilitating better 
firm governance in their role as creditors and, as shareholders, as a result, well-
governed banks can contribute to the proper functioning of numerous firms in various 
sectors. 
 
Previous studies that have examined board diversity or board structure and firm 
performance in the banking industry have found mixed results. García-Meca et al. 
(2015) found evidence that gender diversity on boards of banks improves performance 
and they further concluded that female directors in banks do not substitute traditional 
directors but rather offer unique characteristics that create more value in banks.  
Conversely, Hagendorff and Keasey (2012) examined board diversity in the US 
banking industry and found age diversity was associated with wealth losses, while 
gender diversity had no measurable effects on value. However, they found a positive 
impact on a bank’s announcement returns when the directors had a diverse 
occupational background. In line with this, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that 
female directors engage in better monitoring of management but they do not improve 
firm performance. This study’s findings are similar to those of Adusei (2011) who 
222 | P a g e  
 
found no relationship between the board structure and firm performance of banks in 
Ghana. In addition, Appendix K shows that the banking industry did not have low 
levels of board diversity and in some instances, this industry displayed some of the 
highest average values of the diversity measures such as with highest education band 
and age diversity. Accordingly, in this industry, this study’s findings suggest that the 
argument for greater board diversity may be best centred on the ethical case for it 
rather than the economic or business case. The ethical argument emphasises the social 
responsibility of firms to avoid exclusion of different groups from the corporate elites 
on the basis of gender, age, race or other characteristics (Hagendorff & Keasey, 2012). 
This may be beneficial to firms in the banking sector who are under public scrutiny as 
diverse boards may create firm legitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders (Carter et al., 
2007). 
 
Lastly, another industry that produced some interesting findings was the 
electricity, gas, water collection and sewerage sector (utilities industry). The findings 
revealed a significant and positive association between gender diversity, highest 
education band and Tobin’s Q and no association between the other independent 
variables and Tobin’s Q. In contrast when using ROE and ROA as dependent variables 
the findings in this industry display a negative association between gender diversity, 
multiple directorships and financial performance and no association between the other 
independent variables and ROE and ROA. Lastly, the variable highest experience 
band was automatically excluded from all three regression models by STATA due to 
collinearity. Other studies in the past have excluded utility companies from their 
sample and argued that this is because they have an additional layer of governance in 
the form of public utility commissions; therefore, their boards are different to other 
industries (Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein, 1994; Li & Zhao, 2008). Further to this, 
Abbott and Cohen (2009) note that utility companies differ from other firms because 
they have conflicts between public objectives of their service, such as water services, 
and profit-maximisation sought by private partners. An earlier study by Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001) argued that in the utilities sector, directors’ networks with the 
government or directors with political backgrounds are more important. They further 
argue that in the 1990s competition in the electricity sector, for instance, became an 
important political issue to which electricity companies responded by increasing the 
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number of directors with political affiliations on their boards (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
2001). Similarly, Kang et al. (2007) stated that companies that operate in industries 
with high political costs are more likely to have boards that are more independent in 
order to display their willingness to maintain good corporate governance practices. 
The mean value for the board index in this industry sector was 28 across all the years, 
which is fairly high and is evidence of a good quality of corporate governance board 
practices, however this had no association with financial performance. Therefore, 
similarly to the findings from the banking industry, it may be beneficial for companies 
in the utilities industry to maintain good corporate governance practices for public 
visibility and legitimacy purposes to its broad range of stakeholders (Carter et al., 
2007). 
 
The utilities industry findings on gender diversity are inconclusive as a positive 
association is found with Tobin’s Q, which represents the market’s perception, 
however a negative association is found with the accounting based measures ROE and 
ROA. In addition, these findings are in contrast to Romano and Guerrini (2014) who 
found that the percentage of females on the boards of water utility companies had no 
impact on both the economic and financial indicators that they used. The findings on 
highest education band supports the literature that states highly educated directors 
have greater knowledge and skills that are essential to the success of a firm (Bell et 
al., 2011). However, the findings on multiple directorships in this industry are 
consistent with the over-commitment view of multiple directorships that argues 
competing pressures from numerous board appointments create ‘busy’ directors who 
compromise firm performance (Nguyen et al., 2015). Romano and Guerrini (2014) 
note that literature on the utilities sector, particularly the water industry, lacks 
empirical studies that look at the relationship between board structure and 
performance in this industry. Therefore, this study contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge in the utilities industry by focusing on board diversity and financial 
performance. Overall, the results suggest that high levels of education improve 
financial performance in the utilities industry whereas multiple directorships are 
detrimental to financial performance in this industry.  
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6.10.1 Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis has attempted to address a gap in literature by testing the association 
between board diversity and financial performance within different industries to 
account for contextual factors. In so doing, the industry analysis contributes to the 
extant literature in various ways and the contribution to knowledge for each of the 
independent variables is discussed below.   
Board Index 
The findings from the industry analysis particularly contribute to knowledge in 
three ways. First, the findings suggest that maintaining good corporate governance 
practices does not always lead to improved firm performance, especially in industries 
with high political costs such as the crude petroleum industry. Second, the study finds 
strong evidence of a positive association between corporate governance practices and 
financial performance of firms in the accommodation, business support, construction, 
IT/media and manufacturing industries. Lastly, the study provides empirical evidence 
of a negative association between board practices and financial performance of firms 
in the financial services industry sector using a methodology that accounts for 
endogeneity. Overall, the findings in this study suggest that although theoretically 
good corporate governance practices lead to reduced agency costs, this is not always 
the case in every industry. It is important therefore to consider contextual factors when 
examining the link between corporate governance practices and financial 
performance. Nonetheless, the study concludes that, with the exception of the financial 
services sector, there is no negative impact on performance of maintaining good 
corporate governance practices as measured by the board index. The limitations of this 
study are discussed and acknowledged in the conclusion of the thesis in Chapter 7.  
 
Age Diversity  
This study adds to the small body of research on age diversity by investigating 
the impact of board age diversity on financial performance within an industry setting. 
The industry findings provide evidence that supports the notion one size does not fit 
all and the need for an age diverse board may be contingent on the context.  Generally, 
the results of this study weaken the business case of age diversity on the boards that 
has been put forward in previous studies (Darmadi, 2011; Kang et al., 2007; Mahadeo 
et al., 2012,). However, the study contributes to practice and to knowledge by 
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suggesting that age diversity can positively impact financial performance when there 
are lower levels of age diversity on the board and particularly in industries that are 
high-tech such as the mining industry. Conversely, higher levels of age diversity may 
have negative impacts on financial performance, such as in the retail sales industry 
sector. This is consistent with the stream of literature that contends greater board 
diversity can involve greater costs as the coordination of a diverse group of individuals 
can be more difficult due to conflicts of opinions arising (Smith et al., 2006). 
 
Gender Diversity  
Post and Byron (2015) suggest that it is vital to consider different conditions and 
contexts that may affect the link between board gender diversity and performance. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the existing body of literature by employing an 
empirical methodology that addresses endogeneity and conducting an industry 
analysis of the findings in order to consider different contexts. The study concludes 
the following: first, the study concludes that there is a strong business case for gender 
diversity in service industries such as retail sales, wholesale and utilities sectors. 
Second, the study suggests that when the critical mass is not reached, particularly in 
male dominated industries such as the construction industry, there is no association 
between gender diversity and financial performance. Lastly, in industries such as the 
mining industry, that are associated with higher political costs and that have more 
willingness to maintain good corporate governance practices, there is a strong business 
case for gender diversity.  
 
Highest Education Band 
This study adds to the small body of literature on board education levels by 
providing empirical evidence of a positive association between directors’ education 
levels and Tobin’s Q in the electricity/water, mining, manufacturing and wholesale 
industry sectors. Further to this, the study provides strong evidence of a positive effect 
of directors’ education levels in the manufacturing industry on both market based and 
accounting measures of performance. Finally, the study concludes that in practice, 
contextual factors must be considered when exploring the link between directors’ 
education levels and financial performance. This is because although the multivariate 
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analysis in Chapter 5 displayed overall no association between the highest education 
band and financial performance, the industry analysis revealed that this is not the case 
for all industries.  A future avenue of research that is consistent with Ararat et al.’s 
(2015) findings is that rather than focusing on highest levels of education, it could be 
that boards may benefit from diverse levels of education as directors with limited 
education may bring more intuitive skills and tacit knowledge whilst higher educated 
directors provide more analytical skills.  
 
Education Diversity  
Østergaard et al. (2011) note that prior studies that have examined the 
relationship between educational diversity and firm performance have produced 
mixed results and suggest various theoretical and methodological reasons for such 
inconsistencies. The most prominent conceptual reason for these inconsistent findings 
has been that the effect of educational diversity on firm performance is likely to be 
sample specific and dependent on certain contextual factors. This study adds to this 
existing body of knowledge by providing empirical evidence of the differing impact 
of educational diversity in different industries. This is in contrast to Ararat et al. (2015) 
who argue that educational diversity leads to more diverse perspectives in the 
decision-making process which enhances performance. This study further suggests 
that such a proposition is only applicable to certain industries, and in ‘specialist’ 
industries such as the crude petroleum industry, educational diversity has no impact 
on performance. In addition, in certain business environments, such as the 
accommodation and IT/media industries, educational diversity on the board negatively 
impacts performance. Therefore, industry effects must be taken into account when 
examining the impact of education diversity on performance.  
 
Highest Experience Band  
This study contributes to the existing body of literature by providing empirical 
evidence of the different impacts of highly experienced directors in different 
industries. In so doing, the study draws three conclusions. First, in contrast to 
Anderson et al. (2011) who state that shareholders place greater value on directors’ 
education and experience rather than directors’ gender and age, this study finds that in 
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the majority of industries there was no association between highest experience band 
and financial performance, whereas Section 6.3 provided greater evidence of an 
association with gender diversity. Second, the study finds strong evidence of a positive 
impact of highly experienced directors on the financial performance of firms in the 
accommodation and IT/media industries that have rapidly changing business 
environments and need quicker decision making. Third, the study suggests that in the 
construction industry, highly experienced directors provide a good signal of director 
quality to the market but do not necessarily improve the governance of the firm. 
 
Experience Diversity  
Generally, the industry findings contribute to the extant literature by suggesting 
that experience diversity on the board does not provide benefits to all firms, therefore, 
uniformly prescribing greater experience diversity on the board may not be an 
appropriate governance practice for all firms. Specifically, this study finds that 
experience diversity of directors has a positive impact on firms with moderate levels 
of experience diversity such as the retail sales, transport and management industries, 
with the exception of the crude petroleum industry. In addition, the construction 
industry displayed a positive association between highest experience band and Tobin’s 
Q and a negative association between experience diversity and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, 
the study proposes that firms in the construction industry may benefit more from 
having highly experienced directors rather than directors with diverse experience. 
Lastly, the study finds evidence of a negative association between experience diversity 
of directors and financial performance in the insurance industry, and concludes that in 
some contexts, experience diversity on the board can create conflict or hinder strategic 
change, which would have a negative impact on financial performance.   
 
Multiple Directorships  
The industry findings on the association between multiple directorships and 
financial performance contribute to the existing body of literature in three ways. First, 
the study finds evidence to support the literature that states multiple directorships can 
enhance the visibility and legitimacy of the firm through the prestige of directors. 
Particularly, this study suggests that directors with multiple directorships in the crude 
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petroleum industry can positively contribute to firm value and legitimacy through their 
prestige, visibility and connections. Second, the study extends prior literature by 
showing that in the retail sales and electricity /water industries, multiple directorships 
may lead to less effective monitoring which would increase agency costs and 
negatively impact performance. Lastly, the study’s findings support the propositions 
of Lei and Deng (2014) and Sarkar and Sarkar’s (2009) that it is not necessary to set 
strict limits on the number of directorships held on boards as this study finds very little 
evidence of a negative impact on firm value and performance.  
 
6.10.2 Contribution to Practice 
Terjesen et al. (2009) noted that due to the influence of a firm’s external 
business environment it is important to conduct research at an industry level. Ooi et 
al. (2015) further note that previous studies that have focused on board diversity have 
not taken into account industry-specific factors, which may influence firm outcomes. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the existing body of knowledge, and to practice, 
by examining the link between board diversity and financial performance by grouping 
a sample of the FTSE 350 companies according to their economic activities (SIC 
codes). Despite the Financial Reporting Council in the UK encouraging compliance 
with codes of best practice for all firms, the findings from this thesis with regards to 
board diversity support the notion that ‘one size does not fit all’. The thesis provides 
empirical evidence of which board diversity variables have a positive impact on 
financial performance in each industry and this is summarised in Table 6.4. These 
findings will be useful to board members, nomination committees and shareholders in 
creating boards that are well suited to perform their duties and in advancing the 
diversity agenda. In addition, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine the association between board diversity and financial performance 
in the business support and public administration, accommodation and food services 
and mining and quarrying industry sectors. Previous studies on board diversity and 
performance either have not explicitly examined these industry sectors in the UK 
context or they have only examined either gender diversity or board independence.  
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Table 6.6 Summary of Significant Board Diversity Variables per Industry 
Industry Sector Significant and Positive Board Diversity Variables Significant and Negative Board Diversity Variables 
 
Accommodation, Food & Beverages Services  
 
Gender Diversity 
Highest Experience Band 
Board Index 
 
Education Diversity 
 
Banking  
 
 
None 
 
None 
 
Business Support, Leasing, Employment, Public 
Administration  
 
Board Index 
 
Highest Experience Band 
 
 
Construction and Development of Buildings 
 
Education Diversity 
Highest Experience Band** 
Board Index 
 
Experience Diversity 
Highest Experience Band** 
 
 
Electricity, Gas, Water collection and Sewerage 
 
Gender Diversity** 
Highest Education Band 
 
Gender Diversity** 
Experience Diversity 
 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
 
Experience Diversity 
Directorships 
 
 
Gender Diversity 
 
Financial Services, Auxiliary Services to Finance 
and Real Estate Activities 
 
None 
 
Board Index 
Education Diversity 
Highest Experience Band 
 
 
Insurance 
 
 
Experience Diversity** 
Age Diversity 
 
Gender Diversity 
Experience Diversity** 
 
 
IT, Media, Broadcasting and Publishing 
 
 
 
 
Highest Experience Band 
Board Index 
Experience Diversity 
 
Gender Diversity 
Education Diversity 
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Industry Sector Significant and Positive Board Diversity Variables Significant and Negative Board Diversity Variables 
 
Management Consultancy, Head Offices Activities, 
Architectural and Engineering Services 
 
 
Age Diversity** 
Education Diversity 
Experience Diversity** 
 
 
Experience Diversity** 
Age Diversity** 
Highest Education Band 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
Gender Diversity 
Highest Education Band 
Directorships 
Board Index 
 
 
Highest Experience Band 
 
Mining and Quarrying 
 
 
Age Diversity 
Gender Diversity 
Highest Education Band 
Education Diversity 
Highest Experience Band 
Experience Diversity 
 
 
None 
 
Retail Sales, Gaming and Betting Activities 
 
 
Gender Diversity 
Experience Diversity 
 
 
Age Diversity 
Directorships 
 
Telecommunications 
 
 
None  
 
None 
 
Transport 
 
 
Gender Diversity 
Experience Diversity 
Education Diversity 
 
 
Age Diversity 
Highest Education Band 
 
Wholesale 
 
 
Gender Diversity 
Highest Education Band 
Highest Experience Band 
 
 
Age Diversity 
**These variables produce contradictory findings depending on the measure of financial performance i.e. market based vs. accounting based measures. 
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6.11 Summary of Chapter  
This chapter has presented and discussed the multivariate analysis findings from 
each of the 16 industries represented in this study’s sample. In so doing, this chapter 
has addressed research question 3 and identified that the association between board 
diversity and financial performance differs amongst industries. The chapter found that 
the association between age diversity and financial performance may have a 
curvilinear relationship, suggesting that lower levels of age diversity would be more 
beneficial. The chapter also found that in industries with high political costs, 
companies might be more willing to show their commitment to maintaining good 
corporate governance practices. In addition, the findings from the mining industry 
overall displayed a stronger business case for diversity in comparison to other 
industries. The chapter discussed the various implications of these findings to the 
existing body of knowledge and to practice and overall supports the notion that ‘one 
size does not fit all’ suggesting that the comply or explain system may not be the most 
conducive approach. The next chapter concludes this thesis by presenting a summary 
of the key literature, key findings and the overall contribution to knowledge and to 
practice.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction to Chapter  
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the relationship between board 
diversity and firm performance in UK listed companies. By drawing upon the business 
case for diversity, the thesis has utilised a multi-theory framework that has allowed 
both structural and demographic issues of diversity to be explored simultaneously. 
Accordingly, the study’s research objective was to examine the impact of board 
diversity on the financial performance of FTSE 350 companies in the UK. This chapter 
provides the conclusion to the thesis and summarises the key literature, key findings 
and the contribution to knowledge. The chapter is structured as follows: Sections 7.2 
to 7.4 discuss the key literature, key findings and contribution to knowledge relating 
to research question 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Section 7.5 discusses the study’s overall 
contribution to practice whilst Section 7.6 discusses the limitations of this study. 
Section 7.7 discusses potential areas of further research and lastly Section 7.8 
summarises this chapter. Table 7.1 presents a summary of this study’s research overall.  
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Table 7.1 Summary of Thesis 
Research Objective:   To examine the impact of board diversity on the financial performance of FTSE 350 companies in the UK 
Research Question Relevant Literature Underlying 
Theories 
Research Method 
employed 
Findings and Results  Further work 
Research Question 1: 
Which theoretical 
framework is the best 
modelling tool of board 
diversity and financial 
performance? 
Gaps in literature displayed a 
need to adopt a multi-theory 
perspective alongside several 
calls from previous 
researchers.  
 Section 2.7 of Chapter 2.  
Integration of Upper 
echelons, Resource 
dependence and 
Agency theories.  
 
 
Discussed in Chapter 
3. 
OLS Regression 
 
Akaike Information 
Criteria 
 
 
 
Discussed in Section 5.5 
of Chapter 5. 
Model with variables 
derived from this study’s 
theoretical framework 
was the most 
parsimonious model.  
 
Discussed in Section 5.5 
of Chapter 5. 
Theoretical framework 
developed can be used on other 
samples in future research, 
alongside inclusion of ethnicity 
as a measure of diversity.  
 
Discussed in Sections 7.6 and 
7.7 of Chapter 7. 
Research Question 2:  
Is there a relationship 
between board diversity 
and financial 
performance? 
 
Literature on board 
homogeneity vs heterogeneity 
is discussed in Section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2.  
 
Different board characteristics 
that act as diversity measures 
are discussed in Section 3.3 of 
Chapter 3.  
Integration of Upper 
echelons, Resource 
dependence and 
Agency theories.  
 
 
Discussed in Chapter 
3. 
2SLS Regression 
 
GLS Regression 
 
 
 
 
Discussed in Section 5.7 
of Chapter 5. 
Positive association 
found between gender 
diversity, experience 
diversity, multiple 
directorships and 
financial performance.  
 
No association found 
between age diversity, 
education level, 
education diversity, 
experience level, board 
index and financial 
performance. 
 
Discussed in Section 5.7 
of Chapter 5. 
Future research may examine 
differences between executive 
and non-executive female 
directors’ roles and influence 
on the board.  
 
Further work may also consider 
whether younger or older 
directors are preferable on 
boards in improving the 
financial performance of firms.  
 
 
Discussed in Section 7.7 of 
Chapter 7. 
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Research Question Relevant Literature Underlying 
Theories 
Research Method 
employed 
Findings and Results  Further work 
Research Question 3:  
Does the relationship 
between board diversity 
and financial performance 
differ amongst industries? 
 
Literature on board 
homogeneity vs heterogeneity 
is discussed in Section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2.  
 
Different board characteristics 
that act as diversity measures 
are discussed in Section 3.3 of 
Chapter 3. 
Integration of Upper 
echelons, Resource 
dependence and 
Agency theories.  
 
 
Discussed in Chapter 
3. 
2SLS Regression 
 
GLS Regression 
 
 
 
 
Discussed in Chapter 6. 
The relationship between 
board diversity and 
financial performance 
differs in industries. The 
mining industry sector 
displayed the strongest 
business case for board 
diversity in comparison 
with other industries.  
  
Discussed in Chapter 6. 
Future research could 
investigate whether age 
diversity on boards has a 
curvilinear relationship with 
financial performance to gain 
more insights into the nature of 
this relationship, particularly in 
the retail sales industry sector.  
 
Further work may also examine 
the impact of board diversity 
and financial performance in 
industries such as business 
support and public 
administration, accommodation 
and food services and mining 
and quarrying industry sectors 
where there is limited research 
on this topic.  
 
Discussed in Section 7.7 of 
Chapter 7. 
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7.2 Research Question 1 
This study’s first research question was, which theoretical framework is the best 
modelling tool of board diversity and financial performance? This research question 
sought to identify a theoretical framework that best addressed the different functions 
of boards and allowed both structural and demographic issues of diversity to be 
explored. Research question 1 was addressed in three ways. First, in Chapter 2 of the 
literature review, a review and suitability of previous corporate governance theories 
was discussed. This discussion highlighted that the majority of literature in previous 
corporate governance studies is dominated by a single theoretical framework and does 
not integrate different theories. Second, the chosen theoretical framework of the study 
that comprises agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theories was 
discussed in Chapter 3 and this chapter also provided a synthesis of the three theories. 
Lastly, research question 1 was addressed in Chapter 5 by evaluating four OLS models 
and AIC scores comprised of different variables in order to find the model that best 
explained any variations in the dependent variable. 
 
7.2.1 Key Literature  
Ntim (2015) notes that scholars who advocate for greater diversity in the 
boardroom typically base their arguments on either agency, resource dependence or 
stakeholder theories. Agency theory has been predominantly used in the majority of 
prior corporate governance studies, however scholars argue that agency theory solely 
focuses on directors’ monitoring and control role (Petrovic, 2008). In addition, agency 
theory does not recognise that directors may differ in their capabilities and skills when 
exercising their duties and it does not fully acknowledge the fact that directors are a 
social group that is part of a highly dynamic system influenced by their cognitive 
ability (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Petrovic, 2008). Stakeholder theory is commonly 
used in diversity studies that focus more on the social responsibilities of firms and the 
ethical arguments for diversity rather than the business case (Bear et al., 2010; 
Francoeur et al., 2008). With regards to resource dependence theory, Carter et al. 
(2010) state that resource dependence theory provides a good basis for some of the 
most influential theoretical arguments that advocate a business case for board 
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diversity. However, resource dependence theory focuses more on the resource 
provision role of directors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, Hillman et al. (2009) 
stated that it is not sufficient on its own and should be integrated with other theories 
in order to offer new insights on the phenomenon of interest. In light of this, the 
literature review identified the need for a multi-theory perspective that takes into 
account the different dimensions of diversity and the different functions of the board 
of directors. Therefore, this thesis integrated upper echelons, resource dependence and 
agency theories and the basic conceptual model of the study is presented again in 
Figure 7.1.  
Figure 7.1 Thesis Conceptual Framework 
 
Board Diversity 
Advisory Duty 
Strategic role and resource provision role
Demographic diversity 
Fiduciary Duty
Monitoring and control role 
structural diversity 
Board Decision-
Making
Firm Performance
Agency theory perspective
Resource Dependence and 
Upper Echelons theory 
perspectives
Minimises agency costs
Provides key resources, 
diverse opinions and skills
 
 
 
Jermias and Gani (2014) suggest empirical studies using agency theory have 
produced inconclusive results because of a myopic focus on the monitoring function 
of boards, ignoring other functions such as the resources provision and strategic roles 
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of directors. Therefore, the results from Zattoni and Van Ees’s (2012) study, and other 
researchers, propose that a promising avenue for future governance research is to 
utilise other theoretical paradigms or to combine two or more theoretical frameworks 
to bridge this gap in the literature (Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2011). The study’s 
chosen theoretical framework addressed this gap by utilising the agency theory to 
address directors’ monitoring role and identify issues of structural diversity such as 
board independence, CEO duality and board committees. Resource dependence theory 
is utilised to address directors’ resource provision role and it identifies some 
demographic diversity attributes such as educational background, experience and 
multiple directorships. Lastly, upper echelons theory is used to address directors’ 
strategic and service role and identifies demographic diversity attributes such as age, 
gender, education background, experience and multiple directorships.  
 
7.2.2 Key Findings  
This thesis synthesises upper echelons, resource dependence and agency 
theories in the following ways. First, the three theories together take into account the 
multiple roles and functions that directors play on boards which include evaluating the 
firm’s strategies, monitoring and controlling managers, linking the firm to the external 
business environment and the appointment and remuneration of senior executives 
(Nahar-Abdullah, 2004; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Kuhç & Kuzey, 2016). 
Second, upper echelons theory proposes that in order to understand why organisations 
perform the way they do, researchers must consider the biases and dispositions of their 
top executives (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  However, this theory omits a broader 
set of position holders, namely the board of directors, who are arguably the most 
powerful actors in the firm from both an agency and resource dependence theory 
perspective (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). Third, an amendment of upper echelons theory 
by Hambrick (2007) proposed that the upper echelons of senior executives will be 
poor predictors of performance because the CEO will have the greatest power and 
influence on the decision making process. This proposal highlighted the limitation of 
upper echelons theory in excluding structural issues of diversity that are identified by 
agency theory, such as board independence and CEO duality which are both aimed at 
eliminating issues of power and ensuring that no one individual has ‘unfettered powers 
of decision’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). Lastly, agency theory does not 
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recognise that not every board is well suited to perform their duty and it does not 
entirely recognise unique attributes that individual directors may bring to the board in 
improving effectiveness which are recognised by resource dependence and upper 
echelons theories.  
 
In summary, the study’s theoretical framework postulates that the board of 
directors, who are the most powerful actors in the firm, can be more effective in 
performing multiple board functions when there is both structural and demographic 
diversity on the board. This in turn, is proposed to enhance the decision-making 
process of the board and improve firm performance. In Chapter 5, OLS regressions 
were run on four models. The first model was based on the variables found from this 
study’s theoretical framework, the second, third and fourth models were individually 
based on variables derived from agency theory, resource dependence theory and upper 
echelons theory, respectively.  Through examining the Rsquared and RMSE values of 
each model, the findings revealed that model one explained the greatest proportion of 
the variation on the dependent variable by the independent variables. The results also 
showed that model one overall had a better fit than the other models. In addition, 
further analysis using the Akaike information criteria revealed that model one was the 
most parsimonious model. Although the difference between models one and four was 
minimal, the rationale of parsimony is not based on statistical significance, rather it is 
based on precision of estimation. Therefore, the model that is closest to having the 
least assumptions and the greatest explanatory power in the analysis is considered the 
best fitting model (Bentler & Mooijaart, 1989). Overall, the results revealed that model 
one, with the variables derived from the integrated theories, was a better fitting model 
than the models with variables from the individual theories. Hence the proposal to 
adopt, and the benefit of adopting, a multi-theory framework is justified.  
 
7.2.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
A recent review of the literature on board diversity studies in the past decade by 
Kagzi and Guha (2018) proposes various opportunities for future studies to consider 
when investigating board diversity. This thesis explores several of their 
recommendations and propositions. In regards to theoretical perspectives, they 
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propose that future researchers should explore the relationship between board diversity 
and firm performance by integrating various theories (Kagzi & Guha, 2018). To the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first in the literature to integrate 
agency, resource dependence and upper echelons theories and in so doing, the study 
makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge. Specifically, this thesis makes two 
major contributions to the literature. First, by extending Haynes and Hillman’s (2010) 
and Jermias and Gani’s (2014) work, this study integrates agency, resource 
dependence and upper echelons theories and thus contributes in overcoming the 
dominant and current myopia within the three streams of research based on a single 
theory perspective and provides a more complete lens for exploring the link between 
board diversity and financial performance. In addition, the study provides empirical 
evidence that justifies the choice and adoption of the multi-theory framework utilised 
in this thesis. Second, in contrast to the majority of literature in corporate governance, 
the study contributes to literature by highlighting the major limitations of solely 
relying on agency theory when exploring board diversity. That is, agency theory does 
not take into account the multiple roles of directors, it does not entirely consider 
demographic diversity neither does it recognise that directors may require different 
skills in order to effectively exercise their duties including their monitoring role. The 
analysis of the different models in Chapter 5 further revealed that the model with 
variables derived from agency theory alone had the least predictive power. Overall, 
this thesis directly responds to calls by Jermias and Gani (2014) and Zattoni and Van 
Ees (2012) by providing a theoretical and conceptual framework that ‘bridges the gap’ 
in corporate governance literature examining board diversity. 
 
7.3 Research Question 2 
This study’s second research question was, is there a relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance? This research question sought to identify the 
board characteristics and attributes of diversity that have an association with financial 
performance. Research question 2 was addressed in three ways. First, in Chapter 3, 
the study’s theoretical framework identified structural and demographic attributes of 
the board of directors that can proxy diversity in the boardroom. The chapter also 
developed hypotheses to be tested. The board diversity variables used in this study 
were directors’ age, gender, education, experience, networks and a board index was 
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constructed to measure board practices. Second, in Chapter 4, the measures of each of 
these variables were discussed in line with the extant literature and the study’s 
theoretical framework. In addition, Chapter 4 discussed the construction of the board 
index that was based on the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
2014. Lastly, the second research question was mainly addressed in Chapter 5, where 
the multivariate regression results were presented and discussed.  
 
7.3.1 Key Literature  
Corporate governance literature contends that board structure strongly 
influences the actions and effectiveness of a board, which ultimately impacts firm 
performance (Kim, Burns & Prescott, 2009). One important dimension of board 
structure is the diversity of the board. However, since the 1990s, the majority of large 
UK firms have been homogenously composed of white, middle class, older men with 
similar professional and educational backgrounds (Ararat et al., 2015; Brammer et al., 
2007; Useem, 1993; Wang & Clift, 2009). This study’s theoretical framework, 
together with scholars who advocate for diversity suggest that boards comprised of 
directors with a wide range of skills, expertise and backgrounds will be more effective 
in their functions and will enhance the board’s decision-making process (Adams et al., 
2015). However, other scholars argue that heterogeneous or diverse boards may slow 
down the decision-making process and constrain strategic changes in the firm as their 
different perspectives may make it more difficult for a consensus to be reached 
(Marinova et al., 2016). Whilst it is recognised that some scholars indicate board 
heterogeneity may cause more disagreements, it is argued that generally boards with 
a diverse set of directors will have the capability to objectively and carefully evaluate 
alternatives with added insights (Low et al., 2015). The empirical evidence on board 
diversity and firm performance has produced mixed results and the majority of these 
studies have focused on examining the link between gender diversity and firm 
performance, with less attention being paid to other diversity attributes (Post & Byron, 
2015). Therefore, one of the gaps in literature identified in Chapter 2 was the need for 
academic research to adopt a much wider focus on other aspects of diversity, besides 
just gender diversity, in building a business case for diversity in the boardroom. 
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7.3.2 Key Findings  
The study mainly utilised two stage least squares regression and generalised 
least squares regression to test the association between the diversity measures and 
financial performance proxied by Tobin’s Q, ROE and ROA. The summary of the 
findings and hypotheses is summarised in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Summary of Hypothesis Findings 
 *there is evidence of an association at the 10% significance level. 
 
Table 7.2 reveals that the study’s first hypothesis was rejected as no association 
is found between the board index and financial performance. Hypothesis 2 was 
rejected as no association was found between the age diversity of directors and 
financial performance. The discussion in Chapter 5 suggested that this could be due to 
the different risk appetites of younger and older directors balancing each other out. 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed as a positive and significant association was found between 
gender diversity and all the measures of financial performance. This suggests that the 
presence of women on boards makes boards more effective in their roles and enhances 
the decision making process. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are both rejected as no association 
is found between directors’ education levels, education diversity and financial 
performance. This suggests that the educational background of directors neither 
improves nor worsens performance. Hypothesis 6 is also rejected as no association is 
found between higher levels of experience and financial performance. Hypothesis 7 is 
confirmed as a positive and significant association is found between experience 
diversity and ROE, suggesting that directors with diverse experience contribute 
 Research Hypotheses 
Dependent 
Variable  
H1 
(Board 
Index) 
H2 
(Age 
Diversity)  
H3 
(Gender 
Diversity) 
H4 
(Education 
Level) 
H5 
(Education 
Diversity) 
H6 
(Experience 
Level) 
H7 
(Experience 
Diversity) 
H8 
(Multiple 
Directorships) 
Tobin’s Q rejected* rejected confirmed rejected rejected rejected* rejected confirmed 
ROE rejected rejected confirmed rejected rejected rejected confirmed rejected 
ROA rejected rejected confirmed rejected rejected rejected rejected* rejected 
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positively to the board through their diverse perspectives and skills. In regards to 
multiple directorships, hypothesis 8 is confirmed as a positive and significant 
association is found with Tobin’s Q, suggesting that multiple directorships produce 
higher quality directors who are more effective in their board roles.  
 
7.3.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
This study contributes to the extant literature and existing body of knowledge 
in several ways. First, the study responds to calls by Hillman (2015), Adams et al. 
(2015) and Kagzi and Guha (2018) that propose research on board diversity must 
venture into other aspects of diversity besides gender. This is in order to truly 
understand boardroom diversity and be able to inform practice and policy effectively. 
Specifically, the findings from the overall analysis in this thesis display that there is a 
business case for gender diversity, experience diversity and multiple directorships in 
the boardroom. Although the findings do not display a business case for age diversity 
and educational background, the results do not reveal that these attributes worsen 
performance either. Therefore, this suggests that the argument for these measures 
should be based on other criteria such as the ethical argument for diversity in line with 
the normative side of the stakeholder theory. Further to this, the study’s findings refute 
the propositions of scholars, such as Li and Hambrick (2005), who suggest that board 
diversity is associated with cognitive conflict and obstructs the board’s decision-
making process leading to a decrease in firm performance. Additionally, this study’s 
findings contradict Anderson et al. (2011) who proposed that shareholders place 
greater value on directors’ education, experience and profession than their gender and 
age. The results from this thesis find that gender diversity had a positive association 
with Tobin’s Q, which is a market measure, and experience diversity had no 
association with Tobin’s Q but had an association with ROE which is an accounting 
based measure.  
 
Second, Kagzi and Guha (2018) note that although research on the age 
diversity of directors has received much less attention, the existing literature has 
shown conflicting findings. Therefore, they propose that more research needs to be 
conducted to establish the nature of the effects of age diversity in corporate boards 
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(Kagzi & Guha, 2018). This thesis adds to the existing body of literature by providing 
empirical evidence of no association between the age diversity of directors and 
financial performance. Notably, scholars suggest that prior research in corporate 
governance and board diversity produces inconsistent findings due to several 
methodological issues not being addressed (Adams et al., 2015). This is evidenced in 
this thesis as the results in Chapter 5 revealed a significant and negative association 
between age diversity and financial performance when using OLS and GLS 
regressions. However, in the regression diagnostics in Chapter 4, it was noted that age 
diversity was an endogenous variable therefore in this case, 2SLS regression is a more 
reliable regression estimator as it accounts for endogeneity.  In contrast to the OLS 
and GLS results, the results from 2SLS revealed no association between age diversity 
and financial performance. Therefore, this thesis provides more robust and reliable 
findings on the nature of the association between age diversity and financial 
performance. 
 
Third, this thesis contributes to knowledge by providing empirical evidence of 
a positive and significant association between multiple directorships and Tobin’s Q. 
Martin et al. (2015) noted that previous studies that have examined the association 
between multiple directorships and firm performance have been criticised for not 
accounting for endogeneity in their analysis. This study identified that ‘multiple 
directorships’ is an endogenous variable. Therefore, this study contributes to and 
extends prior work by providing more empirical evidence that confirms a significant 
and positive association between multiple directorships and financial performance 
using a rigorous methodology that accounts for endogeneity. This finding disproves 
the ‘busyness hypothesis’ that contends directors’ external ties make them too busy 
and less committed, which results in negative firm performance (Jiraporn et al., 2008). 
This study suggests that multiple directorships produce higher quality directors who 
are more effective in their monitoring, resource provision and strategic roles through 
the invaluable experience they gain from serving on other boards. This finding also 
has an implication on policy, in that it supports the work of Lei and Deng (2014) and 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) who propose that it is not necessary for codes of best practice 
and regulation to set strict limits on the number of external directorships held by 
directors, as there is very little evidence of a negative impact on performance.  
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Fourth, Hagendorff and Keasey (2012) note that the extant literature on board 
diversity largely concentrates on observable measure of demography such as gender 
and race, however this literature limits itself in making more general inferences about 
the impact of diversity in the boardroom. In line with this, this thesis contributes to the 
existing body of knowledge by focusing on a wider range of diversity attributes 
including non-observable measures such as education and experience. In particular, 
this study provides empirical evidence of a positive association between the 
experience diversity of directors and accounting based measures of financial 
performance. Khanna et al. (2014) state that accounting based measures of 
performance are better indicators of the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices than market-based measures, which reflect investor perception. In light of 
this, this study concludes that the experience diversity of the board reflects the 
different skills and perspectives that directors bring to their jobs, which make them 
more effective in their roles and ultimately leads to improved performance.  
 
Fifth, this study contributes to knowledge by assessing the structural diversity 
of boards that goes beyond the conventional measures of CEO duality and board 
independence and it constructs a board index that is tailored to listed companies in the 
UK. There are a limited number of studies in the UK that have utilised corporate 
governance indices when examining the link between corporate governance or board 
composition and firm performance (Mouselli, Abdulraouf & Jaafar, 2014; Renders et 
al., 2010). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is one of the first studies 
that constructs a board index that is focused on board practices and is based on the 
recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code 2014. The board index that was 
constructed addresses several aspects of corporate governance that broadly fall under 
five categories of the code: leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and 
relations with shareholders. Akbar et al. (2016) argue that when investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance, a methodology that takes 
into account the possibility of endogeneity must be utilised. In line with this, the thesis 
adds to the literature by using a comprehensive and robust econometric approach that 
takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between corporate 
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governance and performance and provides empirical evidence of no association 
between the two. Theoretically, the results are unexpected, however in practice, the 
results may suggest that compliance with corporate governance recommendations may 
not necessarily lead to improved performance.  
 
Sixth, Carter et al. (2010) and Ferreira (2015) conclude that current research 
does not support a business case for gender diversity in the boardroom. As a result, 
Ferreira (2015) further proposes that when discussing the progression of women and 
gender quotas, it is better for policy initiatives to focus more on the ethical case and 
social benefits of gender diversity. This thesis does not disprove this notion, rather it 
extends this work by providing empirical evidence of a strong business case for gender 
diversity on boards. This study’s results support public policy initiatives for quotas of 
women on boards based on the grounds that gender diversity improves the financial 
performance of the firm. In addition, the study supports the proposal of the EU 
commission to promote gender equality and diversity in corporate boards in line with 
the Europe 2020 objectives. This proposal is not only motivated by equality concerns 
but also refers to the business case, citing that gender diversity on boards is a key 
driver of firm performance (European Commission, 2012b). Although the proposal 
states that several studies have shown a positive relationship between gender diversity 
and financial performance, Marinova et al. (2016) note that the majority of research in 
European countries depicts negative results on the relationship between gender 
diversity and financial performance. Therefore, this study further contributes to both 
knowledge and practice by providing more positive results, in the European context, 
of a positive association between gender diversity and different measures of financial 
performance in a sample of UK firms. Studies such as this thesis are useful in 
providing empirical evidence to support the proposals of public policy initiatives.  
 
Lastly, Carter et al. (2010) observe that the academic literature on the 
relationship between board diversity and financial performance is still rather thin with 
a limited number of studies applying a more sophisticated methodology that accounts 
for various econometric issues. In response to this Marinova et al. (2016) note that 
their study contributes to the extant literature by applying a more sophisticated 
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methodology in which they use 2SLS on a relatively small data set and based on one 
year. Adams and Ferreira (2009) note that a concern in using such techniques is the 
difficulty in finding valid instruments. Further to this, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) 
noted that the instruments used are usually not fully tested for validity and relevance. 
This study therefore contributes to the existing body of literature by using a more 
sophisticated methodology on a data set that comprises both cross sectional and times 
series data. In addition, the instrumental variables used in this study, namely total 
equity, total sales, capital intensity, operating margin,  length of operating cycle  and 
sales growth, were all properly tested for both validity and reliability and were found 
to be plausible instruments. Wintoki et al. (2012) stated that although instrumental 
variables techniques can mitigate endogeneity, in corporate governance studies it is 
difficult to find instruments that are not affected by any firm characteristics. Therefore, 
consistent with Jermias and Gani (2014), the findings from this thesis suggest that the 
instrumental variables used in this study are credible instruments for corporate 
governance that can be used by future researchers, as there is no a priori reason for 
these variables to be endogenous to firm performance or corporate governance. 
 
7.4 Research Question 3 
This study’s third research question was, does the relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance differ amongst industries? This research question 
follows on from the second research question and seeks to explore any differences 
amongst industry sectors in line with the notion ‘one size does not fit all’. Research 
question 3 is mainly addressed in Chapter 6 where the industry analysis results are 
presented and discussed. The study’s sample was grouped into 16 industries according 
to SIC codes, which classify companies in industry sectors according to the economic 
activities they are engaged in. 
 
7.4.1 Key Literature  
The ‘one size does not fit all’ notion suggests that corporate governance 
practices are not universal and vary across countries, markets and industries (Kelton 
& Yang, 2008). This is consistent with the contingency theory that can be applied to 
board diversity studies by suggesting that certain diversity measures may be more 
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desirable in some firms and not in others under various circumstances (Fielder, 1967). 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 noted that prior studies on board diversity and 
financial performance may have produced mixed findings because contextual factors 
were not taken into consideration. Therefore, in order to address this gap in the 
literature, Johnson et al. (2013) call for future studies on board diversity to investigate 
contextual factors in helping to reconcile conflicting findings in the literature, and one 
of these contextual factors is industry differences. In regards to the study’s theoretical 
framework, Aguilera et al. (2008) state that the ‘under-contextualised’ nature of 
agency theory framework limits its ability to explain the diversity of corporate 
governance practices in different institutional contexts. In addition, Hiebl (2013) notes 
that contradictory results on certain upper echelons characteristics may be attributable 
to different industries as one size or structure may not fit all. Filatotchev and Allcock 
(2010) state that from a resource dependence theory perspective, it can be argued that 
the role and effects of corporate governance practices may differ in ways that are 
contingent upon the vital external and internal resources within the context of the 
firm’s market or sector.  
 
7.4.2 Key Findings  
The industry findings were summarised in Tables 6.2 to 6.4 in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. The summary of the findings and hypotheses from the industry analysis is 
displayed in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Summary of Hypotheses from Industry Findings 
 Research Hypotheses 
Dependent 
Variable  
H9 
(Board 
Index) 
H10 
(Age 
Diversity)  
H11 
(Gender 
Diversity) 
H12 
(Education 
Level) 
H13 
(Education 
Diversity) 
H14 
(Experience 
Level) 
H15 
(Experience 
Diversity) 
H16 
(Multiple 
Directorships) 
Tobin’s Q confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed 
ROE confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed 
ROA confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed confirmed 
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Looking at age diversity, the industry analysis findings suggest that age 
diversity can positively impact financial performance when there are lower levels of 
age diversity on the board, particularly in industries that are high-tech such as the 
mining industry. Conversely, higher levels of age diversity may have negative impacts 
on financial performance, such as in the retail sales industry sector, this is consistent 
with the idea of a curvilinear relationship. With regards to gender diversity, the 
industry findings suggest that there is strong business case for gender diversity in 
service industries such as retail sales, wholesale and utilities sectors. In addition, the 
industry findings suggest that when the critical mass is not reached, particularly in 
male dominated industries such as the construction industry, there is no association 
between gender diversity and financial performance. The industry findings on highest 
education level displayed evidence of a positive association between directors’ 
education levels and Tobin’s Q in the electricity/water, mining, manufacturing and 
wholesale industry sectors. However, the industry findings on education diversity 
suggests that in ‘specialist’ industries such as the crude petroleum industry, 
educational diversity has no impact on performance. In addition, in certain business 
environments, such as the accommodation and IT/media industries, educational 
diversity on the board negatively impacts performance.  
 
The industry findings on the board index display strong evidence of a positive 
association between corporate governance practices and financial performance of 
firms in the accommodation, business support, construction, IT/media and 
manufacturing industries. The industry findings on the variable highest experience 
band show strong evidence of the positive impact of highly experienced directors on 
the financial performance of firms in the accommodation and IT/media industries that 
have rapidly changing business environments and need quicker decision making. In 
addition, the findings suggest that in the construction industry, highly experienced 
directors provide a good signal of director quality to the market but do not necessarily 
improve the governance of the firm. With regards to experience diversity, the industry 
analysis finds that experience diversity of directors has a positive impact on firms with 
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moderate levels of experience diversity such as the retail sales, transport and 
management industries, with the exception of the crude petroleum industry. In 
addition, the construction industry displayed a positive association between highest 
experience band and Tobin’s Q and a negative association between experience 
diversity and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the findings suggest that firms in the construction 
industry may benefit more from having highly experienced directors rather than 
directors with diverse experience. Lastly, the industry findings on multiple 
directorships suggest that directors with multiple directorships in the crude petroleum 
industry can positively contribute to firm value whereas in the retail sales and 
electricity/water industries, multiple directorships may lead to less effective 
monitoring which would increase agency costs and negatively impact performance. 
Overall, the results from the industry analysis suggest that it is important to examine 
board diversity and financial performance within ‘an industry’ in order to gain more 
insights, because one size may not always fit all.  
 
7.4.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
Kagzi and Guha’s (2018) review of board diversity studies highlighted that 
future research should examine how the type of industry can moderate the relationship 
between board diversity and firm performance. This thesis contributes to knowledge 
by examining the link between board diversity and financial performance within 
industry settings and provides empirical evidence of the board diversity variables that 
have a positive impact on financial performance in each industry. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the Barclays (2010) annual report states that corporate governance 
frameworks should recognise that ‘one size does not always fit all’ and, allow firms 
to operate in ways that suit the needs and challenges they face. Therefore, the findings 
from the industry analysis in this thesis will be useful to board members, nomination 
committees and shareholders in creating boards that are well suited to perform their 
duties. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to examine the 
association between board diversity and financial performance in the business support 
and public administration, accommodation and food services and mining and 
quarrying industry sectors. Previous studies on board diversity and performance have 
either not explicitly examined these industry sectors in the UK context or they have 
only examined either gender diversity or board independence. More specifically, the 
250 | P a g e  
 
study adds to knowledge and practice by proposing that in industries such as mining, 
that are associated with higher political costs and that have more willingness to 
maintain good corporate governance practices, there is a strong business case for 
diversity in the boardroom. Conversely, this study suggests that in the financial 
services and banking industries, there is no business case for board diversity and the 
findings imply that the case for board diversity in these industries should be based on 
criteria other than financial performance.  
 
 
7.5 Contribution to Practice  
This thesis displays an association between board diversity and financial 
performance both in general and within industries. The findings of this thesis can be 
used by regulators in formulating recommendations that are related to the desirable 
attributes of boards and in advancing the discussion on diversity in the boardroom. 
This may help in improving public initiatives and policy on board diversity in the UK 
and within the European context. Board members and shareholders may also benefit 
from this study’s findings in creating boards that are more diligent and effective in 
their functions and multiple roles. Some of the practical recommendations that current 
directors, nomination committees and shareholders can consider are as follows. 
Overall this study’s findings present a strong business case for increasing gender 
diversity on boards and weakens the argument that a critical mass has to be reached in 
order for gender diversity to have an impact on performance (Konrad et al., 2008). In 
this study, for instance, the mining industry had an average of 6% of women on the 
board but still displayed a positive impact on firm performance. This study also 
provides very little evidence of the idea that directors with multiple directorships are 
less committed and less effective in their roles. Rather, this study overall displays 
evidence of a positive association between multiple directorships and financial 
performance. Lastly, nomination committees may also consider appointing directors 
with a mix of professional experience and functional backgrounds as this study shows 
that there is a business case for experience diversity in the boardroom.  
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7.6 Limitations of Study  
Although this study makes several contributions to knowledge, literature and 
practice, there are also some limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the 
study’s sample was limited to UK listed companies and the sampling procedure was 
not straight forward, as some companies were not consistently listed in the sample 
period over the years. As a result the sample screening method used, limited the total 
number of firms in the sample to 198 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
between the years 2004 and 2014.  However, the size of this study’s sample is 
comparable with other studies that have examined corporate governance and board 
diversity (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Marinova et al., 2016). 
Second, this study utilises a self-constructed board index to examine the board 
practices and structures of the sample and to proxy structural diversity in the study.  
However, the constructed index may potentially have some reliability and validity 
issues. The process of selecting governance provisions in self-constructed indices may 
be tainted with subjectivity, therefore Bozec et al. (2010) propose that testing the 
validity of the index can help to signal the reliability and robustness of the index.  In 
this regard, the Cronbach’s Alpha tests results presented in Chapter 4 revealed that the 
items in the index constructed had an acceptable internal consistency suggesting that 
the board index is reliable.  
 
Third, although OLS, 2SLS and GLS regressions were applied in this research 
other regression methods such as 3SLS and GMM estimation could have been used. 
Lastly, another limitation of this study is that it did not take into account the ethnic 
diversity of directors as a measure of board diversity as suggested by the extant 
literature and the theoretical framework adopted. This was mainly due to data 
availability, as many companies particularly in the first half of the sample period did 
not disclose this information. This is a variable that future research could explore 
further using the techniques and conceptual framework employed in this study. The 
limitations discussed should be taken into account when interpreting this study’s 
results and the findings should not be generalised to all firms, as the sample is 
restricted to listed companies. Finally, although this thesis focused on the business 
case for board diversity, the ethical case based on equity and fairness is not ruled out, 
rather the two work hand in hand in advancing the diversity agenda. The notion of 
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equal opportunities is aligned with calls for firms to be more socially responsible, 
however this was beyond the scope of this research.   
 
7.7 Areas for Future Research  
This thesis has identified several avenues that can be pursued by future research 
on board diversity and these will be discussed in turn. First, the results from this study, 
overall, show a strong business case for gender diversity, however the progress in this 
area has still been relatively slow. Therefore, future research can explore the causes of 
this slow advancement of women on boards and potentially examine the barriers that 
exist to female leadership both within the UK and globally. In line with this, the 
correlation matrix in Appendix F displayed that the highest education band variable 
was positively correlated with gender diversity. Smith et al. (2006) found that the 
presence of senior female executives on the board had a larger effect on performance 
when the females were highly educated. In addition, Kakabadse et al. (2015) 
conducted a qualitative study on the perspectives of women in the boardroom and cited 
one of the participants contending that in comparison to male directors, female 
directors must have higher educational qualifications to be part of the board and to be 
effective. “…Whether explicitly or implicitly stated, the necessary resources that a 
woman needs to have in order to penetrate the boardroom are commitment, an 
effective network, and sound education...” (Kakabadse, et al., 2015, p. 271). Therefore, 
future research can look into whether level of education is one of the barriers to the 
progression of female leadership, or if it is a prerequisite for females to gain top 
positions on boards. This line of inquiry can also be extended by future researchers 
through examining the differences between executive and non-executive female 
director roles and any differences in the barriers faced.   
 
With regards to public policy initiatives, researchers could further explore 
whether mandatory gender quotas are more effective than the softer comply or explain 
approach in regards to gender diversity. As noted in Chapter 5, the progress of 
increasing the number of women on boards has been greater in European countries 
with gender quotas than those without mandatory quotas. From an industry 
perspective, the industry findings revealed that there was no business case for gender 
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diversity in the banking and financial services industries. Hillman (2015) suggests that 
the major reason why financial markets may not value gender diversity resulting in 
negative financial performance is that investors’ may perceive that female directors 
may harm the future prospects of the company. Hillman (2015) further states that the 
finance and investment profession has been historically dominated by men who may 
be biased against greater gender diversity. This line of thinking has not been 
adequately substantiated in the literature and is an opportune avenue for future 
research.  
 
With regards to age diversity, the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 5 
showed that the mean value of age diversity did not represent high or low levels of 
diversity. Therefore, the results did not indicate whether older or younger directors 
would be preferable to improve the financial performance of the company. As no 
association was found between age diversity and financial performance overall, an 
area that could be explored further is whether the market values the experience of older 
directors or the dynamics and potential creativity of younger directors. In other words, 
if there is no business case for age diversity, research could look into whether older or 
younger directors are preferable on boards. From the industry analysis, future research 
could also investigate whether age diversity on boards has a curvilinear relationship 
with financial performance to gain more insights into the nature of this relationship, 
particularly in the retail sales industry sector. Lastly, future research could also 
investigate a larger sample size of the mining industry as there was a stronger case for 
business diversity in this industry compared to the other industries. Little research has 
been conducted on this industry in corporate governance, therefore there is potential 
for more insights to be unravelled. Overall, there is still more work and research to be 
done in advancing the board diversity agenda through identifying attributes that create 
successful and effective boards. This is summed up well by the Board Agenda (2018) 
as follows:  
“…an effective board is only as good as the parts and processes that go into it, but it 
also takes strong leadership to pull together the different elements in a cohesive and 
insightful way in order to become truly effective...” (Board Agenda, 2018). 
 
254 | P a g e  
 
7.8 Summary of Chapter  
The main aim of this chapter has been to conclude the thesis by providing a 
summary of the key literature, key findings and the contribution to knowledge for each 
of the study’s three research questions. In addition, the study’s contribution to practice 
and areas upon which future research may focus upon have been discussed. The study 
found that gender diversity, experience diversity and multiple directorships have a 
positive association with financial performance. However, the findings from the 
industry analysis revealed that the association between board diversity measures and 
financial performance differs between industries. This highlights the importance of 
considering contextual factors when examining the link between board diversity and 
financial performance in firms. This study also concludes that there is a need to utilise 
theoretical paradigms that combine multiple theories when assessing the link between 
board diversity and financial performance, such as an integration of agency, resource 
dependence and upper echelons theories.
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